

2

# STUDY PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

DECEPTION AND THE MEDITERRANEAN CAMPAIGNS OF 1943-1944

BY

JOSEPH EDWARD BROWNE

AD-A168 052

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:  
Approved for public release;  
distribution is unlimited.

31 MARCH 1986

DTIC  
ELECTE  
MAY 28 1986  
S D

FILE COPY



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

86 5 27 164

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. <b>AD A168051</b>	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Deception and the Mediterranean Campaigns of 1943-1944		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED STUDENT PAPER
7. AUTHOR(s) Joseph E. Browne		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17103-5050		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS SAME		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE 31 March 1986
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 271
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)  DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Deception, Intelligence, Ultra, Double Agent, Campaign, Operational Level Warfare, Stratagem, Ruse, "A" Force, London Controlling Section, Radio Deception, Indirect Approach		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The thesis is that the American military tends to disregard deception as a tool of war although it is a proven force multiplier and has helped to win many battles. Deception provides the means to "get into the enemy's decision cycle" by forcing the adversary to take actions prejudicial to his operational timetable. This paper examines the contribution of deception to military operations at the operational level of war by focusing on deception in support of the campaigns in the Mediterranean during 1943 and 1944: the amphibious (continued)		

DD FORM 1473  
1 JAN 73

EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

86 5 27 164

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

BLOCK 20 (continued).

landings in Sicily, Salerno, Anzio and southern France, and the breakouts from the "Gustav" and "Gothic" lines in Italy. The research demonstrates the link between operational level warfare, operational maneuver, surprise and deception. The author presents several theories about the conduct of deception in the Mediterranean during World War II and its relevance to planning in support of contemporary military operations.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

DECEPTION AND THE MEDITERRANEAN CAMPAIGNS OF 1943-1944

A MILITARY STUDY PROJECT

by

Joseph Edward Browne

Professor Michael Handel  
Project Adviser

US Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013  
31 March 1986

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:  
Approved for public release;  
distribution is unlimited.



## ABSTRACT

**AUTHOR:** Joseph Edward Browne, NSA

**TITLE:** Deception and the Mediterranean Campaigns of 1943-1944

**FORMAT:** Military Study Project

**DATE:** 31 March 1986 **PAGES:** 266

**CLASSIFICATION:** Unclassified

The thesis is that the American military tends to disregard deception as a tool of war although it is a proven force multiplier and has helped to win many battles. Deception provides the means to 'get into the enemy's decision cycle' by forcing the adversary to take actions prejudicial to his operational timetable. This paper examines the contribution of deception to military operations at the operational level of war by focusing on deception in support of the campaigns in the Mediterranean during 1943 and 1944: the amphibious landings in Sicily, Salerno, Anzio and southern France, and the breakouts from the 'Gustav' and 'Gothic' lines in Italy. The research demonstrates the link between operational level warfare, operational maneuver, surprise and deception. The author presents several theories about the conduct of deception in the Mediterranean during World War II and its relevance to planning in support of contemporary military operations.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This military study project was produced under the sponsorship of the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The scope and general methodology were outlined by Professor Michael Handel without whose support this study would have never been possible. Professor Handel's encouragement and inspiration were invaluable to me during the writing of the manuscript and, regardless of the final product, the opportunity to work with the Professor and explore the world of deception was professionally rewarding for me.

I would also like to thank David Mure for having given me so much of his time and experience, Dr. Charles Cruickshank for pointing me in the right direction, Professor Michael Howard for his gracious assistance, Patrick Beesly for our discussions about the past and future of intelligence, Professor Ralph Bennett for his outstanding patience and explanation about ULTRA, and, of course, Professor R.V. Jones for his insights into his world of scientific deception during World War II. I would also like to thank Lord Leigh and his family at Stoneleigh for their hospitality, especially his wife, Lea, and one unnamed person for the benefit of his experiences with "A" Force and Ops "B". One last 'thank you' goes to Sally Mure for the her courteous welcome to London.

The computer staff at the War College also deserves special recognition for their assistance and patience, especially Mrs. Mary Miller and Mr. Greg Lightner. My son, Paul, helped tremendously in the translation of German language documents.

The findings and opinions expressed in this manuscript are entirely my own and should not in any way be associated with the Department of Defense, the War College, or the US Army Military History Institute at Carlisle.

Joseph Edward Browne  
Carlisle, Pa.  
31 March 1986

iii



For		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CRA&I		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
TAB		<input type="checkbox"/>
iced		<input type="checkbox"/>
tion		
By		
Distribution /		
Availability Codes		
Dist	Avail and/or Special	
A-1		

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT . . . . .	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . .	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . .	iv
LIST OF TABLES . . . . .	v
CHAPTER I      Deception and the Campaign: Operational Level Warfare . . . . .	1
CHAPTER II      Operational Maneuver, Indirect Approach and Deception . . . . .	16
CHAPTER III     Organization of Deception in the Mediterranean, 1943 . . . . .	31
CHAPTER IV      Deception in Support of HUSKY: The Background and Success . . . . .	55
CHAPTER V      The Deception Plans for Operation HUSKY . . . . .	87
CHAPTER VI      The Sicilian Gambit . . . . .	128
CHAPTER VII     Reorganization and Deception Post-HUSKY Part I: The Italian Campaign . . . . .	137
CHAPTER VIII    Reorganization and Deception Part II: Support to Normandy and the Landing in Southern France . . . . .	170
CHAPTER IX      Lessons and Conclusions: The Art of Deception . . . . .	207
CHAPTER X      More Theory and Some Final Thoughts . . . . .	235
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	243
GLOSSARY . . . . .	247
TABLES . . . . .	254
CHARTS . . . . .	262

# LIST OF TABLES AND CHARTS

TABLE ONE	Chronological Sequence of Mediterranean Operational and Deception Plans . . . . .	254
TABLE TWO	Genuine Order of Battle for HUSKY . . . . .	255
TABLE THREE	Bogus Order of Battle for Eastern Mediterranean - Plan BARCLAY. . . . .	257
TABLE FOUR	Bogus Order of Battle for Western Mediterranean - Plan BARCLAY. . . . .	259
CHART ONE	Deception Organizations in the Mediterranean - 1943 . . . . .	262
CHART TWO	Allied Organization for Invasion of Sicily.	263
CHART THREE	Proposal for Deception in the Mediterranean Late 1943/Early 1944 . . . . .	264
CHART FOUR	Deception Organizations in the Mediterranean Mid-1944 . . . . .	265
CHART FIVE	Deception Organizations in the Mediterranean October 1944 . . . . .	266

## CHAPTER I

### Deception and the Campaign: Operational Level Warfare

"Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible." Stonewall Jackson

"All warfare is based on deception." Sun Tzu

The intention of this study is to tell the story of deception and deduce some theories regarding its use by the Allies in the Mediterranean during World War II in the years 1943 and 1944. It is done to counter in some small way the notion in the American military establishment that deception at the higher levels of warfare may not be worth the trouble and inconvenience, and to change or influence the tendency for modern American generals to regard raw military power as the sole means of success on the battlefield. World War II and the Mediterranean are the focus not only because they demonstrate clearly the value of deception in support of modern major military operations and campaigns, but also because most of the information on how the Allies planned and executed these deceptions has now been declassified and is available for research at the National Archives in Washington and the Public Record Office in London.

The subject of deception has received scant attention over the years when compared with the amount of literature concerned with other subjects of war, although the author has noted the recent recognition by the U.S. Army that deception may be important to campaign planning and military operations. This recognition is caveated by the lack of good theory on how to proceed and the prevalent suspicion by the Army hierarchy, especially recently retired Generals who greatly influence current Army doctrine and education, about the value of deception to large scale operations. Hopefully, our generals will recognize that deception in support of the higher levels of military operations has a much larger payoff than deception at the lower tactical levels, and that understanding the principles or theory of deception may be more important than an impressive technical deception device.

The basic structure of this study was designed to stress the importance of deception to campaigning in general and its relevance to operational maneuver and surprise, which is the key to successful large scale military operations. The Mediterranean campaigns of 1943 include the landings on Sicily and at Salerno in 1943, the amphibious operations conducted at Anzio and in southern France in 1944, and the breaking of the 'Gustav' and 'Gothic' lines by the Allies on the Italian mainland in 1944. These cases of deception were part of the tremendous learning process by the Allies during the war which resulted eventually in the great deception scheme associated with the landings at Normandy in 1944 and which achieved such outstanding success.

The success achieved on 6 June 1944, in which the Germans were deceived into thinking the Allies were going to land at the Pas de Calais and that the landing at Normandy was only a diversion even several weeks after the landing, was not a sudden stroke of inspiration or an isolated scheme. To demonstrate adequately the part deception played in World War II and to enlarge the framework for the development of theory, several Mediterranean operations of 1943 and 1944 which preceded Normandy as well as the deception played in the Mediterranean theater in support of the landings in northwest Europe, were selected for intense scrutiny as continuing, repeating phenomena.

One may indeed question the value of examining historical cases of deception in view of conventional wisdom which stresses the violence and rapidity of the modern battlefield in addition to the availability of modern reconnaissance to detect true enemy dispositions during war. In a biography of British General Allenby by his fellow countryman Field Marshal Wavell, both significant figures in the field of deception, Wavell gives good reason for studying past deception operations in his description of Allenby: "His skill in planning and in deceiving the enemy was not the result of sudden flashes of inspiration but of much<sup>1</sup> reading and study of past campaigns and of present conditions." As will be shown in the succeeding chapters, deception practiced during the Second World War violated a claim made between the wars that deception as practiced during World War I would not be possible because of the advancement of modern techniques of war. An interesting article on the value of deception in war written in the 1930's contains these two paragraphs:

At first thought it appears that the increasing efficiency of aerial observation, the effectiveness of modern methods of communication and the speed and range of ground reconnaissance agencies have combined to bring to an end the era in which tactical and strategical surprise were possible. A little thought will disclose the fallacy of this assumption. In fact the skillful commander will employ these very means to deceive his adversary.

Tomorrow, just as he did yesterday, the commander will operate in a "fog of war" through which he will constantly strive to see. By every available agency he will gather information in an effort to discover the intentions of his opponent. Bit by bit a picture will be disclosed to him, a picture that will always be distorted. This is principally because the human error inevitably creeps in. Even the reports of eyewitnesses vary between wide limits and things seen are not what they appear to be. If the opponent can further distort the inaccuracies of this picture and at the same time conceal the fraud, he will have cleared the way for complete surprise. Thereafter his success will be measured largely by the speed and the power which he presses this advantage.<sup>2</sup>

The author's advice apparently fell on deaf ears: at the beginning of the next war in which America fought, deception activities had to be learned all over again, principally from the British, as once again Americans forgot the lessons of the past. It is perhaps axiomatic that America, as history relates, will not be prepared for her next war; this could be disastrous in an era of Soviet and U.S. parity and apparent numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact over NATO. The study of deception operations during the Mediterranean campaigns of 1943 and 1944 is offered in order to demonstrate its significance to the operational level of warfare. This should convince strategists of the need to consider deception so that the numerical superiority is off-set by guile and cunning, and the tradition of Stonewall Jackson, who consistently used deception during the Civil War to defeat



numerically superior Union forces, will reappear.

Today, American Army doctrine describes three levels of war in the Clausewitzian tradition: strategic, operational and tactical. The operational level of war is described thus:

The operational level of war uses military resources to attain strategic goals within a theater of war. Most simply, it is the theory of larger unit operations. It also involves planning and conducting campaigns. Campaigns are sustained operations designed to defeat an enemy force in a specified space and time with simultaneous and sequential battles. The disposition of forces, selection of objectives, and actions taken to weaken or to outmaneuver the enemy all set the terms of the next battle and exploit tactical gains. They are all part of the operational level of war...3

While it is not explicit in this definition, the operational level of war is the essence of the art of war. The written guidance for the operational level of war is the campaign plan which provides the ends and its connection to the means; in World War II, the deception plan was an integral part of the campaign plan. The existence of written plans should not be construed to mean deception can not be 'ad hoc' at this level of war, however, this study demonstrates that deception at the operational level of war requires forethought and planning prior to the commencement of the campaign. Deception created during the progress of the battle is tactical deception or deception in contact with the enemy. Mastering the principles of deception will prepare the commander to use 'ad hoc' deception in the face of battle but this study is not concerned with spontaneous deception -- it is about conditioning and preparing the enemy before the battles begin. The central theme at the operational

level of war is an intellectual contest between opposing commanders; at this level the commander must be flexible and he must master operational maneuver which is the essence of operational art in order to prevail.

Deception in support of the invasion of Sicily by the allies in 1943 was chosen as an initial focus since not a great deal has been written about the main deception scheme Plan BARCLAY. Its study is also important since the deception planned and executed for that operation was the forerunner to the deception planned for the invasion of Europe in 1944, and its potential to educate us in the basic elements and ingredients for deception on this scale and level of warfare is significant. Deception can be the means for commanders to get into the enemy's decision cycle by inducing the enemy to make wrong choices, and since we have records, however incomplete, of Hitler's daily conferences, we have a unique window into the affect of the deception on Hitler who was affecting the outcome of the operational level campaigns as he moved divisions between Europe and the Mediterranean and the Balkans.

In the invasion of Sicily by the Allies in 1943, an example of operational level warfare, two allied armies, the 7th (US) under Patton and the 8th (British) under Montgomery, commanded by British General Alexander as the 15th Army Group, invaded the island on 10 July 1943. The operation was a total success: the island fell into Allied hands in 38 days. The decision to invade Sicily had been taken at the Casablanca conference in January 1943 and deception planning in earnest began at least that early by elements attached to the British Chiefs of Staff and, more

significantly, by "A" Force under General Wavell, CINC Middle East in Cairo, and at Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers.

The operational level of war governs the way the military designs operations to meet strategic ends and the way it actually conducts campaigns. The Sicilian operation is a classic example of the operational art: the strategic objective was to make safe the sea lines of communication through the Mediterranean to the oil fields in the Middle East. Edward Luttwak provides some lucid thoughts on the subject:

In theater strategy, political goals and constraints on one hand and available resources on the other, determine projected outcomes. At a much lower level, tactics deal with specific techniques. In the operational dimension by contrast, schemes of warfare such as blitzkrieg or defense in depth evolve or are exploited. Such schemes seek to attain the goals set by theater strategy through multiple combination of tactics.<sup>4</sup>

Luttwak further states that the two essential principles of the operational level of war are avoidance and deception. The main strength of the enemy is avoided as much as possible and deception is of central importance at every level. This, according to Luttwak, elevates the deception plan to full equality with the battle plan.<sup>5</sup> It is clear from the study of deception in support of the invasion of Sicily in 1943 and the other deception operations in the Mediterranean that these principles were known by the deception planners and commanders by that time; much more so than at the beginning of the war.

Deception is an art -- it is not 'manufactured' by committee and although World War II shows the grandest attempt to organize

and thoroughly integrate deception routinely into operations, chances are that commanders or a handful of masters of deception may provide the inspiration for future successful deception operations. Nevertheless, the organization, plans and mechanics or means should be studied beforehand so that once the conflict begins there are commanders and staffs who are aware of its value and are prepared to use deception as a tool of war. It is hoped that its importance will be recognized and steps taken now to make it a regular part of military planning and thought: its inclusion in the curriculum at the various war colleges, neither as an adjunct nor an esoteric subject for a small portion of the military, but as a part of regular military education would be a significant step forward. There is no doubt that one of the prerequisites for successful deception is the participation by the commander and his support to those on his staff entrusted with this very important work. Examination of deception operations over a long period of time indicates that, if there ever was a force multiplier, deception is it and that deception applied in war to win campaigns can save time, effort, lives and leads to decisive victory. While it has been encouraging to witness the recent revival in the study of the operational level of war by the American military, it only came after a hiatus of several decades and at the urging of those outside the military establishment for our military to consider issues other than the tactics of small units.

Historically, Americans have not believed in the value of deception with a few very notable exceptions, the most important of whom was General Thomas 'Stonewall' Jackson during the Civil

War. Jackson is so important to the study of the history of deception on the battle field that any work on the subject is deficient without at least mentioning his operations. Stonewall Jackson originated two "maxims of war" which are regularly quoted as the basis for successful deception and maneuver:

Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and overcome him, never give up the pursuit as long as your men have strength to follow, for an Army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic stricken, and can then be destroyed by half their number.

Never fight against heavy odds and, if by an possible nameuvering, you can hurl your own forces on only a part, and that the weakest part, of your enemy and crush it (then do so).<sup>7</sup>

Although Jackson was always heavily outnumbered, he had singular success against superior Union forces throughout his campaigns. Jackson's troops moved almost as often by country roads and farm tracks as by major roads. The longer route was preferred even if time was important. His constant surprises had a great affect on the Union troops morale - officers resigned, men deserted and generally there was chaos when the forces knew they were up against Jackson and his troops. From 29 April through 5 June, he and his men marched 400 miles during the Valley Campaign of 1862, fought three great battles and numerous skirmishes and were victorious in all against superior Union forces.<sup>8</sup> Jackson also believed in the importance of operations security to the operational and deception plan -- he once said, "If I thought my coat knew my plans, I would take it off and burn it."<sup>9</sup>

Even if Americans lost the lesson of Jackson's campaigns,

for the British, Jackson is extremely valuable as the connection between Wellington and Allenby who as great commanders relied on deception to surprise and beat the enemy. The study of Jackson's<sup>10</sup> campaigns by Colonel G.F.R. Henderson in the late 19th century provided the British with the inspiration to continue the art through World War I and to pass its significance in war to General Archibald Wavell who inspired much of the successful allied deception operations in Europe during World War II through "A" Force and his 'instrument' Dudley Clarke.


Colonel Henderson learned to appreciate deception by studying Jackson's campaigns and he had an opportunity to put his learning into practice with his participation in the forming of the feint and deception in the relief of Kimberley during the Boer War. Like most successful plans in war, the deception was simple: a feint at the enemy's right and a quick side step around his left. But elaborate arrangements were made to deceive the<sup>11</sup> enemy and make the outflanking force mobile. Allenby, then a<sup>12</sup> Major, and Second Lieutenant Wavell were present; these two gentlemen were responsible for inspiring much of the great British deception operations in the first half of the 20th century.

During World War I, Allenby fought the Turks in Palestine and the following passage from Wavell's book illustrates some of the originality and creativity of this man. The techniques described here, as the reader will learn, are basically the same as were used in the great deception hoaxes of the Second World War. The scene described was in anticipation of the battle of Megiddo in Palestine in September 1918.

That such a distribution (of men and equipment) was achieved without the enemy becoming aware of it was due to the elaborate measures taken for secrecy and for deception. Allenby's plan was the exact reverse of the Gaza-Beersheba battle of nearly a year before. Then he struck the Turk's left flank, while persuading them that he meant to break through on the coast. Now that he meant to break through on the coast he took every possible step to make them apprehend a blow at their left flank. Elaborate precautions were made as if to transfer G.H.Q. from the camp in the plains to an hotel in Jerusalem, which was cleared and prepared for it, with telephone lines laid, offices marked, and so forth. This was backed by rumors of a great concentration in the Jerusalem area and the marking of billets. New camps were pitched in the Jordan valley and additional bridges thrown across the Jordan. Fifteen thousand dummy horses, made of canvas, filled with horse lines; and sleighs drawn by mules raised clouds of dust at the times when when the canvas horse should have been going to water. Battalions marched ostentatiously down to the valley by day and returned by lorries at night. Wireless traffic was continued from Desert Mounted Corps headquarters near Jericho long after the headquarters and nearly all the troops had been transferred to the other flank. Only the Anzac Division, with a brigade of Indian infantry and some other battalions, was left in the valley ... Farther east Lawrence's agents spread news of the large quantities of forage which would shortly be required by the British in the Amman district. Such were some of the measures taken to give enemy observers and enemy agents the impression that another advance east of Jordan was being prepared.<sup>13</sup>

The deception helped an inferior British force destroy two Turkish Armies and win Palestine. Wavell, in the same mold as Allenby, was also a man with an original mind, who was subtle and daring, quick to devise unorthodox strategems and, above all, patient to await the outcome. As we shall see, Wavell was responsible for first drawing attention in 1940 to a centrally controlled and dexterously orchestrated system of deception. Wavell was Allenby's student and he learned all the tricks:

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR



MAP 1



"feigned locations of command posts, the covert movement of troops, the manufacture of substitutes for real weapons or transport, fake radio traffic and the cozening of enemy agents".<sup>15</sup>

World War II was a particularly busy period for deception operations and, now that quite a bit of information is being declassified, rich with official documentation waiting to be studied. In the official accounts of the Italian campaign, however, the Allies were criticized for developing few tactical innovations. They usually resorted to the

... frontal assault, for despite Alexander's partiality for the wide-sweeping outflanking maneuver, the rugged, sharply compartmented Italian terrain imposed upon operations characteristics reminiscent of World War I -- slow, grinding, costly battles of attrition -- and undoubtedly helped account for Kesselring's success in holding the Allies to a long, slow advance up the peninsula. In the rare instances when the Allies did resort to less conventional tactics, such as several skillfully devised deception plans ..., the results were rewarding. Field Marshal Alexander's reliance on deception, for example, on several occasions drew German reserves far out of position.<sup>16</sup>

While this study is essentially an historical account of the deception operations associated with the Mediterranean campaigns, its primary function is to help master and understand those operations in order that the development of current deception theory may benefit. Without any detailed explanation, the essence of the theory derived from this study follows. It is hoped that the reader uses this brief list to check the development of the concepts throughout the accounts. The theories are developed fully through chapter VIII and discussed in detail in chapters IX and X. The theory synthesized below is

from the several cases examined; hopefully, it will help increase current discussions on the subject.

1. Deception begins with a perception of weakness and stops with a recognition of strength.

2. Deception strengthens the preconceptions and fears of the enemy.

3. For operational level warfare, deception is critical to the attack as much as intelligence is critical to the defense.

4. Any information channel between two opponents can be used for deception.

5. Americans do not deceive possibly because they feel superior to any potential enemy.

6. Deception requires support and inspiration from the highest levels of civilian and military leadership.

7. Deception never fails, although it may not always entirely succeed.

8. Deception should be organized and structured to parallel the military organizations which it supports rather than depending on the initiative of the commander.

9. Deception at the operational level of war should not be improvised.

10. The operational level of war requires a continuing deception of strength combined with notional threats of assault.

11. If a deception can not be continued, it must be terminated or covered-up in a way which does not arouse the suspicion of the enemy so that the notional threat can be reintroduced.

12. Deception works best when the opponent is conditioned by alternately raising and lowering his threat level.

13. It is natural for an intelligence organization to exaggerate enemy capabilities when there is a lack of information.

## CHAPTER I

1. Sir Archibald Wavell, Allenby. A Study in Greatness, p. 295.
2. Major Francis G. Bonham, "Deception in War", Infantry Journal XLI, (July-August 1934): 272-276.
3. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations, 20 August 1982, p. 2-3. In the same manual, deception is described alternately:
  - a. in a section discussing fighting in the desert and winter zones, as mandatory for success (pp. 3-11/3-12);
  - b. as part of tactical counterintelligence (p. 6-9);
  - c. as the responsibility of the G3 or S3 in electronic warfare (p. 7-19);
  - d. as including the definitions for demonstrations and ruses (p. 7-22);
  - e. as part of defense preparations (concealment) (p. 11-12);
  - f. as part of defensive preparations before a breakout (p. 13-4).
4. Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War", International Security, (Winter 1980/81), pp. 61-79.
5. Ibid.
6. Barton Whalley, Strategems: Deception and Surprise in War. The principal findings of Whalley's study of deception from 1914 through 1968 were:
  - a. only a small repertoire of strategems is needed to

insure surprise after surprise;

- b. strategem is cheap;
- c. strategem is a sound investment -- it saves casualties;
- d. there is an excellent correlation between surprise and deception.

7. Colonel G.F.R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War Vol I, p. 420.

8. Ibid., p. 425.

9. Ibid., p. 441.

10. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War Volumes I and II.

11. Wavell, p. 80.

12. Whalley, p. 26.

13. Wavell, pp. 269-270.

14. See Ronald Lewin, The Chief: Field Marshall Lord Wavell, Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy, 1939-1947, for more insights.

15. Ibid., p. 53.

16. Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Cassino to the Alps, p. 542.

## CHAPTER II

### Operational Maneuver, Indirect Approach and Deception

"In operational maneuver, commanders try to secure favorable terms of battle by obtaining advantages of position or strength. To do so, they shift directions of movements, change dispositions, probe and feint, throw obstacles in the enemy's path, and, at the best opportunity, mass and commit their forces to battle. In open warfare, this may entail movement of the entire force. In static situations, it involves deception, detailed preparations and rapidly concentrating forces just before battle."<sup>1</sup>

Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign and the landing in Sicily by the Allies are classic examples of successful maneuver - there are many more examples available - which required the support of deception operations and operations security. The notion behind maneuver is the positioning of forces in an area where the enemy is weakest and then striking a blow against those forces or seizing some key objective before the enemy has time to react. This is the principle of mass which governs employment of the major force at the decisive point and the principle of economy of force which governs employment of the lesser force in the area which will not be assaulted. The enemy must not know where forces are being concentrated or where the line is thinnest; in fact, he must be made to think either that the forces are evenly distributed or that the expected blow will come from an area where he has been led to believe a concentration of force

has been created. The operational level campaign is designed to ensure the engagements will be fought where and when an overwhelming force meets a smaller and weaker enemy; the battle, therefore, should be a foregone conclusion if the operational level commander and planner have done their jobs. In order to ensure preponderance of force at the decisive point, the successful commander induces the opposition to place its reserves in the wrong area of the theater or to commit them at the wrong time. The key to successful operational warfare is speed, surprise and the creation of multiple paths to the objective. Surprise and multiple paths are created through deception; there can be no operational maneuver without some form of deception.

At the operational level of war, the commander often makes use of the indirect approach to achieve that which he could not through a direct frontal assault. According to Basil Liddel Hart, the British historian and military strategist, the history of strategy is a record of the application and evolution of the indirect approach.<sup>2</sup> In his survey of 280 campaigns from antiquity to 1914, in only six campaigns did a decisive result follow from a direct approach to the main army of the enemy. Victory was usually guaranteed when an indirect strategy was employed and this applies to both defensive and offensive operations. "As in war, the aim is to weaken resistance before attempting to overcome it; and the effect is best attained by drawing the other party out of his defenses."<sup>3</sup> General Sherman in the U.S. Civil War described this method of maneuver as "putting the enemy on the horns of a dilemma", i.e., the enemy is

faced with several alternatives, of which only one can be correct. Deception makes the enemy choose the wrong one or causes so much noise he can not identify the signal.

Jackson's Valley Campaign, Sherman's Campaign in Georgia and Grant's operations south of Vicksburg during the Civil War all illustrate the advantages to be gained by keeping the enemy off balance by threatening several actions at once <sup>4</sup> so that the enemy has either to split his forces or he defends at the wrong place and at the wrong time.

British planning during World War II was obviously very aware of this approach to warfare since the British Army had learned the folly of direct frontal assault during the First World War and all the casualties it produced. Churchill especially was keen not to repeat the dreadful carnage of Gallipoli and the nation would never be able to accept the casualties of the Somme again. Britain's strategy during the Second World War was to avoid the enemy strength as long as possible or until Germany was so weakened that an attack had an overwhelming chance for success, and to use deception to disperse enemy forces so that the Allied force was always certain or nearly certain of victory. In contrast, American strategy was always intended to go directly at the enemy regardless of the possible consequences since Americans in the long run would be able to out produce the Axis. Unfortunately, this bravado in the face of disaster has cost too many lives during the wars America has fought. Consider, for example, the attitude of American Admiral Edwards during the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II when faced with tremendous losses to shipping through German U-

boat attacks off the east coast, rejected British advice on how to avoid losses, and explained America would learn her own lessons and had plenty of boats with which to do so.<sup>5</sup>

According to Charles Cruickshank, who wrote extensively about deception in World War II, deception "... is the art of misleading the enemy into doing something, or not doing something, so that his strategic or tactical position will be weakened".<sup>6</sup> Put even more simply, "... Deception is the deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a competitive advantage".<sup>7</sup> Whatever definition we use, it is true that deception has been known and used for thousands of years: a deserter persuaded the Trojans to bring the wooden horse inside the walls of Troy, a fake retreat of Norman horsemen was the decisive event in the battle of Hastings, and so on. In the twentieth century, the art of deception is employed extensively in politics, strategic negotiations, public manipulation and during battle.

In war, deception and surprise are nearly synonymous. In his monumental study on deception, Barton Whalley offers, "If surprise is indeed the most important key to victory, then strategem is the key to surprise".<sup>8</sup> Using deception, surprise is nearly guaranteed. In 93 cases of major military operations from 1914 to 1973 covering all the large-scale wars of the major powers, deception was employed in 76 of those cases and of the remaining 17 cases, deception was probably used in six.<sup>9</sup> In 67 cases of surprise since World War I, deception was the key in 49. Although the Germans were certainly surprised regarding Sicily,



they too believed in the correlation of surprise and deception, even in defense, as German General Lothar Redulic wrote after the war: "The most effective among the few means at the command of the defender to surprise the attacker is deception - as to the front line of the projected resistance."<sup>10</sup>

Surprise does not guarantee success, however, since the attacker is often so surprised at his surprise, he does not take advantage and the opportunity is lost.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, even Clausewitz is skeptical about the ability to achieve surprise other than at the tactical level:

Basically, surprise is a tactical device, simply because in tactics, time and space are limited in scale. Therefore in strategy, surprise becomes more feasible the closer it occurs to the tactical realm, and more difficult, the more it approaches the higher levels of policy .... While the wish to achieve surprise is common and, indeed, indispensable, and while it is true that it will never be completely ineffective, it is equally true that by its very nature surprise can rarely be outstandingly successful. It would be a mistake, therefore, to regard surprise as a key element of success in war. The principle is highly attractive in theory, but in practice it is often held up by the friction of the whole machine....<sup>12</sup>

Fortunately for our study, Clausewitz is outdated with respect to surprise: during his time, he did not have the benefit of rail to move troops quickly, nor had he use of aircraft to quickly attack across significant terrain. Clausewitz, in this part of "On War", is discussing strategic surprise gained from one country initiating a war against another country; Pearl Harbor and Operation BARBAROSSA occurred after his time. The essential point of Clausewitz is, however, correct -- surprise is more difficult to achieve at the higher levels of war (but not impossible).

As we shall see, the deception planned and executed in support of Mediterranean operations in 1943 and 1944 insured that the Germans were not deployed to meet the Allied forces engaged for the campaign or that they were caught off-guard and surprised by the timing and place of the enemy's attack. One could make the case that the degree of maldployment portends whether the deception is tactical, operational or strategic. Certainly, as will be demonstrated in the next several chapters, the artful use of deception is capable of moving whole Armies and divisions across hundreds, thousands of miles. The point of the Sicilian deception was to persuade the Germans that the battle was to be fought in a quite different region of the Mediterranean, i.e., to make the Germans look in the wrong direction<sup>13</sup> and deploy their reserves so that resistance on Sicily would be minimal.

Although deception is truly an art, there were moves to codify and institutionalize the planning and execution of deception as it became increasingly successful during World War II. As noted, deception in support of major military operations against the Axis began with the formation of a very small group of people working out of Cairo for CINC Middle East, General Wavell, in 1940. By 1944, no major operation was undertaken without an attempt to deceive the enemy. In fact, even minor operations were given a deception plan. So much was deception a part of operational planning, the Allies were fearful of German appreciation of the means employed in the deception operations and were careful not to repeat some of the tricks which were possibly wearing thin by the end of the war.

The strategic direction of the war was controlled and directed by the Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington as was strategic deception. Global deception policy, that is, strategic deception, was created and coordinated in the two capitols to provide guidance to the various theater commanders for the conduct and coordination of deception during the war. Policy was executed by the CINCs to entice the enemy to make faulty dispositions or to waste his effort and thereby support the theater campaign plan. Deception plans were formulated and coordinated by the Army Group and Army commanders as cover for<sup>14</sup> real operations. In order to examine deception in support of operational level war in the Miediterranean, it will be necessary in this study to examine the strategic deception policy of the Chiefs of Staff, its implementation by the CINCs, and the subordinate actions by the various Army and Corps commanders.

At the top, our Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were interested in delineating lines of responsibility for deception throughout<sup>15</sup> the war. For example, in a JCS directive of 2 February 1944, the two levels for the implementation of cover and deception plans were described as first, being within a theater of operations by the theater commander and, second, outside a theater of operations by the Joint Security Control (JSC), an element of the JCS. While global deception policy was made and coordinated in London and Washington, specific cover plans were developed by the theater commander who became responsible for initiating the necessary action and maintaining a constant check on the progress of deception plans. According to Allied Force<sup>16</sup> Headquarters in 1943, there were three main types of deception

plans operating concurrently and continuously in the Mediterranean theater:

a. operational level deception plans affecting the whole of the Mediterranean including the Middle East;

b. tactical deception plans covering the immediate operations of the Army Groups; and,

c. order of battle deception plans affecting chiefly the strategic reserves situated for the most part in the Middle East.

In addition to these plans, there were a number of special plans which were implemented in the Mediterranean at the request of London concerning such matters as overall strategic policy in Europe, convoy and troop movements, 'secret weapons' and the movements of high ranking military and government officials.<sup>17</sup>

As the terms cover and deception tend to be used interchangeably even today, it would be useful to look closely at the terms through the eyes of the World War II practitioners. In a general sense, cover and deception plans had different objectives. To explain, there were two types of cover plans: type A and type B. Type A plans were formulated to induce the force nominated for an operation to believe its objective was other than the true one. These types of plans assisted security and thus ensured that if there was a leakage of information, that leakage painted a false picture. Those who knew the real plan, were also told the cover plan. This is, in effect, deception of friendly forces. Type B cover plans were 'operational' and were formed to cover a real operation by drawing the enemy's attention to false activities and preparations for an operation on a

different front or sector which were never to materialize. To carry out such a plan, it was necessary for a separate friendly force to undertake various deception activities and movements to simulate a real operation.<sup>18</sup> This is in reality a demonstration and is one of the most difficult things to convince a commander he should order: bombing of cover targets was never totally accepted by the Air Force during World War II.

There were also two general types of deception plans. Type A deception plans were operational plans prepared in pursuance of a general deception policy though they may not have covered any particular real operation. For example, Allied policy during World War II was to contain enemy forces in Greece in order to prevent their use on the Russian front. Type B deception plans were designed to support and implement a general deception policy or a particular cover plan. For example, a deception plan which is intended to mislead the enemy regarding the order of battle and dispositions, radio deception plans, camouflage deception plans, plans regarding the movements of important commanders, plans regarding economic intentions, secret weapons, casualties, etc., are examples of World War II type B deception plans.<sup>19</sup>

Deception can be active (misinforming the enemy) or passive (secrecy and camouflage to hide intentions), offensive or defensive. The following hierarchy is offered as a point of departure to demonstrate some of the means available during World War II to the deception planners:

**\*DIVERSIONS**

+FEINTS - entirely mock attack or simulation.

+DEMONSTRATIONS - actual commitment to fix the enemy and draw his reserves into an irrelevant fray.

+RAIDS - special operation, commando, partisan, etc.

**\*CAMOUFLAGE**

+DISSIMULATIVE - a concealed installation.

+SIMULATIVE - a dummy installation.

\*DISINFORMATION - false information.

+RUMORS

+NEWSPAPERS

+MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS

-COMMUNICATIONS

-IMITATIVE - use of radio to simulate enemy activities in order to confuse him in his own signal plan.

-MANIPULATIVE - either by transmission of misleading materials or by movement of radio stations so as to conceal from the enemy the locations, movements and strength of own forces.

-RADAR - use of equipment to give realistic but false information to enemy radar.

-COUNTER RADIO

-SILENCE - control of periods of radio silence or intensity of communications activity.

-SIMULATIVE - simulation of radio activity.

-TRAFFIC LEVELS - manipulation of traffic.

+PUBLIC RADIO

+DIPLOMACY

+ESPIONAGE - use of double agents to plant information;

20

+FALSE DOCUMENTS

Prior to jumping to a description of deception organizations in chapter III, the reader should have an understanding of the position of Clausewitz on the subject of deception and its contrast with that of Sun Tzu. Although Clausewitz accepted that "... each surprise action is rooted in at least some degree of cunning...", Clausewitz did not regard 'cunning' or deceit as figuring prominently in the history of war.

Analogous things in war -- plans and orders issued for appearances only, false reports designed to confuse the enemy, etc. -- have as a rule so little strategic value that they are used only if a ready-made opportunity presents itself. They should not be considered as a significant independent field of action at the disposal of the commander.

To prepare a sham action with sufficient thoroughness to impress an enemy requires a considerable expenditure of time and effort, and the costs increase with scale of the deception. Normally they call for more than can be spared, and consequently so-called strategic feints rarely have the desired effect. It is dangerous, in fact, to use substantial forces over any length of time merely to create an illusion; there is always the risk of nothing will be gained and that the troops deployed will not be available when they are really needed.<sup>21</sup>

This particular passage by Clausewitz provides a good argument for the American reluctance to use deception, in general, and bombing of cover targets, in particular. Regardless, Clausewitz needs updating in this area as in the case of his view of strategic surprise and intelligence. The use of deception by weaker forces, however, does deserve merit according to Clausewitz:

However, the weaker the forces that are at the disposal of the supreme commander, the more appealing the use of cunning becomes. In a state of weakness and insignificance, when prudence, judgement, and ability no longer suffice,

cunning may well appear the only hope. The bleaker the situation, with everything concentrating on a single desperate attempt, the more readily cunning is joined to daring. Released from all future considerations, and liberated from thoughts of later retribution, boldness and cunning will be free to augment each other to the point of concentrating a faint glimmer of hope into a single beam of light which may yet kindle a flame.<sup>22</sup>

Poetic and predictive words, indeed, as will be apparent when the genesis of deception in World War II, i.e., from a position of weakness, is examined in the following chapters. Compare the Clausewitzian view with Sun Tzu:

All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when acting, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him.<sup>23</sup>



## CHAPTER II

1. Lt. Col. L.D. Holder, "A New Day for Operational Art", Army (March 1985).
2. Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy, p. 18.
3. Ibid.
4. L.D. Holder.
5. See Patrick Beesly, Very Special Intelligence.
6. Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, p. 1.
7. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, "Propositions on Military Deception", in Strategic Military Deception, ed. by Daniel and Herbig, p. 3.
8. Barton Whalley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War, p. 263.
9. Ronald G. Sherwin and Barton Whalley, "Understanding Strategic Deception: An Analysis of 93 Cases", in Strategic Military Deception, ed. by Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, p. 185.
10. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army Military History Institute, Dr. Lothar Rendulic, "The Element of Surprise", MS D-303, 19 July 1947.
11. Michael I. Handel, "Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise", The Journal of Strategic Studies, (September 1984): 229-281.
12. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, pp. 198-199.
13. Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War, p. 278.

14. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, File 4352, Box 7, Cover and Deception Files, Letter from Colonel John Bevan, LCS, to Secretary ISSB, dated 22 February 1943.
15. Ibid., Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 256/2/D, Cover and Deception Plans, CCS 385, section 1, dated 8 April 1943. The issues in 1943 were apparently to coordinate deception activities across theaters and ensure the theater commanders (in this case MacArthur and Nimitz) pay attention to Washington, and more importantly, coordinated their deception operations with each other.
16. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 385, AFHQ Memorandum to Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated 21 November 1943, subject: Cover and Deception Plans November 1942 - November 1943.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, Box 7, Cover and Deception Plans, Memo from Colonel John Bevan to US JCS on Security and Deception, dated 22 February 1943.
19. Ibid.
20. Whalley, p. 219; Carlisle, Pa., US Army Military History Institute, personal papers, BG Arthur Nevins, SOP #6, SHAEF, dated 15 May 1944.
21. Clausewitz, pp. 202-203.
22. Ibid.
23. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. by Samuel B. Griffith,

pp. 66-67.

### CHAPTER III

#### Organization of Allied Deception in the Mediterranean, 1943

"A fact realized by few people is that organized deception was an entirely new development in World War II."

Dennis Wheatley, Member LCS

The story of Allied deception in the World War II is not only the story of the men of "A" Force and British Colonel Dudley Clarke but also the story of the deception planners in the London Controlling Section, at the various theater headquarters, on the Army Group staffs, the special troops tasked with building the dummies and operating the bogus radio links, the double agents and their handlers, and, finally, the gentlemen at Bletchley Park in England who decrypted the messages which originated from German Enigma machines. The story of how these ingredients mixed together is one of the great sagas of World War II, and one which clearly demonstrates the great value of deception to military operations. Deception activities evolved, however, from a very modest beginning in 1940 when Wavell recruited Clarke to command what was eventually to be known as "A" Force, an organization which was to 'mystify and mislead' the enemy in support of the operations of British Middle East Forces. Wavell was a great believer in deception and to him must go most of the credit for

inspiring what was to become a highly organized and focused effort to deceive the Axis about the intentions and plans of the Allies. He charged Clarke with planning and executing deception plans for use on the battlefield<sup>1</sup> in support of British Middle East Forces which were at the time outnumbered by the Italian Army in North Africa. This scenario, that is, a weak force potentially dominated by a stronger force and resorting to guile and cunning to defeat the stronger force, is a recurring theme throughout the history of deception. As the weaker force becomes stronger, it will naturally disregard the deception weapon and use force to overcome the enemy, sometimes at a terrible cost in equipment, time and men.

At the time of his recruitment, Clarke was heading the commando section of the operations directorate for the Chiefs of Staff in London;<sup>2</sup> Clarke, who was with Wavell in Palestine before the war had been the first to lead a reconnaissance party back to the continent after Dunkirk.<sup>3</sup> Clarke's first offensive<sup>4</sup> deception operation for Wavell may have been the plan to deceive the Italians at Sidi Barrani to believe the British had 250,000 men and 400 tanks which eventually enabled British General O'Connor to defeat a greatly superior Italian force<sup>5</sup> in December 1940. In fact, the British MEF had only a force of 50,000 men and 60 tanks. The British desert Army of the early 1940's was compelled by its extremely limited resources to use any weapon as a last resort; deception became a part of every major operation from late 1940 and was instrumental in the British victory at El Alamein in 1942 which turned the tide in North Africa. At El Alamein, "A" Force devised Plan BERTRAM and

# The Mediterranean Basin



505326 (A00849) 1-1-87

MAP 2

several subsidiary plans to conceal the intent of the British to take the offensive and to mislead the Germans about the time and place of the attack.<sup>6</sup> Although the plan was originally written by Clarke, he was in the U.S. at the time with Colonel Bevan of the LCS explaining deception on the scale practiced by the British in North Africa to the Americans. Clarke's deputy, Noel Wild, who was to become head of Eisenhower's deception operation for the Normandy invasion, executed the plan<sup>7</sup> after having to rewrite portions of it to conform with changes in the Allied operational plans.<sup>8</sup> Clarke and his "A" Force also devised plans to support the landings by the Allies on the north Africa coast in November 1942, Operation TORCH. The deception plans in support of TORCH were intended to deceive the Germans regarding the destination of the assault force (SOLO II), to cover the travels of Eisenhower (PENDER I) and British Admiral Cunningham (PENDER II), to convince the Germans that US troops were headed for tropical areas (Plan SWEATER) and, finally, to sell the story of American troops as replacements for the forces in the Middle East (QUICKFIRE)<sup>9</sup> rather than for the invasion of North Africa. By late 1942, the services of "A" Force in the Mediterranean were being called upon more and more to assist the Allied war effort and its influence was now spreading from the Middle East theater centered on Cairo to the Mediterranean theater focused on the Allied forces under Eisenhower. This influence would eventually spread to other theaters and, through transfer of people, would shape the crucial deception played by SHAEF for the landings in northwest Europe in 1944.

Clarke, known also by the alias 'Galveston' when he was working on the intelligence aspect of deception and as 'Croft-Constable' when planning operations,<sup>10</sup> has been called the 'Father of Deception' by Dennis Wheatley, a member of the LCS, and the 'Master of Deception' by David Mure, who controlled the double agents for "A" Force in Beirut. Clarke was an intriguing character who became caught up with the whole idea of deception and the recruitment of double agents to feed the German secret intelligence service the story of the deception plan. He spent much of his time away from the "A" Force Main Headquarters in Cairo coordinating with the "A" Force outstations and meeting with the commanders and operational staffs which "A" Force was to support. There is a hint, in fact, that after Wavell was moved to India in 1941 by Churchill and until Montgomery took over British 8th Army in 1942, Clarke spent too much of his time intriguing in the back waters of the theater and not enough of his time at the headquarters planning for operations in North Africa. This was all reconciled, however, on the appointment of<sup>11</sup> Montgomery who greatly supported and used deception operations in support of his 8th Army in North Africa and Italy and when he commanded 21st Army Group during the invasion of Normandy.

It is important to remind the reader from time to time that the organization described in this chapter evolved during the first several years of the war from nothing. This evolution, as one might expect, caused numerable growing pains in the creation and coordination of deception activities. The organizational descriptions presented in this chapter is relevant through 1943; chapters VII and VIII contain a description of the organizations



from 1943 through 1945. Before further study of "A" Force and Clarke, it is important to outline some of the other organizations which played a role in deception in World War II and how they related to each other.

After the early years, strategic deception policy was increasingly directed and coordinated during World War II by the British and US Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington. Before the advent of a coordinating body and organized deception, the individual commanders were left to their own devices regarding surprise and deception. Plans and their execution were primarily carried out for the Mediterranean and the Middle East by "A" Force which was headquartered at Cairo with subordinate units and stations throughout the Mediterranean area, Africa and the Middle East (see organizational chart one). Its influence on deception methodology spread from north Africa to Europe and the final grand deception operation during the Normandy invasion. As noted in Chapter I, deception in World War II was inspired originally by General Wavell in Cairo and was supported by Churchill and the theater, Army and Army Group commanders in Europe throughout the war despite initial reluctance on the part of the commanders. Churchill's influence is not so easy to divine as he seemed to be more intrigued by technical and scientific deception devices and ideas<sup>12</sup> than by the deception operations played by the Allied and British theater commanders. Churchill believed that there should be an organization along military lines for deception purposes and kept apart from the detailed planning, only approving when necessary.<sup>13</sup> Deception

plans and policy were coordinated at the highest levels by the London Controlling Section in London and the Joint Security Control in Washington for the Chiefs of Staff, although one should not get the idea that these two organizations were comparable -- they were vastly different in their personalities and their work.

Based on the "A" Force success in North Africa in 1940 and 1941, in March 1941 Wavell recommended that a group in London be formed to coordinate deception plans in all theaters whose commands should be thought each have a deception unit.<sup>14</sup> He pressed London for global deception policy and plans, and more active use of deception plans by the operational commanders. This was his vision and the genius of Wavell. Thus the LCS was born in April 1941 as a part of Churchill's Joint Planning Staff at his bunker in central London; the American organization was yet to be formed. Although "A" Force expertise was eventually absorbed by the LCS, the early days for deception in London were rocky indeed. The first chief of the LCS was a Colonel Stanley who was replaced in the summer of 1942 by Lieutenant Colonel Bevan (later Colonel); apparently Stanley could not get coordinated actions among the myriad of intelligence agencies and 'private armies' operating in support of the war effort.<sup>15</sup> Although Bevan would smooth the waters considerably, this theme of discord would prevail throughout the war and was caused by petty jealousies and 'empire building' on the part of the people and organizations involved. The LCS also could not get approval of its plans without first going through the Foreign Office which was natural enough considering that some of the

deceptions would involve planting rumors by embassies in neutral countries. There were serious problems in the beginning in London including impossible directions by the Chiefs of Staff, for example, to use Norway as a cover for the North Africa<sup>16</sup> landings in 1942. Bevan's contribution to deception at this stage in the war was initiation of global policy for the Allies. Problems would remain, however, throughout the war in the coordination and the execution of plans from London.

While the XX (for Double Cross) or Twenty Committee ran double agents to plant bits of misleading information with the<sup>17</sup> Germans, other organizations such as PWE (Political Warfare Executive) for propaganda, rumors, black radio, leaflets, etc.; MI-6 or SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) for intelligence activities such as the decryption of messages sent by radio; SOE (Special Operations Executive) for raiding operations; and, OWI (Office of War Information) all played a role in the execution of plans. The only true deception planning organization in London, the LCS, worked through Churchill's military secretary, General Ismay and the Chiefs of Staff, and this was their main line of influence on British strategic thinking but they had no control over execution of the plans from London and they had to work through committees to orchestrate deception activities by the many organizations which had responsibility for putting over parts of the 'story'. It wasn't until the creation of Ops "B" at SHAEF in December 1943 with the arrival of Noel Wild from Cairo did the machinery begin to work in London regarding support to military operational planning. Ops "B" created specifically for

OVERLORD and the coming battles on the continent received LCS coordinated global deception policy for 1944, Plan BODYGUARD, and directed the planning and execution in preparation for the invasion in June 1944. Ops "B" owed much to "A" Force, including the head of its organization, Colonel Noel Wild, who was Dudley Clarke's deputy in Cairo from the summer of 1942 until late 1943.<sup>18</sup> Wild believed, as any General Staff officer would, in focusing on the object and devising the plan using good staff procedure, i.e., object, discussion of alternatives, selection of course, 'story', treatment and methods to be employed. Thus the deception plan was an integral part of the operational plan and no operation would be considered without a deception operation included.

The XX Committee which directed the double agents was an evolutionary organization and a subsidiary of the 'W Board' set-up in 1940 to decide what should be passed by the double agents. W Board was answerable to the Joint Intelligence Committee and was comprised of the three directors of service intelligence (Director of Military Intelligence, Director of Naval Intelligence and Director of Intelligence for the Air Force), the head of the secret service (SIS or MI-6) and, at times, the head of B Branch (counter espionage) MI-5.<sup>19</sup> The W Board was too high level a body to run the double agents and so a sub-committee, known as the XX or 20 Committee, was set-up in January 1941. This organization was chaired by Sir John Masterman and consisted of representatives of the War Office, the service intelligence organizations, GHQ Home Guard, and the Home Defense Executive.<sup>20</sup> At this juncture in the war, there was yet

no grand strategic design to make use of these agents to support deception plans and military operations.

As mentioned previously, the American organization charged with deception coordination, the Joint Security Control, was part of the US Joint Planning Staff in Washington and answerable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to its responsibilities regarding cover and deception, it also had the responsibility of preventing leakages of information in connection with military operations, coordinating all security measures, and advising the JCS on general wartime security. In practice, the emphasis was on security and the JSC was never as successful as the LCS in London in coordinating deception in other theaters. In a letter from Major General Clayton Bissel, the senior Army member of the JSC, to Colonel Bevan, head of the LCS, Bissel complained on 10 April 1945,<sup>21</sup> "... while we have made some progress with deception in the Pacific, we still have a great deal to learn about it ... ". The JSC was responsible for creating deception policy for the Pacific theaters as a consequence of a division of effort with the British. Bissel went on, "In the Pacific area, ... widely different conditions...the several independent theater commands and the great distances involved ... idiosyncracies of our U.S. services must be taken into consideration ... fluidity of the situation in the Pacific areas and the subordination of that area to the European (problem) ... These problems have materially slowed down the development of overall deception against Japan." These are very telling and significant remarks coming from the senior military intelligence

officer for the U.S. Army during the war. Although deception operations were planned and executed by the individual theaters in the Pacific, there was no coordination across theaters by Washington due mainly to the independence of the senior Army (General MacArthur) and Navy (Admiral Chester Nimitz) commanders and very little adherence apparently to the advice and direction of Washington. This is not unlike the situation before and after the war in which the services were pitted against each other and sometimes in direct defiance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Contrary to some thinking, this is not a strength but a weakness in the American military system. Initiative and ability to act independently on the part of the average soldier, airman and sailor was laudatory but may have been carried to the extreme by senior military commanders during World War II in the Pacific.

Strategic deception policy was prepared by the Joint Staff Planners in both countries, exchanged and approved by the Chiefs of Staff. According to the JCS at the time, cover and deception plans were prepared by the theater commander for those activities which were to be undertaken in connection with a military operation in that theater.<sup>22</sup> The LCS and the JSC were the organizations through which deception planning was coordinated between Great Britain and the United States. While Wavell inspired the creation of a coordinating body in London, it was the British Colonels Bevan and Clarke who travelled to Washington in September 1942 to brief the American Chiefs of Staff on British deception practices.<sup>23</sup> In an attempt to achieve unity of purpose, the two high level coordinating bodies exchanged personnel: US Colonel William H. Baumer (later Major General) was

a member of the LCS and British Lieutenant Colonel H.M. O'Connor was attached to the JSC. It was also the task of the JSC to coordinate and integrate the implementation of cover and deception plans which were to be executed outside a combined US-UK theater of operations. Moreover, JSC was responsible for coordinating the activities of all agencies engaged in the development of devices and equipment, methods and techniques, training of staff officers, priorities and allocation of deception personnel and material to the theaters, and inter-<sup>24</sup> allied affairs concerning deception. Membership of the JSC consisted of Director of Intelligence, War Department General Staff; Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Intelligence; Chief of Naval Intelligence; and, Chief of the Navy Special Section of JSC.<sup>25</sup> The use of a senior US organization responsible for deception was a direct result of the visit of the two British colonels in the autumn of 1942. The resulting organization for deception was a very senior committee of general officers who must have found it difficult, like the British "W" Board, to get deeply involved in the intricacies of deception. In contrast, the British LCS was manned by staff officers and headed by a Colonel but whose sole task was drafting policy, creating strategic diversions of the enemy, and advising the Chiefs of Staff on potential lucrative operations. The LCS was a true deception staff and organization for the British whereas the senior American committee had little staff devoted to it to assist them in these very important operations. The most significant difference between the British and American approach

was that the deception planners worked directly to the Chiefs of Staff in Britain for approval but any deception operations conceived by the American Joint Staff Planners had to go through the JSC before it was provided to the Joint Chiefs.

Probably the most pervasive organization involved in deception during World War II in any theater was "A" Force, which operated throughout the Mediterranean and Middle East from a disreputable house 'in the Kasr-el-Nil' in Cairo.<sup>26</sup> The activities of the 'ladies of the night' were allowed to continue<sup>27</sup> due to the courtesies of Dudley Clarke and, one would think, as a small 'deception' carried out to hide the true nature of Main Headquarters "A" Force. The British Chiefs of Staff had charged "A" Force early in the war with the planning and execution of

... strategic and tactical deception over a wide geographical area covering the Mediterranean, most of Africa, Iraq, and Persia specifically to:

- a. Devise strategic deception plans to mislead the enemy and to advise the Commanders-in-Chief on diversionary operations of all kinds.
- b. Ensure that the enemy's intelligence gains knowledge of these plans in such a manner that he is made to believe they are the real ones.
- c. Devise and execute in the field (usually with the aid of special equipment) tactical deception plans on behalf of Army Group and Army commanders.<sup>28</sup>

As has been pointed out previously, the 'strategic' level in World War II referred to above is comparable to the present day term 'operational level of warfare'; the deception support is rendered to theater forces and their campaigns. Not much is known about the specifics of the "A" Force organization before 1943 and no organizational diagram exists in the public record



before July 1943 but shortly after the landings in Sicily, "A" Force was reported as being commanded by a Colonel Dudley Clarke and having a complement of 41 officers and 76 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men which included the operations of all their outstations in the Mediterranean, Middle East and in other areas. In addition, three units of company strength, trained in the operation of visual deceptive devices, were under the command of "A" Force. The "A" Force organization existed to deceive the Axis in the Mediterranean and Middle East theaters, the main thrust of the war in Europe at the time, and it is incredible that such small numbers of personnel were employed. Present day budgeteers should take note of this. It is also significant that throughout the war, it was blindingly obvious that deception was a very cheap investment and a bonus to the Allies. The "A" Force organization which was created in late 1940 by a handful of officers was structured into six separate headquarters by late 1943 as follows:

Main Hqs - a small mobile controlling Hqs (Clarke himself with a staff of five officers) normally situated in Cairo but which moved regularly throughout the Mediterranean and Middle East to coordinate policy and execution;

Advance Hqs West - located at Algiers and covering Eisenhower's Allied Force Headquarters;


Tactical Hqs West - covering Alexander's 15 Army Group;

Advance Hqs East - operating from Cairo and covering the commands of CINC Middle East, CINC Persia and Iraq, and CINC East Africa;

Tactical Hqs East - available for tactical deployment with any independent commander operating actively in the Middle East theater; and,

Rear Hqs - covering British Army and RAF commands in east and south Africa, and two naval bases at Kilindini and Capetown.  
29

"A" Force was charged by the British Chiefs of Staff with the planning and execution of operational level and tactical deception covering the Mediterranean, most of Africa, Iraq and Persia. By 1943, the organization was inter-service and inter-Allied covering the requirements of all three services and the Allies. For strategic deception purposes, "A" Force was controlled through the War Cabinet, i.e., the LCS, by the Chiefs of Staff in London; although it received its guidance from London it was very much answerable to the commanders in the field for execution of operational and tactical deception. It had to be responsive to the commanders since the deception plan was so intertwined with the thoughts and the plans of the commander. "A" Force was also responsible for intelligence duties associated with British and Allied POWs, i.e., MI-9. The "A" Force sphere of influence for this task was Italy, the Balkans, Turkey, north Africa, Persia and all the Mediterranean islands. The Greek MI-9 organization was also controlled by "A" Force.  
30  
For these escape and evasion responsibilities, control was exercised by the Deputy Director for Military Intelligence (Prisoners of War) at the War Office. The branch in "A" Force for escape and evasion was known as "N" Section; there were two sub-sections, one in  
31  
Algiers and one in Cairo in 1943.



MAP 3

Clarke also coordinated deception activities with the head of Echelon "D", headed by Peter Fleming, the comparable organization in India<sup>32</sup> and, when it was formed in late 1943, Ops "B" at SHAEF, headed by his ex-deputy, Colonel Noel Wild. The Fleming organization in Delhi was created by Wavell on his assumption of the South East Asia Command; Fleming by the way, was the brother of Ian Fleming, the British spy novelist. Regardless of these evolutions in the organizations, "A" Force continued to dominate European theater deception planning and execution until Ops "B" was set up for the invasion of the continent in 1944 and, even then, played a pivotal role, as we shall see, in keeping the German divisions in the Balkans, Italy and southern France away from the Allied invasion force in northwest Europe.

"A" Force not only planned and executed deception in support of operational level warfare but also was responsible for the implementation of tactical deception, i.e., deception when in contact with the enemy, in its area of responsibility through its units located with 15 Army Group and its ready-to-deploy units in support of other forces;<sup>33</sup> these deceptions will be discussed in greater detail in chapters VII and VIII. "A" Force was responsible for all deception executed in the areas for which it was responsible regardless of which organization planned the activity. Deception was normally carried out through intelligence methods, i.e., double agents, and visual arrangements, e.g., dummies. Double agents were worked by Advance Hqs West (Algiers) in Gibraltar, Oran, and Tunis to

Abwehrstelle probably in Lisbon and Madrid; Advance Hqs East (Cairo) worked double agents in Beirut, Cyprus, Smyrna, Teheran and Baghdad to Abwehrstelle in Athens, Sofia and Istanbul. These joint "A" Force and MI-5 stations communicated directly with the Abwehr, the Nazi secret service, via radio and secret inks for onward transmission to Berlin. Also, special correspondents who worked for "A" Force part-time in Tangier, Ankara and Istanbul, planted notional information with the German secret service. Visual deception was carried out in close liaison with camouflage organizations and by the employment of special units operating dummy equipment: 24 Armored Brigade (three units of company strength), 101 RTR (one company), and No. 2 Light Scout Car Company which arrived for duty after HUSKY.<sup>34</sup>

Although there was some hint of conflict from time to time in the historical record regarding the control of the double agents during the war, there appears to have been an amicable arrangement regarding the use of double agents between the intelligence organizations, AFHQ G2 in Algiers and Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) in Cairo, which represented the British counter-intelligence organization MI-5, and "A" Force. Regarding operations under AFHQ control, there was an agreement that all agents, whether used for deception or other purposes, were controlled by G2. G2 nominated for the use of "A" Force agents who were considered suitable for deception purposes and G2 continued to be responsible for their control and maintenance.<sup>35</sup> In the Middle East, the stations were usually manned by a case officer from SIME and a member of "A" Force. These stations were collectively known as the 30 Committee, no doubt a take-off

on the 20 or XX, for Double Cross, Committee in London. In the Mediterranean, station 31 was Beirut, 32 Baghdad, 33 Cyprus and 34 was Teheran.<sup>36</sup> It appeared that "A" Force had much more influence in the working of the double agents than did LCS in London: LCS worked through Bla, the MI-5 branch responsible for controlling the flow of disinformation back to the Germans but also involved were the XX Committee and the other London-based agencies and organizations involved in intelligence and counter-intelligence. Deception operations in the field are by their very nature more streamlined and the staffs were more cooperative with each other than their counterparts at the main headquarters due, in part, to the limited number of personnel in the field and the need to eliminate non-sense and counter-productive activities. The number of people in field organizations has to be properly balanced between the need to meet the requirement and the need to keep the bureaucracy at the absolute minimum to insure efficiency of operations. The British appear to have accomplished that with "A" Force.

Clarke believed strongly that deception organizations should be under the G3 or Operations section in any command. He had to argue that point "fiercely with the Americans when ... (Advance Hqs West) ... came under Eisenhower's command at AFHQ in Algiers". Clarke felt that the deception plan was just as much a function of operations as the real plan -- it was part of the operational plan. Since deception was executed by many units not under the control of intelligence, resulting in the movement of troops and ships, bombing targets, genuine administrative orders,

etc., it followed, according to his thinking, that it should be  
in the operations branch.<sup>37</sup> There is a possibility that this is  
why deception had some difficulty in being a part of US  
operations; the American view was that deception is part of  
intelligence. This was a very contentious point at the time  
and, perhaps, psychologically remains a problem. US deception  
could be more effective if the operations chief thought of it as  
a weapon to use just as artillery or helicopters or tanks and he  
was responsible for it rather than the intelligence chief.

Clarke argued this point in July 1943 when he wrote to  
Brigadier General Strong, Eisenhower's G2, that except for AFHQ  
all of his "A" Force units functioned very well under the  
operations section of the command it supported. He also pointed  
out his forces did not collect information and his units were  
only useful to operations.<sup>38</sup> He apparently won his case - on 3  
August 1943 Advance Hqs West "A" Force at Algiers was instructed  
to operate under the direction of the G3 AFHQ.<sup>39</sup> There were  
other inevitable clashes between the British and the Americans  
concerning deception practices, especially regarding security.  
There were revelations in the American press, usually leaked by  
some official of the Roosevelt administration that such-and-such  
victory was the result of a trick or a deception played on the  
enemy in addition to the superior Allied forces. The Stonewall  
Jackson admonition concerning security in which he would rather  
'burn his coat than reveal his plan' had to be relearned by the  
Americans -- just as security is absolutely essential to the  
operational plan it is also critical to the deception plan and  
that criticality continues beyond the deception operation for the

enemy must never get a hint of deception. Turning off a deception so the enemy does not realize he was deceived is just as important as creating the deception as we shall see in later chapters.

After the landings in Sicily in 1943, the deception organizations had reached an important crossroads -- the apparent success of the major deception operations in the Mediterranean and the Middle East indicated to the Allies that deception must be an important part of the OVERLORD operation contemplated for the spring of 1944. This would be a major contribution to the invasion of the continent in 1944 -- all major commands should have an organization in the operations branch responsible for deception operations and every campaign should have a deception plan. In addition, deception coordination across theaters was essential to ensure that one theater was not working at cross-purposes to another theater and to ensure that the principles and methods are shared among the deception planners at the theater and Army Group level.

What follows here is the background and events surrounding the planning and execution of deception for the landings in Sicily by the Allies on 10 July 1943.



### CHAPTER III

1. Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, p. 19.
2. David Mure, Practice to Deceive, p. 21.
3. Dennis Wheatley, The Deception Planners, p. 19.
4. Interviews with David Mure, London, England, 2-12 February 1986. Mure indicates that Wavell's Chief of Intelligence, Colonel Shearer, deserves most of the credit for the Sidi Baranni deception. Actually when one examines Wavell's history and his experiences in the Boer War, his biography of Allenby, etc., the conclusion reached is that the guiding hand was Wavell himself.
5. Mure, Practice to Deceive, p. 249.
6. Cruickshank, pp. 26-27. This was the battle that 'turned the tide' in North Africa in 1942. Certainly deception and ULTRA deserve much credit for this battle being won by the British.
7. David Mure, Master of Deception: Tangled Webs in London and the Middle East, p. 131.
8. Interviews with Mure. The role of Noel Wild in "A" Force activities and the planning for the deception in aid of the Normandy landings has gone largely unnoticed except by Mure.
9. Cruickshank, p. 37.
10. Mure, Practice to Deceive, p. 11. In an interview with Mure, Clarke was described as being a great friend and companion to Generals who could see immediately what they wanted and do it for them. It was with this trait Clarke ingratiated himself to Wavell and other major military figures of the era; there is no doubt, however, that Clarke had the flair and

imagination for organizing deception operations. According to Mure, Clarke was offered Bevan's job to head the LCS but wished to remain in the Middle East as he did in 1943 when he refused the Ops "B" task.

11. Interview with Professor Michael Howard, Oriel College, Oxford, England, 5 February 1986. Professor Howard has written the official British history of deception in World War II which will be published either in 1986 or 1987.

12. Interview with Professor R.V. Jones, London, England, 13 February 1986. Also, see R.V. Jones, Most Secret War for insights into the technical and scientific war conducted by the Allies during the second world war. Also, see London, England, Public Record Office, PREM 3 (Operational Papers; Files of the Prime Minister's office kept at the War Cabinet Offices), Piece 81/3 which contains, inter alia, Churchill's correspondence on his concern for the use of camouflage by the civilian sector and the military services. In addition, Churchill sent his two nephews (John and Peregrine) to see a General Loch who was responsible for static camouflage and was the War Office representative on the Camouflage Committee under Home Security. Churchill thought that the two nephews, one an artist who executed camouflage and one an engineer who was concerned with the technical aspects of camouflage, would be able to help the war effort involving camouflage.

14. Mure, Master of Deception, pp. 83-84.

15. Ibid., pp. 34-35.

16. Ewen Montagu, Beyond Top Secret Ultra, p. 134.

17. See J.C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 for a detailed description of the double cross system as practiced in Great Britain. Also, David Mure's two books, Practice to Deceive and Master of Deception provide the material to understand the intricacies of the system in the Middle East by one of its practitioners.
18. Mure, Master of Deception, p. 88. Also, interviews with Mr. Mure.
19. Mure, Master of Deception, p. 155.
20. See Masterman, The Double Cross System.
21. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, Cover and Deception Box #1, Letter from Major General Clayton Bissell to Colonel John Bevan, dated 10 April 1945.
22. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 385, JCS Directive Cover and Deception Planning, dated 2 February 1944.
23. Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, p. 116.
24. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 385, JCS Directive Cover and Deception Planning, dated 2 February 1944.
25. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 234/5/D, Charter of Joint Security Control, dated 13 March 1945.
26. M.R.D. Foot and J.M. Langley, MI9 Escape and Evasion

1939-1945. p. 79.

27. Interviews with Mure.

28. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 385, AFHQ memorandum to Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated 21 December 1943, subject: Cover and Deception Plans November 1942 November 1943.

29. Ibid. Also, see Record Group 331, Records of Allied Force Headquarters, memorandum from Colonel Dudley Clarke, dated 12 September 1943, subject: The Future of the "A" Force Organization and memorandum from Colonel Dudley Clarke, dated 13 January 1944, subject: The Organization of "A" Force.

30. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 331, Records of AFHQ, memorandum from N.M. Crockett, Deputy Director of Military Intelligence, War Office to "A" Force, dated 10 July 1943, subject: Spheres of Influence.

31. See Foot and Langley, MI9 Escape and Evasion, for an excellent description of the escape and evasion organization during World War II.

32. See Wheatley, The Deception Planners for a more anecdotal treatment of the LCS.

33. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 331, Records of Allied Force Headquarters, memorandum from Colonel Dudley Clarke, dated 13 January 1944, subject: The Organization of "A" Force.

34. Ibid.

35. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records

Division, Record Group 331, Records of AFHQ, note from Brigadier K.W.D. Strong, AFHQ G2 to AFHQ G3, dated 31 July 1943.

36. Mure, Master of Deception, p. 105.

37. Ibid., appendix.

38. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 331, Records of AFHQ, note from Dudley Clarke to MG Whiteley, Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ, dated 19 July 1943.

39. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 331, Records of AFHQ, memorandum from MG Rooks, AFHQ G3, to "A" Force, dated 3 August 1943.

## CHAPTER IV

### Deception in Support of HUSKY: The Background and Success

"Later in the day, it developed that successful landings had been made on all beaches by 0600 hours. There was little effective opposition though some beaches were lightly defended by machine and coastal guns. Casualties were extremely light."


Narrative, 15th Army Group, D-Day, 10 July 1943

Even before the Tunisian campaign was completed, the Allies decided Sicily was to be next major operation and, as thinking went at the time, it would probably be the only major operation launched in 1943. The Americans were insisting that the only decisive way to defeat the Axis was through a grand assault on the continent of Europe through northwest France in order to get to the heart of Germany as quickly as possible -- the direct assault. The British were skeptical; they regarded the indirect approach of wearing down the Germans slowly and knocking one of her more important allies, the Italians, out of the war as the only sure fire strategy. According to the British there were shortages in landing craft and an amphibious attack against an area where the Germans were maintaining a force of forty four divisions would have less than a good chance for success and the Allies must not fail in this crucial operation against Hitler's Fortress Europe.

At the Casablanca Conference in early 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided an operation of a magnitude to ensure success in northern France would not be possible until the Spring of 1944.<sup>1</sup> An all out campaign against Nazi submarines and a strategic bombing effort directed against Germany were selected as the two major offensives for 1943 in order to protect shipping in the Atlantic and to wear Germany down in preparation for an assault in 1944. In the meantime, detailed planning would continue for the invasion of Europe in 1944, Operation OVERLORD. There were still sizeable allied forces in North Africa and, since a cross-channel operation was out of the question for 1943, these forces must not be wasted after the inevitable defeat of the Germans and Italians in Tunisia which occurred in May 1943. Churchill in a cable to Roosevelt set out the strategy for those forces:

The paramount task before us is, first, to conquer the African shores of the Mediterranean and set up there the naval and air installations which are necessary to open an effective passage through it for military traffic; and, secondly, using the bases on the African shore, to strike at the under-belly of the Axis in effective strength and in the shortest time.<sup>2</sup>

After much discussion and debate, the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided at Casablanca that Sicily, if not the underbelly then the next best thing, was to be the next operation for the Allied forces in North Africa. It was agreed that pressure would be put on Italy to get her out of the war which would further dilute German resources in the protection of its conquered territories around the Mediterranean and the Balkans. The indirect approach had won out. Dilution of German strength in





1943 would pave the way for the eventual return to the continent in 1944. Since there was resistance by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff to prolonged operations in the Mediterranean, no operations beyond Sicily were planned at Casablanca. It was not until late spring of 1943 did the Allies begin to make ad hoc arrangements for further use of their strength in the Mediterranean. This lack of vision would severely hamper the deception planners' efforts later as hasty planning would detract from the success of the amphibious operations at Salerno in September 1943.

The debate in 1942 and 1943 between the British and Americans regarding the strategy to defeat Germany outlines the sharp cultural differences in approach between the two countries. The American view was that Germany was the main enemy in Europe and she must be attacked directly at the earliest possible time by using massive Allied strength against the German concentration of force in northwest Europe. The British, on the other hand, viewed that as potentially disastrous - their plan was the indirect approach, i.e., take the round-about path and strike the enemy where and when she was weakest. Moreover, the Americans were always reluctant to base military operations on political expediencies and suspected that the need to recover and protect British influence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East was the real reason behind the British strategy. Regardless of these fundamental differences, the British approach was to depend on maneuver and concentration of mass at the right place to defeat the enemy. Even ignoring the suspected political

desires of the British, the Americans at this point did not want to get embroiled in a war of attrition in the Mediterranean, especially on the Italian peninsula. The Allies did just that and, at the same time, tied down a high number of German divisions which had attempted to prevent the Allies from getting to the airfields in the north of Italy to use for an air offensive against southern Germany. The controversy between the allies over the Mediterranean and the "soft underbelly" strategy did not stop in the decision to mount a campaign in 1943 against the Axis in the Mediterranean as opposed to an assault in northern France. There was much debate as to which islands, Sardinia and Corsica or Sicily or the Balkans themselves, would lead to the greatest diversion of German divisions. The seizure of Sardinia or Corsica would have the greatest affect on the defeat of Italy because of their proximity to the northern Italian industrial areas and their potential as a base for an Allied air offensive. However, capture of Sicily would provide the Allies with a safer passage through the Mediterranean to the Middle East oil fields and forces in those regions. Sardinia, on the other hand, led too obviously to further adventures in the Mediterranean to the detriment of a cross-channel operation. General Marshall, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was against "interminable operations" in southern Europe and so he did not oppose operations against Sicily as a practical and immediate target for allied forces in north Africa. Sicily would be a good place to end operations for 1943 as conventional wisdom had it at the time.


Following the decision to mount an amphibious operation

against Sicily in 1943, General Eisenhower was designated as the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces for the operation with its planning headquarters, AFHQ (Allied Force Headquarters), located at Algiers. The operation was termed HUSKY and the D-Day was to be 10 July 1943. General Sir Harold Alexander was to be Eisenhower's deputy for the campaign with Generals Montgomery and Patton leading the two major ground operations in the assault (see organizational chart 2). Alexander who was one of Wavell's commanders in the Middle East felt that attacks against Sicily would have the affect of spreading the Germans out further in the Mediterranean and in his view, Sicily was a stepping stone to the Italian mainland for further ground operations, something which the Americans would never be keen about. Alexander's headquarters, Force 141 which would become 15 Army Group, was also located in Algiers in the same hotel (Hotel St. Georges) with Force 343, Patton's group, and with Force 545, Montgomery's command.<sup>5</sup> (Their force numbers corresponded with their hotel room numbers.) These initial planning groups were soon joined by a representative of "A" Force, Lt. Col. Crichton who would become, in 1945, the last commander of "A" Force in the Mediterranean. This transfer of "A" Force personnel from Cairo to support the planning for the Sicily invasion occurring in Algiers was precipitated by the War Office in London on 1 February 1943 when it suggested to General Alexander, who was to command the Army Group formed for the invasion: "... no doubt you will therefore include the excellent deception team now in Cairo in any staff you transfer to Algiers".<sup>6</sup> It is significant

# OPERATION "HUSKY"

## Final Plan for Assault Landings Sicily 10th July 1943

- Beacon submarines to act as markers for Release Positions
- Small boats
- Foibles
- Beaches to be used for assault landings (Full the to land on flanks of Beach 56)
- Av. Landing zones
- Vertical take offing zones
- Principal air fields
- Landings on Lufthaus



MAP 5

to note the perception of the British for American attitudes to deception at the time conveyed in the same telegram to Alexander: "... We have reason to believe Americans in general and General Eisenhower's staff in particular have virtually no experience (in) deception".<sup>7</sup> Crichton's assignment was made to the G2 division, and immediately opposed by Clarke who felt deception was part of operations and not intelligence.

Turning to a strategic view, Colonel Bevan, of the MCS, visited Washington in December 1942 with a draft of a global deception policy for an initial review by the U.S. Joint Staff Planners. This was the first in a series of yearly deception policies generated by the Allies and the first attempt at Atlantic coordination of strategic deception plans. Plan BODYGUARD for 1944 and Plan DEVERISH for 1945 would follow. The draft for the year 1943 which was originally drawn up by "A"<sup>8</sup> Force was not yet formally reviewed by the British Chiefs of Staff who were awaiting the outcome of the January 1943 Casablanca conference. The British were hard at work gaining early American support for their draft policy. The Americans balked, however, and rightly so, at a commitment before the operational strategy was set down by the Combined Chiefs. Major General Strong, the senior Army member of the JSC at the time, wrote on 31 December 1942 about the British draft policy that, "...deception policy must be kept in consonance with strategic planning developments ... ". The JSC eventually did accept Bevan's assumptions on the strategic situation for openers until further modified by the strategy developed by the British and American Chiefs of Staff in Casablanca.<sup>9</sup> Deception policy

for 1943 based on the decisions at Casablanca was finally approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington on 3 April 1943.<sup>10</sup> At this point, Germany had not been defeated in Tunisia and there were no indications of German forces situated in Italy; it was clear to the Combined Chiefs, however, in early 1943 that Sicily was regarded as the first priority by the Germans for reinforcement and that Sardinia was being developed as an operational air base.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, although Italy was important to the Germans, the Balkans were regarded by Germany as vital to her own defense: it was a source of critical war resources such as oil and bauxite; and invasion of the Balkans would lead to a collapse of the German satellite countries; and, pressure in the region would undoubtedly induce Turkey to cooperate with the Allied forces. Later, the Allies, especially the British, would be surprised by the tenacity of the Germans in their defense of the Italian mainland. The challenge for the deception planners was to play on the German fears of an Allied invasion in the Balkans and to convince the Germans the inevitable assault would consist of multiple landings in the western and eastern Mediterranean.

The broad strategic deception policy for 1943 was to threaten the Germans and Italians on all fronts with the object of containing enemy forces and discouraging their transfer to the Russian front. The main notional threats were to be against Scandinavia, the northwest channel coasts of France,<sup>12</sup> southern France and the Balkans. Regarding the central Mediterranean, the Combined Chiefs of Staff saw a significant challenge in diverting

German attention away from the Italian islands -- it was considered a logical extension of Allied control of North Africa. The strategic deception, however, would attempt to persuade the Axis that the Allies intended to free the Mediterranean for its sea convoys by neutralizing Sicilian airfields and by systematic and heavy bombing of southern Italy.<sup>13</sup> The job of putting over this strategic disinformation was to be the responsibility of the LCS in London and maximum use would be made of the double agents in the UK for planting the story with the German secret intelligence service.

In the eastern Mediterranean, the 'story' to be sold the Germans was that following the Allied victory in north Africa and the Russian victory in the Caucasus, considerable Allied forces would be available for operations in that region. Guidance by the Combined Chiefs (it was unusual now for the Chiefs to directly intervene in the shaping of deception strategy by the LCS) was that the genuine forces training for HUSKY must be used to support a notional campaign against the Balkans. This was an advantage the deception planners in the Mediterranean had over the deception planners in London: "A" Force had genuine invasion forces whereas London had to create, for the most part, these forces. It is easier to deceive the enemy regarding the time and place for an assault as long as there are some real forces available that potentially could be used for an assault.<sup>14</sup> Detailed cover plans for HUSKY were to be prepared by AFHQ but "A" Force in Cairo rather than Advance Hqs West at Algiers was the prime drafter for the deception activities in support of the Sicilian campaign. "A" Force in Algiers was still under the G2

at AFHQ and had not yet matured as an organization but it would be directly involved in the execution of the plan as we shall see.

For northern Europe, a threat against Norway would be created, Allied strength in the UK would be exaggerated for a cross-channel operation and the Luftwaffe would be deceived into engaging in a decisive air battle over northwestern Europe. This strategic deception envisioned by the British, was intended to 'sell' suitable dispositions of Allied forces to simulate invasion preparations of northern France as well as displaying preparations through the use of real physical means, and decoys and dummies.<sup>15</sup>

And so, for the Mediterranean at least, these were the challenges for "A" Force: at the end of the Tunisian campaign to prevent the enemy from reinforcing Sicily to such an extent as to make an amphibious assault too hazardous. In addition, as the Germans would inevitably send some forces to Italy and Sicily, it was the intention of the Allies to keep these reinforcements at a minimum and to contain German troops in the west of the island away from the landing beaches.<sup>16</sup> As Sicily would appear to be such an obvious step, it would be necessary to convince the Germans that any attack on Sicily was a diversion to draw forces away from important areas. (A double bluff, if you will.) Deception includes at its highest levels not only deception of time and place but, perhaps more important for operational level warfare, diversion of reserve forces. This was the main object of the Sicily deception.



The Germans, actually Hitler, were obsessed with the idea the Allies would penetrate into the Balkans. As late as 17 July, a week after the landings in Sicily, Hitler believed the next strategic objective of the Allies was the Balkans -- he thought an Allied campaign in Italy did not make sense as it was a dead end whereas an attack in Greece would pose insurmountable difficulties for him. All German reinforcements and supplies would have to move over a single rail line and it was vulnerable to air and partisan attack. The deception planners played on these fears of a partisan attack not only in Greece but also in Yugoslavia. In addition, Hitler feared that Allied successes would convince Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Allies and thereby make German satellite countries in the Balkans nervous about their future and lose confidence in Nazi Germany. Hitler was convinced the Allies would land there in order to check a Russian advance which Hitler thought was a major worry of Churchill,<sup>17</sup> which it no doubt was. Germany was dependent not only on Rumanian oil but also copper, chrome and bauxite from these areas.

One of the principal reasons why Allied deception was so successful during World War II was that they were able to play on Axis fears and preconceptions of Allied intentions, and they were able to follow the results of the notional story being fed and swallowed as bait by the Germans. They did this mainly through the successful Allied cryptanalytic effort: by decoding the radio communications of the German and, to some degree, the Italian armed forces during almost the entire war. Penetration of Enigma, the machine which encoded the messages, provided the

Allies with an almost unbelievable advantage over their adversaries: they were reading the secret operational communications between German military headquarters and were able to clearly determine German intentions, order of battle including disposition of forces, equipment, and, most significantly, for deception purposes, the reports of German intelligence stations to their headquarters. The intelligence derived from reading the higher level encoded transmissions was called ULTRA by the British and the Americans, and this decoding and reporting was mainly done from Bletchley Park for the European and Mediterranean Theaters. For the Pacific, the Allies were able to  
18  
enjoy a similar advantage over the Japanese.

In February 1943, ULTRA showed, that the Germans estimated Sicily was the next allied target in the Mediterranean; they were most sensitive to Sicily, Crete, Sardinia and Corsica, in that order. In March Sicily was still most likely as the target for the expected invasion but by April the German estimates indicated that for the western Mediterranean, Sicily was the main target, but they expected limited attacks in Crete in the eastern Mediterranean. A bogus Allied order of battle and its exaggeration of Allied strength which was fed to the Germans through the double agents was paying off. By 14 May, the German High Command, in a signal to Kesselring, the German theater commander in Italy, was predicting large scale allied landings in the east and western Mediterranean, with the primary assault being the Peloponnese. The OKW estimated that Alexander would lead the assault on Sardinia and Wilson, CINC Middle East at the

time, the assault against the west coast of the Peloponnese. (A more thorough account of the importance of this Bletchley Park decrypt is presented in Chapter VI during the discussion of Operation MINCEMEAT.) From early May until mid June, all German estimates indicated they expected Allied operations against Greece and the western Mediterranean, exactly the objects of the deception plan. From mid-June, the volume of ULTRA decrypts indicated a preference for landings in the western Mediterranean as opposed to the Balkans, since by this time the Allies had bombed and seized the island of Pantellaria in the Mediterranean, just south of Sicily. Kesselring sent a warning on 27 June to all German forces in the Mediterranean that the western Mediterranean was the most dangerous and that the allies would probably attack Italy but Sardinia was now as likely as Sicily. Again, the allies had this information through ULTRA but time was running out for the opportunity of German reinforcement of the island. By early July, the German commanders in the region were estimating major operations to be conducted by the Allies in Greece in the very near future. The Italians, at this time, estimated simultaneous landings in Sicily, Sardinia and Greece.<sup>19</sup>

Italian intelligence reports and assessments deserves much closer scrutiny: the Italian High Command was convinced by 4 July that the expected assault would take place on 10 July in Sicily at the same time the German High Command was uncertain as to Sicily, Sardinia or Greece, and the timing of the assault.<sup>20</sup> The evening before the landings, at 1630 hours on 9 July, the Germans on Sardinia were placed on their first state of readiness regarding an imminent attack: 150 to 200 vessels had been sighted

north of Malta but by this time it was too late for the Germans to move forces to the island and repel the invaders. On 9 July, the Italian High Command concluded the invasion was to occur the next morning and the landings would occur in the Gela-Catania area on Sicily<sup>21</sup> and they were exactly right. All of this information about Axis estimates of the Allied intentions came from signals intelligence, either from high grade ULTRA or from medium grade Italian cipher.

All through June, July and August, the Italian General Staff was estimating large scale attacks were to be expected in July and August. More than one major amphibious operation was expected and Allied strength was grossly over estimated: at one point, the Allies were credited with 50 divisions and over 10,000 aircraft opposing the Axis in the south. This over estimation was the basis for their projection of simultaneous landings in Greece, Italy and southern France.<sup>22</sup> Not all were deceived or confused, however. This is an estimate by the Italian Chief of Intelligence, Sixth Army, Armed Forces of Italy, in his bulletin at 1700 hours on 1 July 1943 which was captured by 7th Army forces on Sicily during the subsequent fighting on the island:

... The mass of forces and materials of the Anglo-Americans disposed in the Mediterranean - 60% of the aviation, 90% of the troops, 96% of the landing equipment -- are located in the eastern basin, thus in the sector that concerns Sicily ... The unanimity of the ... foreign press of both belligerent and neutral countries and information received from good sources, all confirm indications of what the Anglo-Saxons are preparing ... Preparations for such an invasion is now complete ... The period from the 1st to the 10th of July is especially favorable to the successful approach of enemy vessels on our coast be-

cause of moonless nights ... The enemy can not afford to wait ... We must be ready for the start of this operation at any moment ... Sicily and/or Sardinia are the enemy objectives. The major probability is an attack on Sicily. ... It would be a great error to believe that the enemy would undertake a secondary attack. For political and moral reasons of exceptional value, the Anglo-Americans will have to attack with all the strength they have ... It is understood that a surprise attack will be undertaken ... Keep strict guard everywhere. Halt enemy action during the crisis, while parachutists are dropping and while the landing barges are on the beaches.23

Perhaps the ideal combination for the Axis in the Mediterranean would have been Italian intelligence and German military forces. The Italian intelligence service was well informed about events occurring in the Mediterranean, after all it was their natural geographic base whereas the Germans would never have the network of intelligence agents and knowledge of the area; they had started nearly from scratch when they moved into North Africa realizing the Italian Army was getting regularly beaten by the British. The Italian forces were no match for the cunning British but the Italian intelligence services in the Mediterranean were superior to the German. There is perhaps a lesson here for coalition warfare as practiced in World War II by the Axis: use the strengths of your allies and replace one country's weakness with another's strength.

So certain was Hitler of an imminent allied invasion of Greece and that the attack on Sicily was just a diversion, he sent his favorite General, Rommel, to Greece on 23 July, nearly two weeks after the invasion, to be the CINC Southeast.<sup>24</sup> Throughout this period, the OKW believed the real threat was to Greece. No one, however, believed southern France was the

target except those Allied personnel not 'in the know' deceived by their own deception plan. Reasons for failure of the Germans to believe the notional threat to southern France are obvious now but more about that later. By the early part of July, the Germans had sent two divisions to Sicily, the 15th Panzer Grenadier and the Herman Goering Division to reinforce the Italian 6th Army with its two Corps and four field divisions. In addition, the Italians maintained Sicily with five coastal divisions but which were poor in equipment and morale.<sup>26</sup> The 15th Panzer was formed out of the drafts in transit to Africa when the German collapse occurred in May and there was only one tank unit available for its use. The Goering division was formed in the same manner and was sent to Sicily in June.<sup>27</sup> The Allies were aware through ULTRA the division began arriving on Sicily from 20 June.<sup>28</sup> Also, the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division was sent to reinforce the four Italian divisions on Sardinia and since it was difficult due to supply problems to reinforce the island with any more troops, the 11th Air Corps with its two parachute divisions was moved from the north to the south of France to deliver an airborne counter attack should the allies land in Sardinia.<sup>29</sup> Hitler also ordered the 1st Panzer Division from France to Greece to reinforce the German and Italian divisions already there. This move was ordered as a direct result of the deception and Hitler's fears of an Allied amphibious landing in the Balkans.

From March to 10 July 1943, D-Day HUSKY, the Germans moved 10 divisions to the Balkans.<sup>30</sup> As a consequence of a continuing

deception played by "A" Force from 1941 through late 1944 regarding a threat to the Balkans and the Italian surrender in September 1943, the numbers of German divisions rose from eight in September 1941, to 18 in July 1943, to 21 in November 1943, 24<sup>31</sup> in January 1944 and, finally, to 25 divisions in March 1944. This was the real success of deception in the Mediterranean in World War II: it has been estimated that "A" Force deception plans for the Balkans were responsible for tying down between 13<sup>32</sup> and 28 Axis divisions from early 1943 to late 1944.

German Air Force strength rose in Greece and Crete from 125 to 265 aircraft from the fall of Tunisia to 10 July 1943 but the overall GAF capability remained in the central Mediterranean: there were 840 aircraft in Sicily and Sardinia in March, in April 930 aircraft, May 695 and on 10 July 960 aircraft plus 700<sup>33</sup> Italian aircraft. The Luftwaffe was clearly not as deceived as the German High Command and the Army but the Air Force did believe Greece-Crete was the likeliest Allied objective and not<sup>34</sup> the triangle Sardinia-Sicily-Italy.

The deception in support of HUSKY was the largest, most detailed operation conducted by the Allies until that time. It convinced the Germans to move divisions to the Balkans and confused the Germans as to the probable target in the central Mediterranean so much so that they divided their ground forces equally between Sardinia and Sicily. The deception and diversions, moreover, associated with Naval feints by Force "Z" kept substantial German forces away from the landing beaches at<sup>35</sup> their most critical time. In Greece, there was an immense effort to build the physical defenses: minefields were laid,





shore batteries moved, troops concentrated, etc. Corsica and Sardinia were well fortified -- at the expense of Sicily. <sup>36</sup>

The Germans and Italians were aware that the Allies intended to attack somewhere in the Mediterranean but were not in agreement about where the main attack would come. However, the Balkans were much more dangerous -- if a landing occurred in Italy, the peninsula could be sealed off and the Allies would be prevented from penetrating into Germany itself. <sup>37</sup> According to a

German account of the campaign in Sicily, the Allies kept the German headquarters uncertain of the first allied objective -- for Western Mediterranean they were certain it was Sardinia. <sup>38</sup>

Fear of landings in Sardinia was such that the most vulnerable and best equipped airfields in the Cagliari area were destroyed to deny Allied aircraft use of those airfields during a potential assault on that island. No such measures were used in Sicily. <sup>39</sup>

The Allies did not achieve total tactical surprise but they did achieve a dispersal of German forces through the Mediterranean so that their landings on Sicily were met by "slight or negligible" opposition. <sup>40</sup> The weather was also a "lucky" factor for the Allies: the weather on the night of the invasion was not at all conducive to an amphibious landing and the island defenders naturally relaxed their guard that night. <sup>41</sup>

The campaign in Sicily was eventually won because of superior forces concentrated in an area of relative enemy weakness and a major reason for this success has to be attributed to the deception operation mounted in support. Churchill said it rather eloquently:

By the time our convoys were approaching the island, air superiority was formally established and Axis warships and aircraft made no serious effort to interfere with the seaborne assault. By our cover plans, the enemy were kept in doubt until the last moment where our stroke would fall. Our naval movements and military preparations in Egypt suggested an expedition to Greece. Since the fall of Tunis, they had sent more planes to the Mediterranean but the additional squadrons had gone, not to Sicily, but to the eastern Mediterranean, northwest Italy, and Sardinia. In the critical period while the convoys were approaching the target, General Eisenhower established his headquarters in Malta, where communications were excellent.<sup>42</sup>

Whatever one thinks about the success of the deception operation in support of HUSKY, there is no doubt about its importance to the final and most important deception operation during World War II -- Plan FORTITUDE and other plans associated with Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of the continent in 1944. The HUSKY deception once again proved to the Allies, especially the Americans, the value of deception and its use in support of operational level campaign planning. The final act would use all the techniques and methods, the procedures and audacity developed by the "A" Force planners. One of the most important tools developed by "A" Force was the bogus order of battle.

General Wavell once asked Dudley Clarke what was the worth of "A" Force. Based on captured enemy documents, Clarke answered accurately, "Three Divisions, one Armored Brigade and two squadrons of aircraft".<sup>43</sup> These were the forces the enemy and some of the Allied staffs had been deceived into thinking, through the bogus order of battle, Wavell possessed in the Middle East. The first task of a deception staff, according to Clarke, was to build a false order of battle and to continue it from

campaign to campaign. Although it was dull and slogging work, it was the essence of "A" Force success in World War II. The technique was taught to the deception planners which were to become responsible for Operation OVERLORD and was the cause of the Nazi decision to hold divisions away from the Normandy invasion area even weeks after the invasion, that is, the Normandy beaches were just a diversion in support of a major operation to be conducted by partially notional First US Army Group (FUSAG) commanded by Patton against the Pas-de-Calais area. Clarke, as a matter of fact, thought that the bogus OB was the heart of deception in support of large formations since a " ... General can only influence the battle by the use of his reserves, so the Deception staff can only implement its planning by the employment of its notional forces".<sup>44</sup>

Success in all the strategic and operational level deception plans was dependent on the Allied ability to persuade the enemy that the Allies were disposing of reserve forces in far greater strength than was in fact the case. A comprehensive order of battle deception plan covering the whole of the Mediterranean had been operating from early 1942 and throughout the rest of the war in the Mediterranean. Allied forces were over-estimated as much as 50% and captured enemy documents and ULTRA supported their continuing use by demonstrating their continued success.<sup>45</sup>

The design of the bogus OB was predicated on the operational situation at that time. The original bogus order of battle plan, CASCADE 1942, was intended to produce a modest but not unrealistic 33% exaggeration of strength with the object of

discouraging the enemy from launching any offensive against the Middle East, except from Libya, during 1942. The 1943 edition of CASCADE was designed to minimize German opposition in Sicily and Italy. Its aim was to cause maximum dispersal of their forces by exaggerating the Allied forces by 50% of the genuine threat to southern Europe from the Mediterranean area.<sup>46</sup>

The bogus OB built up a false and exaggerated strength in support of the overall story being sold the Axis. The technique was to use real units, usually non-combatant, e.g., training schools, as the basis for the false identification. Usually, "A" Force would request a division number with corresponding brigade numbers and characteristic battalion descriptions from the War Office in London. The War Office would select a division and its components which operated previously as a military unit, for example, during World War I. "A" Force would in coordination with the G3 select a combat brigade, garrison brigade or base area to be upgraded to a division and an administrative order would be prepared by the G1 activating the new division. A new division would appear on the order of battle and it would now get its mail addressed to its (new) designator like any other unit. The new division commander would have been upgraded in rank, but not pay, as would members of his staff. New divisional signs would appear with appropriate designations.<sup>47</sup> Some of the notional units actually thought they represented a division when, in fact, there were a mere brigade. Only a select number of officers in the brigade or base area were informed.<sup>48</sup>

The bogus OB was sold to the Germans through double agents and was supported by radio traffic, real and simulated.<sup>49</sup> The

more important double agents involved in this "sale" in the Mediterranean and which were cited by Mure in his book "Master of Deception" were CONDOR, LAMBERT, STEPHAN, QUICKSILVER, the PESSIMISTS, LEMONS, GALA, HUMBLE and ALERT. More about these double agents in the next chapter.

ULTRA was fundamental for strategic deception and crucial to deception in support of operational level campaigns. Signals intelligence instructed the Allies on the enemy order of battle, helped them observe German secret reactions and monitored any redeployment of troops. The basis for the Allied intelligence assessment before the Sicily landings was high grade signals intelligence: it showed the movement of the German divisions to the Balkans in the spring of 1943, it demonstrated that the modest front line strength of the Luftwaffe in Greece and Crete had been doubled and it reported that a new Luftwaffe command had been established at CINC Southeast in Greece. ULTRA presented significant order of battle changes and noted that, until 10 July, the Germans were unable to exclude Italy or the eastern Mediterranean as the focus of the expected Allied assaults.<sup>50</sup>

On 28 July, ULTRA showed Rommel's appointment as CINC Southeast at Salonika. So impressed was Hitler with the Balkans that he continued to believe until 3 October that the invasion was more likely in the Balkans rather than an advance up the Italian mainland, and, once again, the Allies knew this through ULTRA. From May through the landings on Sicily, the Allies knew the German strength on Sicily would be below their original estimates.<sup>51</sup> In truth, the Allies knew they had strategic

surprise and dispersal over a month before the landings.


Thus, the stage was set for Operation HUSKY on 10 July by the Allies. The genuine invasion forces consisted of the 15th Army Group, the British 8th Army (Force 545) and the American 7th Army (Force 343). The 8th Army comprised two Corps, the 13th and 30th, and three British infantry divisions, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, one infantry Brigade and an airborne division. Two infantry divisions were held in reserve. The American forces included a Corps, the 2nd, three infantry divisions (the 1st, 3rd and the 45th), the 2nd Armored Division and the 82nd Airborne Division. The 9th Infantry Division was held in reserve. The

British forces embarked from Suez, Alexandria, Haifa, Tunisia and, in the case of the Canadians, the UK. The American forces loaded from Algiers, Oran, Bizerta and from the US (45 Division) via Oran.<sup>53</sup> It may prove surprising to some to know that the

amphibious assault on Sicily, the first seaborne assault on a coast held by an enemy in the European theater of war, by eight divisions simultaneously, was larger than the Normandy operation. About 150,000 troops were landed in the first three days, and the ultimate total was 478,000 men. The British landings were on the south-east corner of the island along a 40 mile stretch of beach and the US 7th Army landed along a 40 mile stretch of beach on the south coast and on the British left flank.<sup>54</sup>

Opposing these forces on 10 July 1943 were the German 15th Panzer Grenadier and the Herman Goering Divisions, and the Italian 6th Army comprising two Corps: the XII Corps (two divisions, the 28th and 26th) and the XVI Corps (two divisions, the 4th and 54th) plus some five or six coastal defense

55  
divisions.



MAP 7



#### CHAPTER IV

1. Chester Wilmont, The Struggle for Europe, p. 118. Also, see Michael Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War and Kent Roberts Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II.
2. Ibid. Also, see Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. The Hinge of Fate and Closing the Ring.
3. Trumbull Higgins, Soft Underbally, p.46. Also, see Carlisle, Pa., U.S. Army Military History Institute, General Marshall interview conducted by Major Hamilton and Dr. Sidney Matthews, 25 July 1949.
4. Carlisle, Pa., U.S. Army Military History Institute, General Alexander oral interview conducted by Dr. Sidney Matthews, p. 19.
5. Albert N. Garland, Howard McGaw Smyth and Martin Blemenson, Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, pp. 56-57.
6. London, England, Public Record Office, AIR 20, Unregistered Papers from Air Ministry Branches, Piece 4535, dated 1 February 1943. In a telegram to the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Nye, the next day, Alexander informed the Chiefs that AFHQ had requested the 'Cairo team' ("A" Force) to handle all deception in connection with HUSKY since the major part of the operation would be carried out in the Middle East. This was the beginning of a 'deception in the field' partnership in tandem with the strategic London-Washington link between the Allies.
7. Ibid.

8. Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, p. 51.
9. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum from Joint Security Control to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 31 December 1942, subject: Deception Policy.
10. Ibid., Memorandum from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated 3 April 1943, subject: Deception Policy 1943 (Germany and Italy).
11. Ibid.
12. Cruickshank, p. 61. Plan COCADE was the overall name for the deception plan for the notional cross-channel invasion of 1943. STARKEY was the deception threatening an amphibious feint across the channel, TINDALL was a fictional operation to contain the Germans in Norway and WADHAM was a large scale amphibious operation threatening the Britany coast. See also John Campbell, D Day 1943: The Limits of Strategic Deception for a thoughtful review of the problems encountered by LCS in convincing the Germans the Allies would land in western Europe sometime in 1943. The failure of this operation led to the belief perhaps that a totally different organizational approach was needed. Ops "B" was created on the style of "A" Force late in the year specifically for the cross-channel operation in 1944. These failures in 1943 certainly gave ammunition to those Americans who thought the British had an 'inbred preference for theatrical shows of force over the real thing'. The failures were a result of competing training and operational priorities, a problem which also gave the deception planners in the Mediterranean sleepless nights. For the London planners, this was especially true for

landing craft: most of the landing craft possessed by the Allies in 1943 were in the Mediterranean ready for HUSKY. Aircraft to drop leaflets or to bomb targets simply to provide genuine evidence of Allied intentions to follow up with an assault were scarce and the Air Forces generally resisted employment of aircraft for these purposes. Another problem for the London deception planners in 1943 was that they were in a sense competing against "A" Force for German attention and the Mediterranean attraction was far more tantalizing. Another problem, as Campbell points out, was the London planners did not have disaster staring them in the face if they failed, unlike the "A" Force planners who could urge operational actions in support of the deception plans and generally succeed when they pointed out that the success of the landings could hinge on keeping Germans away from the beaches. No such exigencies existed in the UK at the time.

13. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated 3 April 1943, subject: Deception Policy 1943 (Germany and Italy).

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid. Memorandum from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated 3 March 1943, subject: Deception Policy 1943 Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff. See, also Cruickshank and Campbell.

16. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of

Staff, COS 385, AFHQ Memorandum to Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated 21 December 1943, subject: Cover and Deception Plans November 1942 - November 1943.

17. Martin Blemenson, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino, p. 62.

18. Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West, pp. 20-38 for one of the more lucid accounts of the ULTRA story. Also, Ronald Lewin, ULTRA Goes to War and The Other ULTRA.

19. F.R. Hinsley, et al, British Intelligence in the Second World War. Volume II. Part I, pp 77-80. Also, London, England, Public Record Office, DEFE 3, Communications Intelligence from German Radio Transmissions, Piece 815, ML 1955. This report of a decrypt of an OKW message for 12 May 1943 (sent out from Bletchley Park at 1515Z on 15 May 1943) to CINC South and CINC Southeast was the message which convinced the Allies that the Germans had swallowed the MINCEMEAT deception which is discussed in detail in chapter VI.

20. Hinsley, p. 70.

21. Ibid., pp. 77-80.

22. Barton Whalley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War, p. A334.

23. London, England, Public Record Office, WO 204, AFHQ papers, Piece 758, dated 5 August 1943, subject: Enemy Intelligence on Allied Invasion Preparations. The documents were captured by 7th (US) Army during the fighting. Italian military intelligence, SIM, had complete details of the planned invasion. During the interrogation of Italian officers, according to the 7th Army

report, it became apparent that the assessment was so correct it amazed even the Italians on Sicily. There are actually three intelligence bulletins: one for 24 June, and two for 1 July. The intelligence bulletin for 24 June 1943 correctly deduced from intensive night paradrop exercises conducted by the Allies in the vicinity of Oran that paratroops would be landed at night on Sicily to begin the invasion. According to the estimate, there were approximately 780,000 men in French North Africa, Gibraltar and Malta. In Libya, an additional force of 50,000 men was noted. There were 3800 aircraft available to the Allies, according to the report. The Italian estimate was right but for the wrong reason: the estimate clearly expected the brunt of several assaults to fall on Sicily. If this same organization had been on Sardinia or on the mainland, the estimate may have had the Allies landing there with their strongest force. Also, see Brigadier General Oscar W. Koch, with Robert Hays, G2 Intelligence for Patton.

24. Whalley, p. A334. Also, see Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army Military History Institute, ULTRA, ML6507, Reel 137 dated 7 to 11 July 1943 for the warning from CINC Southeast that they expected an imminent landing in the Balkans: "According numerous reports (some credible) British preparing landing operation in area Jannina, Arta and Agrinion. Port of Astakos, and island of Cephalonia and Ithaca...(possible) landing points..."

25. Albert N. Garland, Howard McGaw Smyth and Martin Blumenson, Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, p. 46.

26. Ibid., p. 63.

27. Basil Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War,  
p. 436.
28. Hinsley, p. 74.
29. Liddel Hart, pp. 437-438.
30. Hinsley, pp. 80-81.
31. Ibid., p. 29.
32. Whalley, p. 235; David Mure, Master of Deception,  
pp. 205, 232, 239. Although one could argue, especially from  
August 1943 on when the Italian collapse was at hand, that most  
of these forces were for internal security reasons and to replace  
the Italians, there were still much too many German divisions in  
the Balkans. It was gross inefficiency on the part of the  
Germans to tie down so many men for such a long period of time.  
Each side, however, achieved its objective: the Germans did  
prevent a landing in the Balkans (at a tremendous cost) and the  
Allies did tie down an inordinate number of German divisions  
in the Balkans at a minimal cost to the Allies.
33. Hinsley, pp. 80-81.
34. Brigadier C.J.C. Molony, et al, History of the Second World  
War: The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume V, p. 46.
35. Cruickshank, p. 59; Brigadier C.J.C. Molony, et al, History  
of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and Middle East,  
Volume V, p. 30.
36. Ewen Montagu, The Man Who Never Was, pp. 149-150.
37. Molony, p. 37. Also, see Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army  
Military History Institute, Stenographic Service at Fuehrerhauptquartier:  
dated 28 August 1945, Conference of the Fuehrer with Field

Marshall Keitel, 19 May 1943.

38. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army Military Institute, Hans van Griffenberg, General of Infantry, "Deception Carried Out During the War on Higher German Command Levels, F-044a, p. 76.

39. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 385, AFHQ memorandum to Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated 21 December 1943, subject: Cover and Deception Plans November 1942 - November 1943.

40. Hinsley, p. 88.

41. Molony, p. 55.

42. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Closing the Ring, p. 32.

43. Mure, p. 275. Clarke is actually underestimating when one considers the defense is generally considered superior to the offense by a factor of three.

44. Ibid., p. 274.

45. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 385, AFHQ memorandum to Combined chiefs of Staff, dated 21 December 1943, subject: Cover and Deception Plans November 1942 - November 1943.

46. Ibid., Record Group 331, Records of AFHQ, Memorandum from Brigadier Dudley Clarke, dated 7 June 1944, subject: WANTAGE Order of Battle Plan (second edition). Also, see London, England, Public Record Office, WO 204, AFHQ papers. Piece 1795, Memorandum from Brigadier Dudley Clarke, dated 25 June 1944, subject: Note on Results Obtained by the "WANTAGE" Order of

## Battle Plan.

47. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 331, Records of AFHQ, memorandum from Lt. Col. Train, Commander Advance Hqs West "A" Force, to Brigadier Davy, AFHQ G3 section, dated 12 February 1944. It is interesting to note that in this same memorandum, Lt. Col. Train, a US Military Intelligence Officer, explains why bogus order of battle does not work for American divisions: "On the other hand such procedures as are described above do not exist in the U.S. Forces and are unfamiliar to the U.S. War Department, the Adjutant General's Department, G-1 and G-3 U.S. ... In order factually to devise a similar system in U.S. Forces so much explanation and so many changes in custom and procedures would be required as to 'blow' the scheme pretty thoroughly before it could be put into effect. Furthermore, it is understood that all American divisions are activated on War Department authority in the U.S. and that activation of local formations in a Theatre of Operations would not be possible."

48. Mure, pp. 93-94.

49. Ibid., p. 209.

50. Hinsley, p. 11.

51. Ibid., p. 74.

52. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 331, Records of AFHQ, 141 Force Operation Instruction No. 2, dated 21 May 1943.

53. Liddell Hart, p. 440.

54. Ibid.



55. Albert W. Garland, Howard McGaw Smyth and Martin Blumenson,  
Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of  
Italy. p. 63.

## Chapter V

### The Deception Plans for Operation HUSKY

"(Surprise) ... is more or less basic to all operations, for without it, superiority at the decisive point is hardly conceivable." Clausewitz


At the Casablanca conference in January 1943, not only did the Allies decide on Sicily as their next major operation but also that deception be used to disperse German forces in Europe so that an amphibious landing in Sicily would not be opposed by a strong and organized Axis force. The Allies were more concerned with German fighting forces than Italian forces, and most of their deception operations for the Sicily operation were consequently aimed at Hitler and the German High Command. Nevertheless, it was becoming increasingly clear that the enemy was too strong in northern France and the Allies had limited ground forces to attempt a cross channel operation until very late in 1943 or perhaps in 1944. Since it would not be possible to go directly onto the continent until Germany was weakened, the notion was advanced by General Sir Alan Brooke at Anfa Camp near Casablanca on 16 January 1943 to disperse German forces as much as possible by attacking their allies, the Italians, and forcing them out of the war. Germany would be forced to occupy Italy

with a considerable number of divisions and would be compelled eventually to replace Italian divisions in the Balkans. An attack on Italy would also ease the pressure on the Russians on the eastern front or so the Allies thought; Stalin thought otherwise: he was urging the opening of a second front in northwest Europe since a campaign on the Italian mainland did not lead directly to Germany and would not relieve his burden in the Alliance.

Since preparations against Sicily would surely be recognizable and the Germans would have to prepare defenses against the multiple capabilities of Allied amphibious forces to land in Sardinia, Sicily, Crete, Greece or the Dodecanese, Brooke thought there was a great opportunity for a successful deception operation. Although Sicily was to be the next target, preparations for a build-up of forces in the United Kingdom would continue for the final action of the war in Europe, a cross-channel invasion of the continent.<sup>1</sup>

In May 1943, Eisenhower considered an assault against Pantellaria prior to the Sicilian landing as prudent in order to secure airfields to base tactical aircraft for support to the Allied invasion forces in July. There was a danger -- an operation against Pantellaria would surely tip the Allies intentions to move against Sicily as their next step in the Mediterranean. However, operational advantages apparently outweighed the risk of reducing surprise for the Allies and so with heavy bombing as a preliminary, 1st (BR) Division landed on<sup>2</sup> Pantellaria on 11 June and the Italians quickly surrendered.





MAP 9

To questions from Churchill on 29 May 1943 at a meeting in his villa in Algiers, Eisenhower replied concerning the potential for reduction of surprise during the landings in Sicily, " ... there was no reason to suppose that it would prejudice surprise in HUSKY since the operation could be represented as a necessary step in clearing the Sicilian narrows ... ".<sup>3</sup> This operational plan certainly represented a significant danger to the deception plan and possibly caused the immediate transfer to Sicily from the mainland of the Herman Goering Division as discussed in detail in chapter IV. There is nothing in the public record which indicates any complaint by the deception planners nor is there any record of coordination with the deception unit either at Algiers or Cairo or London which does seem curious. We shall examine this apparent anomaly later when we discuss the Kesselring interviews and his view of the Pantellaria operation.

Nevertheless, it was proposed at Casablanca that an organization be set up to plan the whole operation against Sicily and to prepare a " ... cover plan which would need to be integrated between the U.S.A., U.K., Northwest Africa, and the Middle East and put into effect to disperse troops ... ".<sup>4</sup> This is the original authority for a deception organization with Eisenhower's staff in Algiers.

"A" Force in Cairo was the organization which planned the deception operation in support of HUSKY and Plan BARCLAY issued by "A" Force in early 1943 was the coordinating document for the detailed planning and implementation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff deception policy throughout the Mediterranean for that year. When eventually approved by the Combined Chiefs, BARCLAY

included cover and deception not only for the invasion of Sicily but also for the eastern Mediterranean, southern France and the Balkans. The plan encompassed activities under Allied Force Headquarters, CINC Middle East, and CINC Persia and Iraq Commands. In this chapter, we shall discuss in detail that plan, its organization, the 'story' to be sold the Germans, and the treatment used to put the story over.

Procedurally, the broad deception policy, i.e., the strategic plan, covering all the theaters involved in the war against Germany and Italy was issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the year 1943 in April of that year. This policy was developed into specific cover and deception plans by "A" Force for the Mediterranean and Middle East theaters; in addition, Section 17M of British Naval Intelligence originated a scheme which involved passing phoney documents to the Germans to convince them there would be an assault against Sardinia and the Balkans in the spring. Plan MINCEMEAT, a brilliant ruse, will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. The deception operations in support of the landings in Sicily was the largest scale and longest period of systematic deception attempted in the Mediterranean until that time and represented the culmination of knowledge gained from the deceptions in the North Africa desert beginning in 1940 which included the need for a formal organization and a continuing deception concept played against the Axis from at least 1942, i.e., the notion that the Allies had much greater reserves than was actually the case.

Captured documents and interrogation of prisoners indicated

surprise was achieved regarding both the date and scale of the assaults but, more importantly, the Allies dispersed the German forces so that the Axis was not strong enough on Sicily to resist the Allies in July 1943. AFHQ assessed the enemy's ignorance to the scale of the attack by the apparent failure to appreciate that British Middle East Forces were involved in the operation until contact was made on the battlefield with units of the British 8th Army.<sup>5</sup>

Allied deception policy for 1943 required causing the enemy to contain forces in Norway, western Europe and the Balkans and to discourage transfer to the Russian front. The objects of BARCLAY were: to deceive the enemy regarding the whole conduct of the war against Germany and Italy, and to provide cover for HUSKY. This would require vision and extraordinarily detailed planning. The third object was intended by the British as a cover for operations against Rhodes and the Dodecanese: to provide cover for potential and genuine Allied operations in the eastern Mediterranean.<sup>6</sup>

The principal object of BARCLAY in relation to the landing in Sicily was to retard the reinforcement of Sicily by German troops and to reduce the number of air and naval attacks on the shipping carrying the invasion forces and its supplies. The most vulnerable period was D-7 to D+5 when the Allies could be easily interdicted by air and submarine attack. The "A" Force intention was to divert German troops into southern France and the Balkans so that reinforcement of Sicily would be exceedingly difficult and to deceive the Germans regarding the real destination, dates of departure, routes and strengths of the eastern and western



task forces involved in the operation. It would also be necessary to move the Italian fleet east of Italy so that it would not have free access to the straits of Messina and thereby pose a threat to the invading forces.<sup>7</sup> Although Allied shipping was only superficially damaged in the operation, total credit can not go to the deception planners and tactical diversionary personnel as the tactical deception activities were less than successful.

The "A" Force planners assessed that the total forces theoretically available in North Africa, excluding the free French troops, after the conquest of Tunisia would be about 20 divisions. Knowing the enemy propensity to exaggerate total allied strengths, the planners assumed that three-fourths of these divisions could be employed for offensive operations in the Mediterranean area. This propensity to exaggerate Allied forces, even greater than the deception plans attempted to accomplish, is a recurring story in the Mediterranean in 1943 and 1944. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had instructed Eisenhower to use forces in the Algerian/Moroccan area for notional attacks against southern France and this force was to include the free French forces under General Giraud.<sup>8</sup> General Giraud would throw up obstacles for the deception planners in his refusal to allow bombing of cover targets in southern France but the deception planners failed to attract German forces into southern France for other even more pervasive reasons: lack of aircraft to bomb cover targets, a similar problem experienced by the planners in London for Plan COCADE in 1943.<sup>9</sup> A deception plan outlining an attack

against southern France without a preliminary or simultaneous assault against Sardinia and Corsica would hardly have been believed by the Germans since forces on those two islands would threaten the lines of communication between north Africa and France. A preliminary attack against Sardinia and Corsica was ruled out since no immediate threat would be apparent against southern France. It had to be notional simultaneous attacks against southern France, Sardinia and Corsica.

In Plan BARCLAY, "A" Force set out the notional force for operations in the western Mediterranean: three divisions to take the two islands and nine to be notionally landed in France. Of course, the greater the threat to France, the more likely the Italian fleet would be west of Italy which would conflict with the basic objectives of the plan to keep the fleet in the eastern Mediterranean and away from Sicily. This problem would be 'solved' by threatening an attack in the Balkans prior to operations in the Western Mediterranean area. As we have seen, an exaggeration of Allied strength through the bogus order of battle allowed the Germans and the Italians to estimate the potential for several operations, some major and some diversionary, occurring nearly simultaneously in the Mediterranean. Another drawback for the planners to using southern France as a notional target was the need to include French forces in the attack; measures were to be taken to ensure that the French forces themselves were not deliberately deceived into believing they would take part in the operation. Perhaps, this was an impossible undertaking; problems with the resistance, false hopes by the French people, etc., would be

faced by the planners in London in 1943 and by Ops "B" in 1944, as well.

BARCLAY proposed that the enemy be persuaded that an American force under General Patton would be launched from Tunisian and Algerian ports against Sardinia and Corsica. "Force 343", 7th (US) Army, was to consist of the 82 Airborne Division and the 1 and 3 Infantry Divisions. This was the first of many times Patton would be used in a deception plan. An allied force under General Alexander would be launched simultaneously from North Africa to establish a bridgehead in southern France. This force, known as "Force 141", 15th Army Group, consisted of 1 (BR) Airborne Division, 1 (US) and 2 (US) Armored Divisions, 6 (BR) Armored Division, 9 (US) and 34 (US) Infantry Divisions, and the 1 (BR), 46 (BR) and 78 (BR) Divisions. Most of these forces were actually preparing for an assault against an adversary somewhere in the Mediterranean. Once a bridgehead was established in France, the British Eighth Army and a French Army from North Africa would be landed to attack up the Rhone valley.<sup>11</sup> In 1944, this operation would be executed by the Allies under Operation DRAGOON but would include US and French forces: deception plans had a habit of turning into real operations as the number of options dwindled.

Regarding the eastern Mediterranean, the object of BARCLAY was to contain enemy forces in the Balkans and weaken the garrisons in the Dodecanese and the Aegean areas to provide an option for genuine operations in this area, long a desire of Churchill. A separate deception plan for the Middle East called

WAREHOUSE 1943 prepared by "A" Force now fell under the BARCLAY umbrella. In addition, the foundation for deception plans in the eastern Mediterranean in 1943 was the Middle East - PAIC (Persia and Iraq Command) Order of Battle Deception Plan CASCADE. As the 'story' went, now that the Soviets were victorious at Stalingrad in January 1943, the German threat to the Middle East was largely negated and British "Divisions" in Persia and Iraq could be returned to the Middle East command for operations in other areas. The CASCADE scheme provided for the enemy to perceive the following order of battle during the HUSKY timeframe:

^A wholly notional "Twelfth Army" under CINC Middle East for offensive operations overseas and comprising:

Two Corps, each of one Armored Division and three Infantry Divisions;

Two Armored Divisions;

One Airborne Division;

One Army Tank Brigade.

^Two Armored Divisions to reinforce the Turks when required.

^The equivalent of three Armored Divisions and fifteen Infantry Divisions for the defense and internal security of the Middle East and PAIC. The latter included a Polish Army of four divisions which could conceivably be used in Europe at a later stage.

12

^The existing garrisons of Malta, Aden and the Sudan.

Turning to the German appreciation of these Allied schemes, the following conversations between Hitler and Generals Jodl and Buhle on 12 December 1942 during one of Hitler's daily conferences is most enlightening: it underscores graphically the

importance of the bogus Allied order of battle conveyed principally through double agents to the German secret intelligence service and to Hitler himself. The men are discussing German Tiger tanks:

HITLER: How about the Tigers? How many of them are over there?

BUHLE: Seven. One is on the way, three are in Italy and nine are on the way to Italy.

HITLER: If you don't bring them over, it is of no use.

BUHLE: The first unit will be ready in eight or ten days.

JODL: Then there are reports of a confidential agent about possible operations of the English in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is the thing boiled down -- he works on rumors and the many reports: The Allies would push against Crete and the Aegean Isles, using Cyprus, Syria or Egypt. He would make the following statements, based on all reports of his most reliable men. He says that an operation of the English against Crete before the spring of 1943 is very unlikely.

HITLER: I don't believe that anymore, either.

JODL: His reasons are the lack of large transports, the lack of smaller ships, because those are fully needed for the supplying of the British 8th Army, the fact that Cyprus is unsuitable as an assembly area, the lack of fighter protection, and the unsuitable weather in the months of November and March.

HITLER: Until March or only November and March?

JODL: November until March. Seventh, the current tying down of the 8th Army in Cyrenaica. Therefore, he comes to the conclusion that the reports about impending actions are planted to draw German forces from other theaters. He has made a detailed statement of that. Perhaps you'd want me to leave that here?

HITLER: I have thought about that continually in the last few days ...

(Hitler reasons that a landing on Crete will be folly because of superior German forces on the island and concludes the Allies will lose much in the way of shipping during such an

operation.)

... That's why I don't believe much in a landing on Crete. Then, perhaps the Dodecanese, or sooner in some parts where he supposes that the natives will rush to his aid immediately ... I'd sooner believe that if he gets back the 9th Army, that he will ship it to Syria and will try to advance from there.

(The British 9th Army was a genuine formation with bogus or with transient divisions passing through between theaters; it was perpetuated as an Army to the Germans through the bogus order of battle plans CASCADE and WANTAGE. This thought by Hitler is exactly what the Allies focus on during 1943 and 1944 when the 9th Army becomes central to the deception plan.)

JODL: The reports make a very sensible impression. He concludes as follows: There will be no attack until the spring of 1943. An attack will depend entirely on the development of the war situation. A shift of forces to Syria is more likely than one to the Aegean Isles ... Crete certainly indicated, if only as a preventative measure.

13

HITLER: That is exactly my own opinion.

Hitler has been set up by "A" Force to believe that a major Allied operation will be conducted sometime in the spring of 1943, not in the western but in the eastern Mediterranean. He believes this because he wants to and because the British certainly have the (notional) force to accomplish it by the spring.

Plan WAREHOUSE, the eastern Mediterranean plan, included threats against the Peloponnese, the maintenance of an existing threat to Crete, the creation of a threat to eastern Greece from Thrace, and finally an implied threat to Bulgaria from Thrace, which would figure largely in 1944 as the "A" Force tried to maintain German divisions through Plans ZEPPELIN and TURPITUDE in

the Balkans during the critical days of OVERLORD. It was assessed by "A" Force that sufficient notional land forces were available to support all four threats, that the threats to eastern Greece (the Dodecanese Islands of Rhodes, Cos and Leros) and Bulgaria would follow the threats to the Peloponnese, with the primary objective of seizing Piraeus, and that a threat to Crete was feasible. The actual German order of battle for Allied forces in 1943 is not available but the affects of the 1944 plan (WANTAGE) was assessed by Dudley Clarke when the OKW order of battle for 1944 was captured during the fighting on the Italian mainland in May 1944: it shall be discussed later in chapter VIII.

WAREHOUSE 1943 was to persuade the enemy that the Peloponnese would be invaded simultaneously with a diversion against Crete. The force for this operation was the notional "Twelfth Army" ten divisions plus one division of the British Eighth Army from Malta. Moreover, the enemy was to be convinced that the allies considered this operation likely to bring Turkey into the war and that subsequent operations would be conducted into Thrace to seize Dedeagach and support the Turkish Army on the Bulgarian frontier. A Polish Army of four divisions then would be introduced into the Balkans from Thrace and Aegean ports.

In order to grasp the affect all of this was having on the Fuehrer and his immediate circle, the following conversation recorded on 19 May 1943 between Hitler, and Generals Keitel and Warlimont is offered. By this time, Plans BARCLAY and MINCEMEAT,

etc., are in full bloom.

HITLER: I have been thinking of late, and especially again last night what the consequences would be if we lost the Balkans, and there is no doubt that those consequences must be severe ... This would lead to repercussions among our allies and cause the loss of the Romanian and oil territories and bauxite and chromium territories as well.

KEITEL: Copper!

HITLER: We would lose copper. Under these circumstances I do find it necessary to take further precautions against a possible attack on the Peloponnesus. We are bringing up a division now (apparently pointing to the map), the (11th) Luftwaffenfeld Division. We have no armored forces there.

(The conversation continues after a long discussion about moving forces to the Balkans.)

HITLER: You can't depend on the Italians, but, on the other hand, I am convinced that in case some dirty business occurs in Italy we could handle that with relatively small forces, especially since the first spearheads would arrive within 10 days as (General) Zeitzler explained it to me.

(There follows much discussion about moving forces around the Balkans and which units could be moved from the eastern and western fronts to the area. Hitler argues for the importance of the Peloponnese.)

HITLER: I have therefore come to the conclusion to place under all circumstances a (1st) Panzer Division on the Peloponnesus -- perhaps in the Athens area, but preferable right on the Peloponnesus. As things look now, it could be taken only from the west.

(And, so the deception plan COCADE begins to fall apart but BARCLAY and MINCEMEAT appear to be succeeding. The conversation continues about the Balkans.)

HITLER: Be that as it may, we must have it under all circumstances. I don't believe in a landing of the British in the west at the moment.

(Hitler discusses potential landings in northwest France.)

HITLER: By then we shall have a clearer picture. Still,



I would think it over once more whether they cannot get along in Sicily and one can keep the 16th (Panzer) back in Italy for the time being and send something else over to Sardinia.

(Kesselring and the Italians are asking for reinforcements of two islands but Hitler doesn't want to put too much in the 'sack' and lose precious resources if the Allies attack. Hitler has the final order.)

HITLER: The enemy can not do that in the west, everything is too strongly fortified. (He is talking about the west wall in France.) If they want to attack somewhere, then they will attack only in Italy, or, naturally, on the Balkans. The Balkans are dangerous. It is so: Everything must be considered. If anything should happen to Turkey, then I would have only the Bulgarians as reserves and we would have to draw reserves from the East, anyhow.<sup>15</sup>

The conversations clearly demonstrate Hitler's fear of operations in the Balkans by the Allies and his dismissal of the Italian threat as one which could be taken care of with little fuss. Naturally enough, Kesselring and the Italians are demanding more resources to help in the inevitable task, in their estimation, of defending Italy against the next Allied offensive. Of course, at the same time, CINC Southeast in Salonika was warning of a potential invasion by the British in the Balkans. The deception is being played out against Hitler and the OKW and they are misinterpreting events or, if the deception planners have their way, 'correctly' interpreting the disinformation being supplied by the Allied deceivers. Is it true that on this level of deception, the closer the adversary is to the situation, the more likely he may be able to see through the deception or is this a case of a local commander reacting to a threat, no matter how innocuous, in his area of interest and asking for additional resources from higher headquarters?

BARCLAY envisioned that naval and air forces in the eastern Mediterranean prior to the Sicilian campaign would probably be sufficient to sustain a threat to the Balkans. Nevertheless, dummy landing craft were produced by the "A" Force technical team to demonstrate the apparent concentrations of the landing force and, in addition, 200 dummy aircraft were displayed, to show the build-up of close air support aircraft in the same area so that German air reconnaissance and uncontrolled Axis agents would 'see' these apparent threats. Although naval and air forces for HUSKY would only amount to a force suitable to support seven divisions for operations in the western Mediterranean, these forces would be exaggerated by 50% to allow for support of a<sup>16</sup> theoretical force of ten divisions plus two airborne divisions.

The timing of the notional attacks in the Mediterranean was absolutely crucial to putting over the plans to the enemy and was one of the techniques learned by "A" Force in the North Africa desert and would be passed on to the Ops "B" planners for the Normandy deception of 1944. Since the primary objective was to draw forces to the Balkans away from Sicily, the immediate threat would be made against the eastern Mediterranean. More significantly, the notional attacks would be "postponed" until after HUSKY to lower enemy vigilance during the week prior to 10 July 1943, the target date for the actual landings. "A" Force theorized that the enemy would more likely believe a moonless period which occurred about the end of each month during that year as the most likely time for an operation as a mask for the convoy movements. Actually, the operational planners also

required some moonlight to assist the glider pilots and the paratroops during the nighttime insertion early on 10 July. Like most things associated with military planning, the date was a carefully worked out compromise. In order to tempt and alternately to relax the adversaries, the first period for the notional attacks and which later would be "postponed" was 26 May<sup>17</sup> through 2 June.

The timetable for operations before the "postponement" was:

- 26 May - Assault on western Crete
- 28 May - Assault on the Peleponnese
- 4 June - Assaults on Sardinia and Corsica
- 6 June - Assault on southern France
- July/Aug - Attack on Dedeagach from Thrace.

"A" Force intended for the first postponement to be made on 15 May and that the enemy should become aware of it by 21 May through double agents and actual administrative procedures taken by the Allied forces. The timetable for operations after the first "postponement" follows:

- 26 June - western Crete
- 28 June - the Peleponnese
- 2 July - Sardinia and Corsica
- 4 July - Southern France
- August/ - Dedeagach.
- September

The second "postponement" was notionally made on 15 June and the news was to reach the enemy by 21 June. The final timings were:

- 24 July - western Crete

26 July - the Peleponnese  
31 July - Sardinia and Corsica  
4 August - simultaneous assault on southern and  
18  
northern (or western) France.

To summarize, Plan BARCLAY was intended to make the Germans believe that the Allied policy for 1943 was to invade the Balkans and advance northwards into Europe with the strategic objective being to contact the Russian left flank as they advanced towards Germany. The original British Chiefs of Staff directive stated the deception policy as:

" ... emphasize that the primary object of our North African campaign is the freeing of the Mediterranean for our convoys to the East. For this purpose we intend to build up large air forces in North Africa to neutralise the Sicilian airfields and for the heavy and systematic bombing of Italy. It should be stressed that our immediate land operations against southern France and the Balkans will by-pass Italy ... which will only be invaded at a later date."19

The Germans and Italians were to believe no operations were intended against Italy because of the potential occupation costs and the formidable physical boundary protecting Germany in the north of Italy, actually very good reasons for not invading. The allies intended to bomb Italy rather than invade, which was, in reality, the American desire. In order to prevent the Germans from reinforcing the eastern front, a second front would be opened in 1943 in southern and northern France. Attacks against southern France would necessitate seizing Sardinia and Corsica.

As is the case with operational planning, the deception planners followed good staff procedure in the presentation of their scheme which helped them to lay down clearly the object of

the whole exercise and to demonstrate to the commanders the logic of their plan. By the time the "A" Force planners arrived at the writing of the plan for Sicily, they had mastered the procedure and format for the deception plan: first, the object, and this was the crucial part for if this was wrong or not in synchronization with the commanders object, the plan was useless. Not only must the plan parallel the operational plan, the deception plan must coincide with the strategic policy. Next, in the plan, came the discussion of the consideration or factors which affected selection of the particular story to be sold the enemy. This was the part which convinced the reader of the validity of the deception plan. The heart of the plan was the basis of the deception scheme including the timings, forces to be used, and the actual story to be sold to the enemy including the parts which were true and which were notional. Finally, came the 'treatment' which detailed how the plan would be put over to the enemy: for example, by double agents, by the movement and operations of real forces, by genuine administrative procedures, by display of dummies, by propaganda and rumors, etc.

The "A" Force plan envisioned a "treatment" of the enemy to perceive the notional operations against southern France, Sardinia and Corsica. This "treatment" required all of the means mentioned above. The story was planted in 'bits and pieces' on the German secret service by double agents controlled by "A" Force in the triangle Gibraltar - Teheran - Capetown. For plants outside that area, "A" Force requested the London Controlling Section be responsible for those operations.

David Mure, in his book "Practise to Deceive", provides much insight into the scope and depth of the use of double agents to plant the bits and pieces for Plan BARCLAY on the German secret service. Some of the most important agents described by Mure were the PESSIMISTS, three in particular: PESSIMIST B - Costa, PESSIMIST C - Mimi and Jack (Mimi was the leader and Jack was the radio operator), and PESSIMIST Z - Basile. These were real agents who were captured and either were now in jail or had been turned on the Germans and held incommunicado, a practice imposed by Clarke but not by London in their handling of double agents. Their place was taken by controllers who transmitted the notional order of battle to a German secret service station in Sofia, for example, from Damascus. Costa was actually in jail in Palestine, Mimi and Jack were confined and actually assisting British intelligence, and Basile was factually in jail in the  
20  
Middle East.

QUICKSILVER was also a turned agent who was now assisting the British; he was notionally providing information from Lebanon to the German Abwehrstelle in Athens. As was the case with other turned agents, he was also confined. Assisting him were CHEESE and others in Egypt, Tripoli, Algiers and Casablanca; HUMBLE and  
21  
ALERT in Syria and Lebanon, and LEMON in Cyprus. A report from Crichton's Advance Hqs "A" Force on 6 June 1943 in Algiers detailing progress made on selling the story to the Germans portrays hints of other agents in north Africa not mentioned in Mure's book. These were RAM, JEWEL, WHISKERS and an "Elkstom team" with the exception of EL GITANO" which had opened up their  
22  
channels to the Germans.

In addition to these 'Most Secret Intelligence methods', movements and operations of real forces supported the BARCLAY plan, one of the toughest things for the deception planners to achieve, especially regarding the use of air assets. LCS was requested by "A" Force to arrange with the Air Ministry for photographic reconnaissance over landing beaches in southern France. Main Hq "A" Force in Cairo requested GHQ Middle East Forces arrange for photo reconnaissance sorties over beaches in the Peloponnese and western Crete and raiding operations against western Crete, Kythera Island, Zante Island and the Peloponnese. According to M.R.D. Foot, the SOE historian, partisan diversions were arranged in Greece; this operation was known as Plan ANIMALS.<sup>23</sup> GHQ MEF was also to arrange for special training of Greek troops for Balkan operations, as it was also important to deceive their own allies, and for the installation of a special radio link between Cairo and Cyrenaica, one of the embarkation ports for the notional invasion. In support of the BARCLAY plan, long-range fighter attacks were flown against shipping and other targets in southern Greece, increasing in intensity as the notional D-Day approached. The "A" Force operation in Algiers, Advance Hq "A" Force, requested that AFHQ conduct photo reconnaissance flights and raiding operations against landing beaches in Sardinia, maximum bombing of targets in Sardinia with an extra effort immediately prior to 10 July, and training of French troops in North Africa for amphibious operations. The radio links between Malta, the location for Eisenhower's Headquarters directly prior to the invasion, and Washington, and

among stations serving Montgomery's Eighth Army were disguised by routing traffic via cable, 'other means', probably courier, and by routing the traffic so as not to provide a direct link between Malta and Washington. This later connection was especially critical since one of the Eighth Army divisions, the one on Malta, was notionally to assault in the Peloponnese. AFHQ disguised these stations as American and British naval stations rather than a combined/joint headquarters by using naval ciphers, procedure and personnel.

Headquarters Middle East Forces also initiated genuine administrative preparations for an invasion of the Balkans. These procedures focused on preparing forces to fight in a country which spoke the Greek language and which used Greek currency. Greek interpreters were earmarked and awards were given for proficiency in the Greek language. Greek currency was purchased and notice boards in the Greek language were erected near the exit from the docks which would load the invasion forces. Maps of Crete and the Peloponnese, and intelligence documents, medical instructions for the Balkans, etc., were issued to the formations bound for Sicily. Cyrillic-type documents and Polish-Bulgarian phrase books were prepared by Hqs MEF. One of the planning staffs of Force 545 (British 8th Army) was renamed "Hq Twelfth Army". AFHQ was asked by "A" Force to issue maps of southern France, Sardinia and Corsica to the notional forces bound for operations in the western Mediterranean and France. French currency was purchased and appropriate intelligence documents were prepared for distribution to the troops. An order from the Chief of Staff, AFHQ, cancelled all



leaves in that command to begin on 20 June. This order which went out in early June was rescinded on 15 June to coincide with the second postponement of the invasion. On 7 June inquiries were made at seven book stores in Tunis for travel guides and maps of Sardinia and southern France.<sup>24</sup> Some of the troops who were on the receiving end of these procedures would naturally question the sanity of the upper command levels: one of the by-products was to confuse their own troops and, thereby, provide information to those low-grade Axis agents who were not under the control of the Allies.

In the eastern Mediterranean, dummy landing craft and aircraft were displayed by "A" Force in Cyrenaica and Egypt where real landing craft and aircraft could not be spotted by enemy air reconnaissance. The "A" Force unit attached to AFHQ did not have to arrange for dummies in North Africa because sufficient real landing craft and aircraft were available -- this is the shipping which gave the game away to those excellent Italian intelligence analysts on Sicily who had dependable sources in North Africa. It was necessary, however, to conceal concentrations of landing craft in Sousse, Sfax and Malta in order to disguise the apparent threat to Sicily and this was reported accomplished by 6 June by "A" Force in Algiers.<sup>25</sup> AFHQ also arranged for French troops to undergo amphibious training immediately after the training for the HUSKY forces was completed. This amounted to 96 French officers who received training for a mission they would never be sent on - the invasion of Sicily. (Once again, as in the case of the Greeks and the Polish troops, an ally, the French, were

deceived about the plan to invade Sicily.) To assist in concealing tanks concentrating near eastern Tunisian posts, sunshields which were effective in the dessert during the deception operation for El Alamein were used.

In London, the LCS arranged for rumors to be spread in the UK and, through JSC, in the USA, that the 1 (Canadian) Division and the 45 (US) Division which were to be used in the assault, were to be considered a reinforcement to North Africa with the port of landing somewhere in Morocco. This rumor was to be spread to only those who knew the convoys were to sail -- in effect, deceiving their own troops who were sailing from the UK (the Canadian division) and from the USA. "A" Force also requested that LCS coordinate with PWE for the dropping of leaflets directed against the morale of the Axis forces in southern France. "A" Force in Cairo coordinated the dropping of leaflets in western Crete and the Peloponnese. Rumor campaigns in the UK and the USA were originated to support selected items of the 'story'. Again, LCS coordinated this effort with the JSC in Washington. Rumors were spread among invasion forces that they were destined for the Balkans. Rumor campaigns by SIME were created in Egypt, Palestine and Syria to support appropriate parts of the story. In addition to these rumors, LCS arranged with the British Foreign Office for diplomats to plant information via the "cocktail circuit" in Sweden and Switzerland.

The intensity of leaflet dropping was timed to coincide with the postponements. For example, the first peak for Sardinia would be reached on 10 May followed by a sharp drop until early

June, when efforts were to be gradually intensified until the genuine D-8, 2 July. Leaflets were to be dropped on Sicily but gradually would be eased off until 10 May; then there was to be a sharp drop and a low, but regular, effort maintained up until D Day. Leaflets, 340 thousand of them, were scheduled to be dropped on southern Italy by early June.<sup>27</sup> The actual number of leaflets and the locations for the drops were far below what "A" Force wanted, however, due to lack of allied aircraft.<sup>28</sup> "A" Force in Algiers, however, arranged for the intensification of radio broadcasts to southern France to compensate.<sup>29</sup>

Based on a suggestion from Alexander, Eisenhower proposed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 29 June to use 'black radio', i.e., an Allied radio broadcast which would appear to be an Italian broadcast originating from Italy, immediately prior to HUSKY D-Day to spread propaganda that Italy had asked for and the Allies had agreed to an armistice. Use of 'black radio' was thought by the field commanders to have a potential to discourage Italians at the crucial moment but which also had the potential to deceive the British and American troops about the expected strength of the Italian resistance. Churchill felt, and Roosevelt agreed, that the consequences would be grave if the knowledge of this operation became known to the people of Italy and, thereby, damaged the credibility of the Allied information services.<sup>30</sup> Eisenhower withdrew his proposal on 4 July. Actually, the state of the Italian morale was already weak and would be weakened even further as news of the Allied landing and victory in Sicily became known in Italy. Churchill and Roosevelt

hesitated to accede to to their field commanders suggestion in order to protect the direct links to the Italian people -- in this case, it was not necessary and the risk far outweighed the possible gain.

Cover dates and destinations were made known to those who knew the real dates and destinations in order for personnel to have readily available a date and destination which were not genuine rather than compelling members of the invasion forces to off-handedly disguise the genuine dates and destinations. Cover dates were useful in refusing social engagements, giving up billets, etc.

The BARCLAY cover plan included an elaborate radio deception plan which intended to manipulate radio traffic in order to not convey to the enemy the destination and date for the landings in Sicily. "A" Force planners were faced with several problems: inevitable increases and decreases in traffic volume at several terminals resulting from the need for increased coordination between the planners and the commanders as D-Day approached, planned movements of the commanders to Bizerta and Malta from Algiers as Eisenhower and Alexander moved their staff closer to the battle, and differences in radio traffic procedures between the Allies. Since it was not possible to disguise increases in the volume associated with Bizerta and Malta, a rare double bluff was created. "A" Force intended to make the enemy believe that the move of Eisenhower and the other commanders was a deliberate attempt on the part of the Allies to focus attention on the central Mediterranean. If the moves of the commanders were to take place before D-6 (4 July), no action would be taken in

connection with Bizerta. However, traffic to and from Malta would be disguised as follows:

- a. traffic was to be routed by cable wherever possible;
- b. traffic which must be transmitted by radio was manipulated to look like dummy traffic; and,
- c. special measures were to be taken at Malta to reduce the volume and the number of priorities of genuine radio traffic.

If the move was to take place after D-6 and no double bluff was necessary, the following steps were to be taken:

- a. traffic from Algiers to London, Washington and Cairo, etc., and in the reverse direction was to be maintained at the same level as before the move;
- b. traffic to and from Bizerta and Malta was to be routed by cable;
- c. genuine traffic was to be made to look like dummy traffic;
- d. the volume and number of priorities of genuine traffic was to be reduced, and, if possible,
- e. radio traffic in the USA was to be manipulated in order to screen the date of sailing of the convoy from the states.

The movement of Eisenhower's headquarters to Malta was apparently seriously considered by AFHQ as early as May 1943 and strongly opposed by "A" Force. It was clear that a move to Malta would signal to the Axis that an invasion of Sicily was the next operational objective of the Allies and it would give the Germans time to move forces to Sicily or, at least, onto Italy ready for

reemployment to either Sardinia or Sicily. According to "A" Force, it would not be possible to disguise the movement of AFHQ from May until D-Day because of the notorious indiscretions of air crews which would fly the aircraft supporting the headquarters and the uncontrollable talk by the merchant shipping crew which were sailing between Malta and North African waters. The deception for Sicily was at a particularly critical time in early May and a move to Malta could have destroyed Plan BARCLAY. "A" Force argued for AFHQ to remain at Algiers or for a move to Bizerta which would have supported the deception plan.<sup>34</sup> This time AFHQ listened to their deception planners and delayed the move of the headquarters until just prior to D-Day.

Radio deception was also used to disguise the movements of American reinforcement aircraft in the Mediterranean. Signals to and from aircraft flying from west to east were exaggerated to give the impression a buildup was occurring in the eastern Mediterranean, and signals minimized from aircraft flying east to west across the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Ground radio traffic was manipulated to convey movements of American transport aircraft to Egypt from North Africa about a week before HUSKY.

Radio was also used to simulate a Naval Headquarters at Tobruk to coincide with the appearance of dummy landing craft in that area. "A" Force formed a committee consisting of representatives of the Mediterranean Air Command, CINC Mediterranean (Naval) and a Force 141 representative to do the detailed planning necessary to effect the radio deception plan.<sup>35</sup>

By the middle of May, as we have seen in chapter IV, it was

apparent through ULTRA that the Germans were buying the story in that troops and material were being earmarked for both Sardinia and Corsica. However, German troops were moving onto the Italian mainland and could pose a threat to the Sicilian operation, if moved onto or near the island. In order to continue the German focus on Sardinia and Corsica, "A" Force in Algiers asked AFHQ to request the Allied Air Forces to attack targets in southern France, Corsica and Sardinia. Up until that time, southern France was not attacked from the air because of a ban imposed by General Giraud on bombing of France from North Africa.<sup>36</sup> Bombing, however, was conducted against Sardinia and Italy in early June 1943 to support the deception plan. The record shows that the deception planners at AFHQ thought the bombing of Pantellaria occurring at the same time was for the benefit of the deception plan.<sup>37</sup> Weren't they aware that Pantellaria had become a genuine operation? Possibly not. There is a chance that since "A" Force was under intelligence at AFHQ, at the time, Crichton was not privy to the genuine operations plans, although that hardly seems credible. Clarke made urgent appeals for strategic bombing missions against southern France in the weeks immediately preceding HUSKY D-Day. Due to the lack of bombing in France and the attention being paid to bombing in the central Mediterranean, German divisions were moved from southern France into Italy. The allied capture of Pantellaria on 10 June focused increased attention on Sicily and Sardinia, especially Sicily, at the expense of the deception plans. Clarke recommended that CINC Air in North Africa request permission to bomb Toulon or

communications in southern France from the Combined Chiefs of Staff but apparently to no avail.<sup>38</sup>

In addition to the massive operational level deception operation being conducted against the Axis, a Naval demonstration was employed during the first few days of HUSKY to retain enemy reserves in the western side of the island at a time when 15 Army Group was attacking the island from the south and the east. Also, in early July, there was a highly visible west-to-east movement of a large British naval task force, Force "H", of four battleships, two aircraft carriers with accompanying six light<sup>40</sup> cruisers and eighteen destroyers through the Sicilian narrows. This force arrived near Crete and made a show in tandem with commando raids (Operation ANIMALS) taking place there. Also, noise-making devices and naval gunfire was used by the US Navy against the Trapani Naval District on the northwest coast of Sicily up through D plus 1.<sup>41</sup> Other tactical diversions such as the use of sonic equipment (Operation ARSENAL), radar reflectors and jamming devices were employed by the Navy during HUSKY and were supervised by US Lt. Cdr. Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., a special<sup>42</sup> operations officer attached to USN Northwest African Waters. The US Navy 'beachjumpers' also were involved in raiding operations on the southwest and northern coasts of Sicily to<sup>43</sup> continue to draw attention away from the landing beaches.

Although not formally directed in Plan BARCLAY, there were a number of ad hoc steps taken by Advance Hqs "A" Force in Algiers in the week immediately preceding D-Day to support the overall cover and deception involved in the Sicily operation. As the airborne divisions which were to participate in the operation



moved to their assembly areas for the crossover to Sicily, AFHQ and "A" Force were particularly concerned that these movements did not botch the security of the operation and break down the deception plan. The story proposed and executed by "A" Force was to sell the Axis the movement to the assembly area was only preparatory to a final move for jumping off to Sardinia and Corsica. "A" Force knew it would be impossible to hide the movements of the entire 1 British Airborne and 82 U.S. Airborne Division, and that the enemy was already aware of its initial location. The assembly area definitely threatened a move to Sicily. The distinctive red beret worn by the troops was like a road sign and the Germans and Italians paid much attention to these forces because of their role in indications and warning of forthcoming operations. Although there had been much confusion among the troops themselves during the regroupings in North Africa after the successful operations in that area as to where they would be going next, "A" Force planned to take a number of steps to deceive the enemy. "A" Force arranged with the Air Force to fly reconnaissance missions against the new (notional) base areas and administrative preparations were taken to substantiate a further move at a later date. Other allies in North Africa were asked to assist the airborne divisions with their reconnaissance, and conferences were held in the reconnaissance area to support the movement of the two divisions. In addition, the double agents were employed by "A" Force and SIME in the area to sell the idea of another move after the genuine move into the assembly area. The airborne divisions,

AFHQ and 15 Army Group all assisted in the operation by arrangements through "A" Force. All of this was to no avail as the Italians divined the intentions regarding Sicily, however, and they correctly located the Allied airborne forces moving to the railhead.<sup>44</sup>

Tactical Hq West "A" Force with 15 Army Group also assisted through coordination with Advance "A" in Algiers during the move of the Alexander's headquarters from Buzareah to La Marsa in the weeks preceding the invasion. The Hqs moved in small parties in a westward movement on 24 June towards Oran and left parts of the Hqs to reflect an initial presence in that area.<sup>45</sup> Radio links were maintained from the old locations and the troops themselves including the leaders of these small parties were not told the extent of the move.<sup>46</sup> In addition, "A" Force arranged for reserve divisions to move some of their forces to occupy the areas vacated by the assault forces in the several days before the jump-off.<sup>47</sup>

The Allies went through enormous pains regarding the operational and deception planning for Sicily -- it was the grandest operation of the war until Normandy. But their effort did not go unrewarded: they dispersed the German forces and saved Allied lives. Not all of their effort, however, was entirely successful but they learned much from the Sicily operation which would win them the prize in future operations. The experiences of the Allied theater deception planners were bound to also help other theaters and so the Combined Chiefs of Staff requested Eisenhower submit a report of the planning and implementation of deception, and its organization, in order that other theaters

would benefit.

Before we close the story on the deception operation mounted for Sicily, we need to review one of the most famous ruses of the Second World War - Operation MINCEMEAT - but in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER V

1. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army Military History Institute, Record Group 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Minutes of Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting held 16 January 1943 at Casablanca.
2. Albert N. Garland, Howard McGaw Smyth and Martin Blumenson, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Sicily, pp. 69-71.
3. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army Military History Institute, Record Group 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Minutes of a Meeting held at General Eisenhower's Villa, Algiers between Combined Chiefs of Staff, Churchill and Eisenhower on 29 May 1943. At the same meeting, Churchill proposed following up bombardment of Pantellaria by dropping harmless bombs which would deceive the enemy into thinking they were still underfire and thus keep their heads down until the assault force arrived. There is no record of his suggestion being taken up at the meeting.
4. Ibid., Minutes of Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting held 20 January 1943 at Casablanca.
5. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 385, AFHQ Memorandum to Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated 21 December 1943, subject: Cover and Deception Plans November 1942 - November 1943.
6. Ibid., Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, Cover and

Deception Files, Box 7, Plan BARCLAY, dated 10 April 1943.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid. Also, see Record Group 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated 3 April 1943, subject: Deception Policy 1943 (Germany and Italy).

9. Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, pp. 61-84.

10. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military History Division, Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, Cover and Deception Files, Box 7, Plan BARCLAY, dated 10 April 1943.

11. Ibid., and Amendment No. 2.

12. Ibid., and Amendment No. 1.

13. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army Military History Institute, Stenographic Service at Fuehrerhauptquartier, dated 28 August 1945, Hitler daily briefing 12 December 1942.

14. Plan BARCLAY and Amendment No. 1.

15. Stenographic Service at Fuehrerhauptquartier, dated 28 August 1945, Hitler daily briefing 19 May 1943.

16. Plan BARCLAY.

17. Ibid., and Amendment No. 1.

18. Ibid., and Amendments No. 1 and 2.

19. Ibid. See, also Record Group 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated 3 April 1943, subject: Deception Policy 1943 (Germany and Italy).

20. David Mure, Practice to Deceive, pp. 97-97 and 256.

21. Ibid., p. 101.

22. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, Memorandum from Lt. Col. Crichton, Advance Hqs West "A" Force, dated 6 June 1943, subject: Progress Report from Advance Hqs "A" Force.

23. M.R.D. Foot, SOE in France, p. 308. Also, see Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army Military History Institute, ULTRA Records, Reel 137, 7 July to 11 July 1943, ML 6507, dated 7 July 1943. This report by Bletchley Park of an ULTRA decrypt demonstrates the nervousness of the German CINC Southeast concerning Allied landing intentions in western Greece. The German assessment for 2 July estimated the British preparing landing operations in the area Jannina, Areta and Agrinion. The Port of Astakos, and the islands of Cephalonia and Ithaca were also mentioned but not specified in the German report. One of the causes for the German estimate was the presence of guerilla bands in Aetolia, Akarnania and in Jannina - Arts area. Finally, there were Allied agents captured on Corfu which were tasked with investigating the food situation, climatic and weather conditions of the island, and favorable airlanding areas near the coasts.

24. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, Memorandum from Lt. Col. Crichton, Advance Hqs West "A" Force, dated 6 June 1943, subject: Progress Report from Advance Hqs "A" Force.

25. Ibid.

26. Cruickshank, pp. 58-59.

27. Lt. Col. Crichton memorandum dated 6 June 1943, subject: Progress Report from Advance Hqs "A" Force.

28. Cruickshank, p. 57.

29. Plan BARCLAY and Amendments No. 1 and 2. Also, see London, England, Public Record Office, FO 898, Piece 398, dated 29 June 1943, for information about the leaflets dropped on Paris and the radio broadcasts from North Africa in support of the Sicily invasion. "A" Force originally requested leaflets be dropped on Perpignan, Narbonne, Sete, Marseilles, Toulon and Nice on the southern coast, and Toulouse, Montpellier, Nimes, Arles, Avignon, Clermont-Ferrand, Vichy, St. Etienne, Lyon and Grenoble further inland. The only location at which the Allies dropped leaflets was over Paris: over 800,000 in 50 packages. The broadcast instructed the French people and the resistance to expect a major operation any day but not to do anything unless specifically instructed to do so by the Allies, including the Free French.

30. London, England, Public Record Office, AIR 20, Piece 4535, Telegrams: from Eisenhower to Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated 29 June 1943; from Churchill to Field Marshall Dill, dated 3 July 1943; from Churchill to Alexander, dated 3 July 1943; from Churchill to Eisenhower, dated 4 July 1943; from Eisenhower to Churchill, dated 4 July 1943; from Dill to Churchill dated 4 July 1943.

31. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army Military History Institute, Arthur S. Nevins papers, Box HUSKY and S. Italy, File: Force 141, Hq Force 141 Planning Instruction 14, Implementation of the Cover Plan.

32. Plan BARCLAY, Amendment No. 1, Wireless Deception Plan.

33. Ibid.

34. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records

Division, Record Group 331, Records of AFHQ, Memorandum from Lt. Col. Wild, Main Hqs "A" Force, dated 7 May 1943, subject: Proposed Move of General Eisenhower's HQ to Malta.

35. Plan BARCLAY, Amendment No. 1.

36. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 331, Records of AFHQ, Memorandum from Lt. Col. Crichton, Advance Hqs "A" Force, dated 14 June 1943, subject: Main Objects of Plan "BARCLAY" in Relation to the Advisability of Early and Consistent Bombing of Cover Targets.

37. Ibid., Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, Memorandum from Lt. Col Crichton, Advance Hqs "A" Force, dated 6 June 1943, subject: Progress Report from Advance Hqs "A" Force.

38. Ibid., Record Group 331, Records of AFHQ, Memorandum from Colonel Dudley Clarke, Advance Hqs "A" Force, dated 19 June 1943, subject: Bombing of Southern France. As is the case with several memorandums in AFHQ records, Clarke writes his memorandum from a location nearer the impending action; in mid-June 1943, he is at Algiers, apparently helping Crichton in the progress of the deception plan for the Sicily invasion, a scant three weeks away.

39. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, volume IX, Sicily - Salerno - Anzio January 1943 - June 1944, p. 167.

40. Ibid., p. 167.

41. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, RG 331, Records of AFHQ, Memorandum from Lt. Col. Caldwell, Hqs 7th (US) Army, to AFHQ, dated 4 December 1943, subject: Effects of Cover and Deception Plans. See also, London, England, Public Record Office, WO 204, Piece 6860, Memorandum



dated 27 June 1943, subject: Operation FRACTURE. Operation FRACTURE was a series of ship and convoy moves by the Allies intended to protect the landing beaches by containing German reserves on Sicily awaiting a notional second invasion. The planners assessed that the presence in the western basin of Force "Z", a group of Allied surface combatants, and the sailing of US landing craft from Bizerta and follow-up US landing craft on D+3 plus the concentration of shipping on the North African coast after D-Day would help contain the German reserves at least until D+2. The naval feint, part of FRACTURE, was intended to take place on D+2/D+3 but occurred on D+1 instead probably due to the immediate potential for the commitment of the German reserves. In addition to the naval feint and the supporting convoy moves, the Allied air forces bombed the ports of Marsala, Masara and Trapani on D+1, again to fix German attention on the western approaches to the island.

42. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, RG 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 385, AFHQ Memorandum to Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated 21 December 1943, subject: Cover and Deception Plans November 1942 - November 1943; London, England, Public Record Office, WO 204, Piece 1561, Memorandum from Lt. Cdr. Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., USN Forces, Northwest African Waters, dated 24 November 1943, subject: U.S. Navy Special Operations - report of.

43. Ibid.; Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, RG 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 385, Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African

Waters to Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet, dated 11 November 1943, subject: Recommendation for Special Organization for Deceptive Warfare. Parts of Admiral Hewitt's memorandum deserve a further quote: "... It has been apparent from my experience in this Theater that the requirements of the Naval and Military Services frequently demand mutual assistance for special operations but that there is no central pool from which trained deceptive and diversionary planning and combat personnel can be drawn, nor any central depot from which all services can be provided with the special equipment and materials they need.....I recommend that it be proposed to the JCS that a single American inter-service organization be established to perform the following functions:

a. Develop and present to the JCS and for approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, overall strategic deception plans;

b. Supply Theater Commanders with personnel, trained in deception, to devise and implement strategic deception plans and to plan diversionary and/or raiding operations...;

c. Develop for and supply to Theater Commanders the special equipment required;

d. Be prepared to assist in planning and, when required, executing other special services, i.e., prisoner escape operations, landing of agents behind enemy lines; assist and advise Allied Secret Service organizations in executing their missions...". Hewitt went on to state that an inter-service organization would have advantages over the British "A" Force organization which was largely manned and controlled by Army personnel. This monopoly by British Army personnel gradually shifted to include all three services and a heavy dose of

Americans by the end of 1944.

44. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, RG 331, Records of AFHQ, Memorandum from Lt. Col. Crichton, Advance Hqs "A" Force, to AFHQ, dated 10 June 1943. Also, see Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army Military History Institute, ULTRA Records, Reel 137, 7 July through 11 July 1943, ML 6675, dated 9 July 1943. According to an Italian intelligence report for 2 July which was relayed by Kesselring's staff and available to the Allies through ULTRA, there were numerous trainloads of English airborne troops observed on the railway at Oudja and Constantine. The Italians estimated these troops belonged to the British 1st Airborne Division which was previously located in Mascara district south of Oran. The Italians spotted and correctly identified these troops a week before the invasion moving eastward to their jumping off points and thereby negating the work by "A" Force 15th Army Group to deceive the enemy regarding the airborne troops. Again, the Italians prove they had impeccable sources.

45. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, RG 331, Records of AFHQ, Memorandum from Lt. Col. Strangeways, Tactical Hqs "A" Force, to Force 141, dated 14 June 1943. See, also London, England, Public Record Office, WO 204, AFHQ, Piece 1561, Memorandum from Force 141, dated 16 June 1943, subject: Report of Deception Plan.

46. London, England, Public Record Office, WO 106, Piece 3867, Message from Force 141 to War Office 18 June 1943. Reference states the intention of 15th Army Group to open up a dummy radio

link from Oran on 27 June to London. 15th Army Group requested that the traffic volume be maintained at 1500 groups daily and that all traffic be dummy both ways including the average number of priorities, checks and repeats. If the dummy link broke down, London was to contact the Army Group via AFHQ in Algiers. The dummy link was to be closed down at 0700Z on D-Day when the operational link from La Marsa would open. The genuine headquarters at La Marsa would use AFHQ to route messages except for personal messages from Alexander which would be routed via radio link between the Air Ministry in London and the Command Post Mediterranean Air link from La Marsa.

47. Colonel Archibald, G3 Operations, AFHQ, Memorandum to G3, dated 18 June 1943, subject: Cover Plan for Move of 1st US Infantry Division.

48. London, England, Public Record Office, WO 106, Piece 3944, Message from War Office (Combined Chiefs of Staff) to Eisenhower, dated 22 November 1943.

## CHAPTER VI

### The Sicilian Gambit

"Move when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of forces." Sun Tzu

Plan MINCEMEAT conceived and executed from London is the best known deception operation carried out in support of the Allied landings in Sicily simply because of a book written in 1953 by Ewen Montagu, a member of Naval Intelligence in London during the war. Montagu and Flight Lieutenant Cholmondeley originated the idea in 1942 of using a body washed up on the shores of Spain to present the Germans through the Spanish authorities with documents which hinted that the next operation in the Mediterranean would be carried out against Greece and Sardinia.<sup>1</sup> Although the story of "The Man Who Never Was" was popular long after its release, read again, the book is understandably misleading in that it pretends that some material which showed acceptance of the ruse by the Germans in 1943 was not available to London until the capture of German records in 1945. This was a deception played on the public so the real secret of how the Allies knew -- through ULTRA -- that the bait had been taken would not be revealed to the public until long after the war.

The book was so popular that a motion picture was made depicting the events now described. Lieutenant Commander Montagu, a member of Naval Intelligence Division (NID), Section 17M, and the member representing Naval matters on J.C. Masterman's XX Committee, created a fictitious identification of a Captain, (acting Major), William Martin of the Royal Marines, which was given to the body of a person who died of pneumonia after exposure in late 1942. The body was placed in cold storage in November 1942 while Montagu got permission for the scheme<sup>2</sup> and while the necessary documents were prepared and signed by the real characters in the plot. In addition to the preparation of documents, a cylindrical canister stuffed with dry ice for the shipment of the body was built to Montagu's specifications. A submarine and the cylinder were used to transport the body from Scotland via submarine to a location off Spain near the town of Huelva where a German agent was known to be operating. The notion was to convince the authorities that the body had been involved in the crash of an aircraft on a flight from England to Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers.

"William Martin" floated into the harbor in a Mae West on 30 April 1943 with a leather courier pouch attached to his arm. The Spanish authorities as the British suspected<sup>3</sup> turned the documents over to the Germans who copied them and sent them to German Naval intelligence in Berlin. The documents in the pouch built up a personality for Martin and included his engagement to an imaginary fiancée, an unpaid bill for an engagement ring, a letter from his pompous Edwardian father, theater ticket stubs

and bus tickets.

The most important document in Major Martin's possession was a letter to General Alexander, Eisenhower's deputy for the invasion of Sicily, from General Nye, Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff.<sup>4</sup> The letter written in an 'old boy' style from 'Archie to Alex' attempted to persuade the Germans that Sicily was a cover target for BRIMSTONE (the real covername for the invasion of Sardinia) and that forces in the eastern Mediterranean, some of which were in reality to be used against Sicily, were part of an extensive operation to be mounted by CINC Middle East against the Balkans. Although Sardinia was not directly mentioned in the Nye letter, Montagu did get approval for a joking reference to "sardines" in another letter from Lord Montbatten to Admiral Cunningham in the same pouch.<sup>5</sup>

While Montagu's book demonstrates the brilliance of a very risky but ingenious ruse, it does not show the necessary underlying bogus order of battle which allowed the Germans and the Italians to estimate that there could be two operations conducted simultaneously in the Eastern and Western Mediterranean which gave credence to the documents. Montagu also takes much credit for origination of the strategic deception policy of the LCS, the Mediterranean strategy of "A" Force and its work to sell in bits and pieces the whole story to the Axis. Written in 1953 before the ULTRA secret had been disclosed, the book did not elaborate on how the Allies knew the deception operation had been successful: within two weeks of the body being washed up on the Spanish coast, ULTRA revealed the Germans had accepted the plans and documents to be genuine.<sup>6</sup> On 14 May, the

radio link from the OKW to Kesselring and other commanders, revealed that the High Command had 'absolutely reliable' information that large scale Allied landings would occur in both the western and eastern Mediterranean with the object of the latter being the Peloponnese.<sup>7</sup>

As we wrote earlier, Montagu was a member of Naval Intelligence and the Navy member on the XX Committee, Masterman's group which directed the activities of the double agents. He was also in on ULTRA but when he wrote his book in 1953, none of these explanations, i.e., the double agents, ULTRA or the "A" Force and LCS, were known publicly. The Allies, however, as we have seen in Chapter IV, were provided a continuous update of the scope of German reinforcements to Sicily, Sardinia and the Balkans after the fall of Tunisia to the Allies.<sup>8</sup>

Hitler was still uncertain during this period regarding the extent and location of the diversion operation which was to be conducted in the Western Mediterranean but he apparently remained convinced that the major assault would take place in the Balkans. Kesselring, although he had gone along with Hitler initially, feared a landing at Palermo perhaps after Sardinia, and moved the 15th Panzer in position to go to either island from the mainland; he also moved two Italian divisions on Sicily to the western side of the island.<sup>9</sup> In June, after the seizure of Pantellaria, Kesselring ordered the Herman Goering Division onto the island as he was now certain Sicily was the next Allied target in the Mediterranean.

Although the idea for Plan MINCEMEAT was originated in 1942



by Montagu and Cholmondeley, they could not have known at that time the next effort by the Allies would be against Sicily. It was not until the Casablanca conference in January 1943 that the British could be certain the Americans would agree to Sicily. The body of Major Martin washed ashore on 30 April and the information reached the Germans in Berlin in early May at about the time their forces in Tunis had been destroyed or captured. The critical time for decisions relative to defense in the southern region against subsequent Allied operations was during May -- the timing for the MINCEMEAT operation could not have been better.

What is interesting about the MINCEMEAT affair is not only the method used and the deliberate inaccuracy of the information released in 1953 but also the idea for the deception originated in London for a military operation in the Mediterranean. The concept was created and executed by intelligence officers in London, all fairly rare occurrences for operations in that theater up to that time. Regardless, the story does demonstrate the value of a one-of-a-kind ruse and the need for an organization and men who have the creativity and initiative to originate schemes like the MINCEMEAT operation. What is also interesting is the coordination process necessary to allow this rather unconventional program take place -- although section 17M in NID originated the idea, the coordination process took it to the London Controlling Section, the British Chiefs of Staff and to Churchill himself for approval. This process took time and it wasn't until 30 April that the body finally floated to the Spanish shore although the scheme was hatched many months before.

Chance does really play in war. Regardless, the body arrived at the right place at the propitious moment, was picked up by Spanish fishermen, handed over to the authorities who in turn provided the information from the courier pouch to the Germans. The nameless German liaison recognized the value of the documents and forwarded them on to Berlin for evaluation. Less than two weeks later, on 12 May, the OKW had made their estimate for their field commanders. The timing and luck of all this is phenomenal!

The ULTRA decrypts clearly demonstrated that the OKW accepted the documents as genuine and made their estimate on that single incident, a dangerous practice. The estimate simply paraphrased the Nye letter to Alexander and did not question or expand on the information in that letter as to the places for the assault and the forces for the assault -- this is absolutely incredible and points out the need to suspect an intelligence estimate based on one piece of information.

It is now time to leave the successful deception operations in support of Sicily and follow the Allies on to the Italian mainland where things did not always go as smoothly.

## CHAPTER VI

1. Even Montagu, The Man Who Never Was, pp. 15-18.
2. London, England, Public Record Office, CAB 79, Piece 60, British Chiefs of Staff meeting #68, 7 April 1943; Meeting #78, 13 April 1943 for approval by Chiefs of Staff for MINCEMEAT. Also, see AIR 20, Piece 4535, Summary from Chiefs of Staff meeting #77, 15 April 1943 for Churchill approval and direction that Eisenhower be told of the operation.
3. Montagu, Beyond Top Secret ULTRA, p. 144.
4. Montagu, The Man Who Never Was, pp. 44-48 and appendix.
5. Ibid., p. 58.
6. Ronald Lewin, ULTRA Goes to War, p. 280.
7. F.H. Hinsley, et al, British Intelligence in the Second World War. Volume II. Part I, pp. 78-79; Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army Military History Institute, Reel 127, 5 to 15 May 1943, ML 1955, dated 15 May 1943. The ULTRA report from Bletchley is quoted in full: ML1955 Information from Supreme Commander Armed Forces, Operations Staff, Army to AOC in C South (CINC South) and C in C South East (CINC Southeast) on twelfth (of July 1943). Operations staffs of Supreme Commands Navy and GAF (German Air Force) informed. Quote According to a source which may be regarded as absolutely reliable, an enemy landing undertaking on a large scale is projected in the near future in both the eastern and western Mediterranean...The undertaking in the eastern Med has as its objective the coast near Kalamata and the coastal sector south of Cape Araxos, both places on the west coast of the

Peloponnese. (The bait has been swallowed.) The landing near Kalamata is to be carried out by Five Six Infantry Division, and that near Cape Araxos by the reinforced Five Infantry Division. It is not clear whether both divisions will operate at full strength or only with elements. (This is a comment by the Operations Staff, OKW.) If the former were the case about two or three weeks would be needed before the beginning of the landing. Should only elements of the divisions operate, the landing could take place at any time. The cover name for the landing is HUSKY (the deception planners 'give away' the codename but the Germans believe it represents a landing in the Balkans). A feint against the Dodecanese must be reckoned with. Unquote. Comment: (The following comment is by the Bletchley Park reporter.) Known that further information, presumably dealing with western Mediterranean, nature of which unknown here, was to be sent to other addressees named above, but not to C in C Southeast. (Presumably the message dealing with the western Mediterranean was not sent by radio to other addressees and, therefore, not available to the cryptologists.) Date of Message is 15 May 1943, sent at 1551Z. End of Message. This is the undeniable evidence that the Germans believed the MINCEMEAT letters -- the operations could be substantiated by other reports (double agents in the Mediterranean, bogus order of battle, etc., etc.) and they had now 'pieced together' all the bits and pieces. The deception was complete until the Allies tipped their hand and seized Pantellaria in June; although it was too late for Hitler to move major formations to Sicily, it was not too late for Kesselring to

move the Goering Division onto the island.

8. Lewin, p. 106.

9. Ibid.

10. Montagu, The Man Who Never Was, p. 25.

## CHAPTER VII

### Reorganization and Deception Post-HUSKY

#### Part I: The Italian Campaign

"The more you employ stratagems and ruses, the more advantages you will enjoy over the enemy." Frederick the Great

Following the apparent successes of "A" Force in the Mediterranean in mid 1943 and the overall contribution to Allied operations of deception, as measured by the Allies themselves, there were perceptible steps to begin a shift of emphasis from the Mediterranean theater to the Western European theater and the forthcoming invasion of the continent, Operation OVERLORD. The organization of deception in the Mediterranean and the Middle East had evolved from Wavell's action to bring Dudley Clarke to his command from London in late 1940 as his instrument to conceive and execute deception in support of military operations for British Middle East Forces. From this rather modest beginning of a Colonel and a small staff of officers in Cairo, "A" Force had become the most pervasive and influential military deception organization in Europe and the Middle East. However, as we shall see in this and the following chapter, the "A" Force organization was reduced in late 1943 by the transfer of people to the deception organizations being formed in England, and

further reduced by the need for experienced deceivers at 21st Army Group and for the landings in southern France as the focus of deception activities shifted to the central and western areas rather than the central Mediterranean and the Middle East.


After the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, the deception planners were called upon to generate plans and deception activities in support of the landings at Salerno near Naples, at Anzio near Rome, and on the southern coast of France. In addition to these operations, there were requirements to continue support of the Allied land operations in Italy and, most importantly, support to the crucial deception in support of the landings in Normandy. In this chapter, we shall explore the deception operations mounted by the Allies during the Italian campaign and some of the "A" Force reorganization following Sicily.

Immediately after the HUSKY operation, there followed in rapid succession a number of plans created and executed by "A" Force in support of Allied operations during the summer and fall of 1943. The first of these plans, Plan BOARDMAN, was created in July while the future of HUSKY was uncertain; no deception for the long term, such as Plan BARCLAY, could be created until the results of Allied operations on Sicily were known. The interim theater deception scheme, Plan BOARDMAN, in support of any immediate landings on the Italian mainland, aimed at weakening Axis strength in Italy and threatening early operations against Sardinia and southern France, followed by an attack on the Peloponnese from the Middle East in late September. The


simultaneous (notional) attacks envisioned in Plan BARCLAY against Greece, Sardinia and southern France in late July and early August were (notionally) postponed. The story to be sold to the Axis now was that the Allies always considered an attack on the Italian mainland to be folly as this represented a direct frontal assault and that owing to the success at Pantellaria it was decided to assault Sardinia in late August preparatory to an invasion of Europe.<sup>1</sup>

It was not until 20 July that the Combined Chiefs requested Eisenhower to consider an assault in the Naples area, the extreme limit for fighter protection, instead of the 'toe and ball' operations being planned by AFHQ. The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive which authorized operations on the Italian mainland apparently caused some confusion among Allied personnel through its lack of lucid strategic direction: after the conquest of Sicily, Eisenhower was directed, first, to eliminate Italy from the war and, second, to contain the maximum number of German divisions in Italy. This second objective was ambiguous in that there were no geographical objectives set and as a result the Italian campaign became, on reflection, what Field Marshall Alexander called "a great holding attack".<sup>2</sup> In late July 1943, however, British intelligence was estimating that a landing in Italy would precipitate a peace overture from the Italians which<sup>3</sup> was something Alexander and Eisenhower wanted to effect through the use of 'black radio' before the landings in Sicily. The Allies were assuming at this time that the operations onto the Italian mainland would be a 'cake walk' and cause an Italian collapse. Actually, the Italian government was already





MAP 10



139 b.

negotiating with the Allies for an armistice many weeks before the landings at Salerno.

On 26 July Operation AVALANCHE, an amphibious assault against the Italian mainland at Salerno, south of Naples, was authorized for early September by the Combined Chiefs in addition to operations to be conducted by the XIII (BR) Corps across the Sicilian narrows, Operation BUTTRESS, and the invasion of the sole, Operation GOBLET, by 5 (BR) Corps. BUTTRESS would later be renamed BAYTOWN for Montgomery's 8th Army crossing to the Italian mainland at Messina on 3 September; the British would land unopposed at Taranto in September. Planning for AVALANCHE was more dispersed, hectic and exasperating than HUSKY -- it started late and suffered from hesitancy and the debate caused, in part, by Allied disagreements on how to proceed after Sicily. Eisenhower asked Lieutenant General Mark Clark in mid-June to prepare plans for the seizure of Sardinia<sup>4</sup> as an alternative if an assault on the Italian mainland was judged too risky. On 17 July, BRIMSTONE, however, the invasion of Sardinia, was cancelled in favor of operations on the mainland to quickly knock Italy out of the war. Salerno was selected to be the landing site but Alexander did not have a firm plan until 30 August, only 10 days<sup>5</sup> before D-Day.

Consequently, the deception plan in support of the operation to be conducted against the Italian mainland was not drawn up by "A" Force at 15th Army Group until mid-August 1943, just several weeks before the landings, its aim was to cause the dispersion of the German forces being sent into Italy as widely as possible

and, in particular, to prevent any concentration near the landing beaches at Salerno. Plan BOOTHBY, drafted on 14 August for the landings less than month away, covered both Operation BAYTOWN and AVALANCHE; the 'story' sold to the Germans through double agents and other means was that the Allies intended to undertake two and possibly three operations against the mainland. (After all, the Allies were aware the Germans expected a landing on the mainland at any time -- London and AFHQ had been announcing that for several months before the landings in a war of nerves with the Italian government.) One of the operations, conducted by 13 Corps, was to be mounted against Crotone in southern Italy from Sicily; the second to be launched against the mainland was to be by British 3rd Corps from the Middle East on 10 September against the heel of Italy. In addition to these operations, the Allies were to assault Sardinia with the British 10th Corps including the use of British 1st Airborne Division from Tripoli, and Corsica would be attacked by two French Divisions and the 82nd (US) Airborne Division, all on 5 September 1943. Directly after the Allies established themselves on Corsica, the US 5th Army and the British 5 Corps were to assault the coast between southern France and northwest Italy but no firm destination had been reached. There was the usual treatment by "A" Force: air reconnaissance of the areas concerned, small scale raids against Crotone, pamphlet dropping in northern Italy, concentration of troops in excess of those actually taking part in the landings at Salerno or the crossing at Messina, bombing of cover targets in Sardinia and Corsica plus bombing of roads behind troops in southern Italy, broadcasts to Italian partisans enlisting their

assistance, and, finally, the most secret sources, the double agents. The plan was ambitious and "quick-and-dirty" considering the lack of time given to the planners by the hesitancy of the Commanders and the Chiefs of Staff in authorizing the movement to the mainland.<sup>6</sup>

Once again, ULTRA showed the disposition of German forces in Italy: 16th Panzer at Salerno; the 29th Panzer Grenadier, the 1st Parachute, and the 26th Panzer in Calabria and Apulia; the 15th Panzer at Gaeta; the Herman Goering at Caserta; and the 2nd Parachute and 3rd Panzer Grenadier Divisions near Rome.<sup>7</sup> British intelligence was predicting that the Germans would not defend Italy south of the line Pisa to Rimini and possibly as far north as Venice and the Tyrol.<sup>8</sup> This would have defeated the Allied intention to draw and contain German divisions on the Italian peninsula but the estimates proved wrong even though there was clear evidence the Germans would go north. Based primarily on urging from Kesselring that the Allies must not get a hold of the airfields in the Foggia area and thereby conduct an air offensive against Germany, Hitler agreed to fight the Allies in the south.

It did not escape the Germans that Salerno was the northernmost practicable landing place for the Allies on the west coast of Italy since it was the northern most extension of the air fighter cover from northern Sicily: maximum combat radius for fighters was about 180 miles at the time. The selection of Salerno as the landing site is open to question in view of the presence of 39,000 German troops nearby, a hundred thousand within three days march and the considerable defenses (machine

guns, pillboxes, roadblocks,) in the area. The decision was made at a time, however, when the Allies were expecting Italian capitulation and an easy entry into Italy. Nevertheless, to keep German divisions dispersed, the deception planners made amphibious threats against the heel of Italy, and against Crotone from Sicily while maintaining the notional threats against Sardinia and Corsica. As was the case in the HUSKY operation, the landings at Salerno were conducted when the enemy's vigilance was lowest, i.e., following a notional postponement,<sup>10</sup> which was becoming an indispensable condition for the Allied deception artists.

Fifth (US) Army under General Mark Clark landed in Salerno Bay on 9 September 1944, just two months after the invasion of Sicily, and one day after the announcement of the surrender of Italy. The operational planning and selection of landing sites on the Italian mainland were delayed until after HUSKY was completed thereby severely restricting the scope and depth of the deception plans in support of that operation; perhaps, the Allies should have been making a multitude of plans, operational and deception, to keep their options open. The invasion occurred entirely in the 16th Panzer's sector and, in some areas, came as a surprise to the defenders.<sup>11</sup>

The deception in support of the Salerno landings did help achieve some surprise but its success will have to be judged not as much the surprise at the beaches but on the premise that due to his confusion as to the possible landing sites Kesselring did not move more troops down from Rome to oppose a landing in the Naples area. The plan was hampered as least as much by the

short time available to implement the plan as by the "impracticability of bombing cover targets prior to the landing",<sup>12</sup> a consistent theme throughout the Mediterranean experiences. Of course, there is always a possibility that the Army was complaining, naturally enough, about this problem not because the problem was real but because the Army was frustrated in not having tighter control over the Air Force. On the other hand, why should the deception planners have always expected to get ample aircraft for bombing of cover targets when the aircraft were so valuable to regular ground operations and were the essence of the strategic bomber offensive, which was, according to the airmen, the best way to end the war?

Strategic surprise was not attainable at Salerno under the circumstances and tactical surprise was unlikely in view of the Allied propensity to be cautious by always assaulting inside<sup>12</sup> Allied fighter cover range. Nevertheless, according to Eisenhower's Chief of Staff General Bedel-Smith writing to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, "some degree of surprise on the beaches was obtained, and opposition during the early stages was confined to that of a single German Division". The 16th Panzer, as with all the German forces in Italy at the time, and the Italian coastal forces in the area, were told on 8 September, the day<sup>13</sup> before the assault, to expect a landing at any time. All the beaches were mined, tank traps were laid and bridges were<sup>14</sup> demolished. The landings at Paestum in the Bay of Salerno and in the British sector were among the most fiercely contested in World War II and for a short time the Allies even considered

withdrawing from the beaches. Could the Allied position been worse? Possibly. Bedel-Smith's report accounts: "Subsequent information showed that a German parachute division had been moved from the west coast to the heel shortly before the Salerno attack." It appears that BOOTHBY may have been partially successful in drawing German forces to the south. Or did Kesslering send the division south to delay Montgomery's forces which landed in Calabria on 3 September? It is difficult to say -- certainly, the deception to draw German forces to the Crotone area began in mid-August and could have resulted in the decision to station (parts of) this division in the south. The German 1st Parachute Division, flown to Sicily from Avignon immediately after the Allied landings in Sicily, was spread out after the evacuation of the island in late August: it was headquartered at Altamura after the evacuation of Sicily;<sup>15</sup> signals intelligence shows that parts of it were in Calabria on 28 August defending the southern coast;<sup>16</sup> on the 9th of September parts were in Apulia but retreating northwards after the British 1st Airborne Division landed by ship at Taranto; and, parts of it were with the Herman Goering Division in the north.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, the Allies were eventually able to establish a beachhead and, after some delay and after surviving a major German counter-attack, moved inland.

In retrospect, as soon as the Allied convoys were sighted steaming towards the Italian mainland, immediate tactical surprise was lost. Casualties were light during the landing, perhaps, as a result of Kesselring's tactic not to defend strongly at the beaches but to bring up German divisions quickly



to expel the Allies. This tactic was certainly influenced by his lack of certainty as to where the Allies would enter the mainland. As with Sicily, the Germans expected a major landing soon but assessment had fluctuated on exactly where: Gaeta, Salerno, Rome, Apulia, northern Italy beyond fighter coverage, Sardinia, even a direct assault on the Balkans was seriously considered as a possibility. Kesselring himself was in favor of landings at Calabria, Apulia and Naples. On 14 August, ULTRA showed that Italian intelligence was predicting a landing in the Naples-Salerno area plus landings in Sardinia and Corsica. Decrypts on 15 August reported the Abwehr in Istanbul had information that the Allies would land in the Gulf of Salerno and Calabria, which was correct. Not all German agents or Nazi sympathisers were turned by the Allies in the Middle East as had been done in England. ULTRA also reported on 20 August that the Abwehr was estimating landings in the Salerno area and that the Luftwaffe was estimating Gaeta, Naples or Salerno. At this time, the Italian Navy was predicting landings in southern Italy, Sardinia and Corsica,<sup>18</sup> exactly what the Allies wanted the Axis to believe. There were no more superior Italian intelligence operators available, now that the Sixth Army Chief of Intelligence on Sicily had been captured in July. On 29 August 1943, Kesselring apparently gave up and concluded the site<sup>19</sup> was 'entirely unpredictable'; he had now been so bombarded with potential landings that he was not able to make a rational judgement as to where the Allies would land next. The day before the landings, he thought the landings would occur near Rome and

directed reinforcements and alerted the troops in that area. The German Naval Command was no better; it was estimating north or south of Rome, perhaps both. On 6 September, ULTRA reported that the Abwehr at Naples estimated that landings in the Naples area were imminent due to the heavy air bombardment, a tip-off to Allied operations in the past. A few days before the landings, ULTRA showed the German Navy was on a thirty minute alert south of Rome in view of the imminent Allied landings.<sup>20</sup>

In the end, the casualties suffered, according to the official accounts, were attributed to lack of fighter cover sorties and not enough close air support, and, in the case of the Navy, refusal by the Army to allow Naval ship bombardment for fear of losing tactical surprise. These charges and counter charges were typical between the services when casualties were more than expected in a campaign.

Immediately following the landings at Salerno, the Germans began evacuating Sardinia and Corsica, possibly as a result of the notional threats in support of the Sicily and the Salerno landings but probably more a result of German strategy to shorten her lines of communication in direct response to the latest Allied move. Hitler gave the order on 12 September to evacuate German forces from Sardinia to Livorno via Corsica. The Allies occupied Sardinia without a fight by 18 September and held Corsica by 3 October.<sup>21</sup>

At this time, Dudley Clarke saw the hand writing on the wall and began to think and write in the late summer of 1943 about the future of deception and the need to focus resources on the last act -- the cross channel operation and the subsequent offensive

into Germany, planned for 1944 -- and how "A" Force could assist that effort. It was now necessary to review those requirements and activities for which "A" Force was responsible and evaluate their relative worth in light of more significant needs in support of OVERLORD and ANVIL (the plan for landing in southern France). Although "A" Force was responsible for deception as well as escape and evasion activities in Persia and Iraq Command (PAIC), it had been necessary to focus attention on the Mediterranean since that is where the main Allied operations were being conducted. In view of the 'special interests' of the South East Asia Command in India regarding Persia, negotiations were underway with Echelon "D" for them to assume responsibility for deception in support of PAIC from Delhi. Now that Sicily was in Allied hands and the lines of communication were open to Egypt through the Mediterranean, East and South Africa were reduced in importance to Allied plans in the Mediterranean.

Clarke recommended in September 1943 that the organization to be created in support of OVERLORD be organized along the lines of "A" Force with responsibility overlapping with "A" Force for the Western Mediterranean in order that deception activities be executed directly by SHAEF and closely coordinated with "A" Force for the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It was essential to deceive the Germans on a multi-front basis and to coordinate deception activities across theaters so that (notional) activities could be verifiable by the Germans. A pull from one direction must be in synchronization with a pull from another direction, something which was not achieved in 1943 when "A"

Force competed with London for German divisions in France. The LCS certainly was not the type of organization which could tackle the most important deception of the war: the LCS was a policy making body for the British Chiefs of Staff and a coordinating point with the Americans. It was not a military operational-level planning and executing group like "A" Force. At about this time, the autumn of 1943, Colonel Noel Wild, Clarke's deputy in Cairo, was designated as chief of the COSSAC (Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command and soon-to-be SHAEF), deception organization Ops "B", for what was to be the most important deception operation of the war. Wild arrived in London on Christmas eve 1943 not knowing he was to be head of Eisenhower's deception planning organizations -- the post was to be one of the most important jobs for the invasion. "A" Force was losing other valuable people to the planning for Normandy and the landings in southern France, which reflected the shift in emphasis to the western European area.

After the landings in Italy at Salerno and in the south, it was necessary to assist 15 Army Group and their current operations during September on the Italian mainland in a rapidly changing situation so that deception planning was done on a day-to-day basis. Once the situation stabilized on the mainland after the Salerno landings, "A" Force was able to coordinate operational deception planning with Plan FAIRLANDS. To assist the forces sloggng their way up the peninsula, "A" Force threatened two landings behind the Germans to put their lines of communications at risk and force them to weaken their front: a landing in October 1943 between Elba and Gaeta, and a landing in

November between Livorno and Spezia on the west coast of Italy. The landings between Livorno and Spezia were to be conducted by fourteen Allied divisions from north Africa, Sicily and Corsica. The British element notionally designated for the beaches between Livorno and Pi-a was the British 1st Army, a wholly notional force which had previously been created by planting bits and pieces via double agents and through genuine administrative procedures executed by the Army Group.<sup>25</sup> General Patton, well known to the Germans, 'secretly' toured the locations of the assault forces in the Mediterranean islands, north Africa and Cairo so that the agents which were not controlled by "A" Force could report back to their handlers the movements of high ranking American generals. The movement of high ranking Allied military and civilian officials was the object of many deception operations during the war. Patton would not command in combat until he was given 3rd (US) Army after the landings in Normandy but he was worth just as much inactive as an instrument of the deception planners -- Patton was used not only for his notoriety but also because the Germans had a healthy respect for this man in combat. The American force designated for the notional assault was the 7th (US) Army, commanded by Patton during the landings in Sicily. This Army was to consist of the 2 (US) Corps, 30 (BR) Corps and 1 (French) Corps de Debarquement -- in line with the coalition, the deception planners consistently mixed forces of several nations in their cauldron. At about this time, the genuine forces of 7th Army and the British 50 and 51 Divisions were moving to the UK in preparation for OVERLORD.<sup>26</sup>

The deception planners at AFHQ were faced with the problem of deceiving the Germans that an assault would take place against the west coast of Italy with a force which was moving in reality to the UK. Operational security, as it had with other deception activities, played an important role in protecting the identity of the transferred divisions. This deception in FAIRLANDS was carried out, in part, through the following means:

a. Radio silence was imposed on all formations in Sicily with the exception of 7 Army Headquarters. Since there was no equipment or personnel available to simulate traffic for the divisions which had moved to the UK for the invasion of Normandy, the only recourse was to forbid all formations from communicating by radio from the island. The Allies in Italy were already learning the reality of playing second fiddle to the preparations for the Normandy landings.

b. The ships which were carrying the forces to England were equipped with mosquito nets, malaria pills, etc., to give the impression to the Germans that these forces were not bound for cold climates.<sup>27</sup> This scheme was well practiced by the Allies during World War II and should have consistently raised questions from the German side about the validity of these ostensible signs. Of course, now that the Italians were out of the war and their intelligence network largely nullified, the Germans would be in even worse shape than they had been previously.

FAIRLANDS, written in late September and valid only until early November 1943, also intended to encourage the evacuation of Rhodes and Crete, by threatening assaults against these islands

in October and November. The notional assault against Rhodes was subsequently cancelled when real operations were planned by CINC Middle East in late 1943.<sup>28</sup>

In September 1943, as a first phase to get "A" Force prepared for its operations in 1944, Clarke recommended the reshaping of "A" Force into two distinct organizations responsible for two areas: one with responsibility for the Western Mediterranean in close coordination with the suggested organization for OVERLORD and one for the Eastern Mediterranean with more independence of action in support of deception in the Middle East.

The "East" organization was to be based on the Advance Hqs "A" Force in Cairo for theater or operational level requirements and on a Tactical Hqs "A" Force ready for any tactical requirements in the field (see organizational chart #3). The organization was to be responsible for the Middle East, Turkey and the Balkans. The "West" organization consisted of a Main Hqs at Algiers responsible for north Africa and the Iberian Peninsula, an Advance Hqs in Italy in anticipation of Allied victories there, and a Tactical Hqs with 15th Army Group for satisfaction of tactical requirements of General Alexander.<sup>29</sup> The group which had been supporting the deception requirements of Montgomery's 8 Army (Tactical Hqs "A" Force) was transferred to his newly forming 21 Army Group in the UK for the Normandy invasion and became known as the "R" Force, headed by Lt. Col. Strangeways who was head of the deception organization at 8th Army up until this time. Later on as the 12 Army Group

commanded by General Omar Bradley was formed on the continent, a special plans branch at that Hqs was responsible for cover and deception planning with troops specially designated for that purpose: 23rd Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Special Troops; 3103rd Signal Service Battalion and 3132nd Signal Service Company; 406th Engineer Combat Company; 603rd Engineer Camouflage Battalion; and 23rd Signal Company.<sup>30</sup>

The strategic deception policy of the Allies in mid-summer 1943 for the essentially non-operational Middle East (but which was the location of the strategic reserve of the Mediterranean) was to prevent the Axis from withdrawing forces from the Balkans and to encourage maintenance of German forces in the Balkans at the expense of the eastern front, northern Italy, northern France and southern France. In addition to the "A" Force organizational changes mentioned above, the Main Hqs at Algiers was responsible for the initial deception planning for the invasion of southern France -- eventually, the Sixth Army Group would get its own deception unit. As the operational structure changed to accomodate the offensive into Europe, so did the deception organizations.

After FAIRLANDS and before Plan BODYGUARD, the overall strategic deception policy for 1944, came into effect, the "A" Force unit with 15th Army Group created a plan to cover operations from mid-November through the end of the year. The object of Plan OAKFIELD was to induce the Germans to withdraw their forces south of the line Civitavecchia to Pescara to the north, something which they did not do. The plan was to continue a threat to northwest Italy, to threaten a landing east of



Bolonga, and to involve Middle East forces in these threats in the central Mediterranean to give the impression that the intention in the eastern Mediterranean was purely defensive<sup>31</sup> -- the inescapable conclusion is that the British were tending operational plans to slip back into the Balkans at any time. An unexpected affect of the 'Bolonga landing' deception was the transfer to Italy from Yugoslavia of the 114th Jaeger Division in January 1944. Decrypts of German traffic had shown a grave anxiety on the part of the Germans of a landing operation by the Allies on the Adriatic: the fear of a Balkans operation was outweighed by fear of another Allied landing on the Italian mainland<sup>32</sup> at the time. As they had done so successfully in the past, "A" Force played on the fears of the Germans but the deception planners did their work too well and, perhaps as a result of their 'notional' defense posture in the Middle East, drew additional German forces to Italy at a time when they wanted to disperse the German reserves and move the bulk of the their forces further north of Rome. They achieved the opposite affect and, in essence, competed with "A" Force in the eastern Mediterranean for the attention of German divisions in the Balkans. This competition must have been awfully difficult to detect during the war and, more difficult, almost impossible to avoid in a confined area of competing interests. Deception at the operational and strategic level must be coordinated to ensure one area is not competing against another area -- this is one of the major tasks for the higher level military deception organizations.

Plan NUNTON, created by the "A" Force planners at AAI (Allied Armies, Italy) Headquarters expressly for the landings on 22 January 1944 at Anzio near Rome, helped the Allies achieve significant surprise but it did not help to move the Allied forces with speed inland after the landings. This failure, which was termed the 'Salerno complex' by Churchill, was an illustration of a landing force wishing to prepare for an inevitable enemy counter-attack after the landings rather than expanding the bridgehead and pursuing the enemy to take advantage of the surprise of the landing on the enemy forces. Once military forces achieve surprise, they must pursue the objective with speed while the enemy is off-balance or lose the benefits of surprise. Deception is a necessary but not sufficient condition for success. Often, intelligence and deception were better and smarter than the generals, and hence opportunities were not exploited. Stonewall Jackson understood: "...and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and overcome him, never give up the pursuit as long as your men have strength to follow...". The purpose of the deception plan was to conceal the large scale shifting of divisions behind the Allied front in the south in order to divert the Germans from the forthcoming Allied offensive, away from the prospect of another western beachhead, and away from the southern front area near Monte Cassino. It was hoped to induce CINC South to hold his reserves away from the main areas of attack and cause uncertainty on exactly where the point of greatest force would be concentrated.<sup>34</sup> Although the landing force had apparently expected a bitterly opposed landing, there was little opposition

to the Allied forces and complete surprise was obtained. According to the commander of the operation, Major General Lucas who was not in on ULTRA and who was unaware of the paucity of German troops in the immediate area, the Allies had " ... achieved one of the most complete surprises in history."<sup>35</sup> The Allies, however, failed to take advantage of the beachhead and the Germans quickly sealed it off. The only advantage accrued by the Allies to the landing was the pinning down of three first line German divisions for several months.<sup>36</sup>


To tell the story completely: by mid-November 1943, the Germans had dug into their 'Winter Line' (the 'Gustav Line') between the Gulf of Gaeta in the west to Ortona on the Adriatic. The landing at Anzio was intended to be a left-hook behind the Germans on the western coast of Italy; it was a major landing deep into the German rear. Operation SHINGLE, as it was called, suffered similar problems in operational planning as did AVALANCHE before it and ANVIL would after it: hesitancy and indecision but this was largely overcome by the sheer audacity of the operation. Operation SHINGLE was cancelled once (on 22-23 December) and not finally approved until 12 January, ten days before D-Day. The deception plan envisioned a landing at Livorno at the end of January and included the activation of a radio station in Corsica, representing an advance Hqs VI (US) Corps for the assault, with a crescendo of radio traffic building up to the notional D-Day. The double agents in Italy and North Africa planted information with the German secret intelligence service that the 5 (US) Army was not advancing on the west coast but that



1000

loading machine and haul-truck from 1960-1962) before  
from 3rd July 1962 at 1st January 1963

Under the heading "Cost of the plant" reference is made to 1960.



1570

the 8 (BR) Army on the Adriatic coast was preparing for a big push up the coast (as a diversion for the landings at Livorno). In fact, the British 10 Corps did mount an attack directly before the Anzio beachhead which figured strongly in diverting Kesselring's attention at the critical time.<sup>37</sup> German intelligence was thoroughly confused regarding the potential landing locations: Livorno, Genoa, Ravenna, Istria and Anzio were all considered likely.<sup>38</sup> The sheer audacity of the landing, not a trait of the Allies in the Mediterranean, as well as the diversionary attack by the Allies in the south, may have been just as responsible as the deception operation for the surprise achieved on the beaches at Anzio. The Anzio landing operation with its supporting deception plans, is a classic example of successful operational maneuver with the right amount of boldness, diversion and deception which, if had been practiced more frequently, would have reduced the Allied forces time and effort in the Italian Campaign.

The landings at Anzio included five US and two British divisions and initially was intended to be a diversion for a 5 (US) Army attack in the Cassino area, which was supposed to be the main effort but which did not achieve any particular success. At the time, in early January 1944, the Allies knew, based on ULTRA intercepts, that Kesselring had told General Jodl that no Allied landings were expected for the immediate future and Admiral Canaris, head of the Abwehr, had briefed that a landing was out-of-the-question for a month to six weeks. Immediately prior to the landings at Anzio, the Allies had ULTRA intercepts showing that the local German command feared a landing at



Civitavecchia due to Naval bombardments conducted in that area. The Allies also knew, again through ULTRA, that strategic surprise was almost certain since German reserves were diverted elsewhere to reinforce the 'Gustav Line' and that the Germans<sup>40</sup> were capable of moving two divisions to Anzio but only by D+3.

The Germans maintained 26 Divisions in Italy in early 1944: 12 on the 'Gustav Line', 6 against the Anzio bridgehead and 8 in reserve. The Allies, on the other hand, maintained 27<sup>41</sup> divisions. One wonders who was pinning down whom -- the Allied objective was to contain German divisions in Italy using 27 in the process but the Germans were in greater need of manpower than the Allies. Nevertheless, the Allies were achieving the goal set by the Combined Chiefs -- keep German divisions busy and away from northwest Europe. Breakout from the Gustav line, Operation DIADEM, was not achieved until late spring 1944 with Rome being captured on 4 June, two days before the Normandy landings. During the breakout, the deception plans were attributed to the success of the offensive. The following official account describes how:

The Germans clearly had been taken in by the Allied deception plan. In the area selected for their main effort - the Liri valley - the Germans had underestimated Allied strength by seven divisions...German intelligence had credited the Allies with much larger reserves than they actually had...Kesselring disposed his forces on that assumption. This was to prove a vital factor in the early battles of the coming offensive.<sup>42</sup>

The collapse of the Gustav line was a direct result of an Allied deception plan conceived by the "A" Force planners. Shortly after the start of the offensive, the Germans identified



a number of Allied divisions presumed to be in the rear area. The German view of the Allied order of battle at the time had the 36 (US) Infantry Division, 1 (Canadian) Infantry Division, and the South African 6 Armored Division in the vicinity of Naples preparing for another amphibious operation whereas they were actually engaged in the assault on the Gustav line. In addition to these forces, the Germans believed that on Corsica one American and three French divisions were being held in readiness as a 'forward echelon of a large strategic reserve in North Africa', earmarked for landings either in southern France or on the Ligurian coast of Italy. On 15 May, German 'agents' behind the Allied lines at Bari, which was actually an "A" Force outstation, reported a large concentration of shipping which Kesselring's headquarters believed to be in support of an amphibious attack against the Adriatic in coordination with the breakout attempt at Anzio.<sup>43</sup> The Allies knew all about these German intelligence appreciations on 15 May 1943, four days after the attack began, because they had captured the<sup>44</sup> intelligence files of the German 14th Army during the fighting. These files included the OKW reports of the Allied order of battle for the entire Mediterranean and will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Kesselring and his staff persistently worried over the possibility of amphibious landings occurring on the Italian coasts and on the Tyrrhenian flank. Consequently, the deception planners played on his fears and supported his view. In the end, he was "unwilling to authorize more than a piecemeal commitment

of his reserves, and had forfeited his only opportunity for checking the Allied armies before the offensive acquired an irresistible momentum." <sup>45</sup>

The object of the plan was to create surprise at the main assault, to dilute German forces in the Liri valley and to make the Germans hold their reserves far in the north, beyond Rome, if possible. The 'story' put across by the Allies was that since the last frontal attack on the Gustav line at Cassino had failed, which it had, the Allies were going to attack Rome by a landing force of three divisions north of Rome near Civitavecchia on 15 May. In other words, the Allies were going to do another 'Anzio operation' but further north and catch the Germans unprepared, a brilliant deception if they could pull it off. The method used was to represent a force principally by radio deception in the Salerno area, training for an amphibious operation: radio groups representing the Canadian Corps (1 Canadian Corps, 1 Canadian Infantry Division and 5th Canadian Armored Brigade) opened up communications channels from the Salerno area on 22 and 27 April as these formations in their true area went on radio silence. Moreover, the 36 (US) Infantry Division opened up a communications link with the Canadian Corps and closed its real link to 5 (US) Army. The Canadians actually sent some troops (military police) to the Salerno area and placed signposts with maple leaves all over the Salerno area and renamed

<sup>46</sup>  
many of the roads with Canadian names. One of the more interesting aspects to this deception is that it showed the importance of keeping the deception going even after the main attack has started to keep the enemy off balance and confused -- a similar tactic was employed during the FORTITUDE SOUTH

deception plan for the landings at Normandy and was even more successful. In both cases, the Germans believed the initial assault was only diversionary; "A" Force techniques and concepts continued to deceive the Germans and the capture of enemy documents proves conclusively the value of these particular activities in May 1944. All German divisions in reserve were either grouped around the Anzio beachhead or strung out along the coast awaiting an amphibious landing that never occurred. By the time Kesselring realized that the main push was further south, it was too late: his divisions were drawn into the fighting and destroyed piecemeal.

After the collapse of the Gustav line, in support of the breakout from the Anzio beachhead in late May 1944, VI (US) Corps mounted still another Allied deception operation, Operation HIPPO, which was designed "to deceive the enemy as long as possible as to the offensive's true direction by a strong demonstration on the beachhead's far left flank a few hours before the breakout began.<sup>47</sup> (The Americans finally were enthusiastically embracing the deception weapon.) The German concern about the two British divisions (the 1st and 5th) involved in the deception denied timely reinforcement of the central sector opposing General Truscott's VI Corps offensive and the breakout was achieved out of the Anzio beachhead with Rome<sup>48</sup> falling shortly thereafter.

As in the case of the breakout in May, 5 (US) Army was the source of a large scale demonstration in August during an 8 (BR) Army attack near Florence. Mark Clark's forces distracted the

enemy by simulating an "imminent attack by both Allied Armies  
along the 25 mile front ..." <sup>49</sup> but we are now getting ahead of  
the story. Let's shift attention now to the preparations for  
the landings in southern France, Plan BODYGUARD and more  
reorganization for "A" Force.

## CHAPTER VII

1. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 331, Records of AFHQ, Memorandum from Major General Rooks, Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, to G3, AFHQ, dated 19 July 1943, subject: Deception Plans. This method of escaping gracefully from a deception after the operation ended and the 'story' could no longer be believable, i.e., advancing the story the Allies were surprised at the ease of victory, was a common occurrence in the deception operations in Europe during World War II. It seems incredible, however, for the Germans to have been deceived that the object of a major operation which took months to plan could be changed so easily.
2. Martin Blumenson, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino, p. 175. It would be difficult to fight and die in Italy knowing you were part of a 'diversion'.
3. F.H. Hinsley, et al, British Intelligence in the Second World War. Volume II. Part I, p. 103.
4. Albert N. Garland, Howard McGaw Smyth and Martin Blumenson, Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, pp. 260-261.
5. Blumenson, pp. 25-26. A major lesson was that strategic and operational level deceptions could not be ad hoc -- major deceptions took time to plan and execute, and a sustained deception, e.g., the bogus order of battle, was always more valuable as the backdrop for the 'story' rather than a series of small deceptions strung together.

6. London, England, Public Record Office, WO 204, Piece 1561, Memorandum from Lt. Col. D. I. Strangeways, Tactical Hqs "A" Force, 15 Army Group, to G2 and G3, AFHQ, dated 15 August 1943. It is clear from the memorandum that "A" Force was not certain up through at least 15 August that AVALANCHE would be executed.
7. Hinsley, p. 108.
8. Ibid., p. 103.
9. Blumenson, p. 401; Brigadier C.J.C. Molony, et al, History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and Middle East. Volume V, p. 266.
10. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 385, AFHQ Memorandum to Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated 21 December 1943, subject: Cover and Deception Plans November 1942 - November 1943. This ability to influence enemy fears and to build their confidence that an assault was or was not in the offering is the mark of the successful military operational deception. This is the 'cry wolf' syndrome so aptly described by Michael Handel in his "Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise", in The Journal of Strategic Studies, September 1984.
11. Blumenson, p. 85.
12. Molony, p. 256.
13. Ibid., p. 267.
14. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II. volume IX. Sicily - Salerno - Anzio January 1943 - June 1944, p. 160.

15. Molony, p. 213.
16. Hinsley, p. 108.
17. Molony, p. 243.
18. Hinsley, p. 110.
19. Blumenson, p. 66. This unpredictability is the result of a mediocre intelligence effort or an excellent enemy deception effort.
20. Ibid., p. 68. There is every reason to believe the Germans misread the Allied plot to invade Sardinia and Corsica as an operation to be conducted against Rome. The deception planners did not play on this fear, during the Salerno planning, of the Germans for a landing near Rome -- even though they had the information through ULTRA that this is where the German strength was located.
21. Hinsely, p. 110.
22. Morison, pp. 305-306.
23. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 331, AFHQ, Memorandum from Colonel Dudley Clarke, dated 12 September 1943, subj: The Future of the "A" Force Organization. In this same memorandum, Clarte also suggests that London will have to take more of a role in deception in support of 15 Army Group as the double agents in the Middle East and Africa could only help in building up notional strength of reinforcements from Africa whereas 'stories' would have to be planted in Switzerland and Spain which were under the purview of London. In addition, "A" Force connection to the beaucracy in London for arranging such things as leaflet dropping, cover bombing, etc., was not as good as the LCS and they had to go

through the LCS for proper handling and explanation of such requests -- it would make a lot more sense if these matters could be handled by London. Clarke's style, that is, constant travelling between "A" Force organizations, was putting a physical strain on the man as he had to visit the western "A" Force organizations to assist them in planning deception for military operations while keeping in close contact with the eastern organizations for continued maintenance of the notional strategic reserve. The best alternative was to begin to split the organization off into two parts, one of which he would handle and the other handled by London, either the LCS or another "A" Force headquarters. This idea was the genesis for Ops "B".

24. Ibid.

25. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 331, AFHQ, Memorandum from Lt. Col. Crichton, Advanced Hqs "A" Force to Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ, dated 4 October 1943, subject: Plan FAIRLANDS, Resuscitation of the titles "British 1st Army" and "British 9th Corps".

26. Hinsley, p. 8.

27. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 331, AFHQ, Memorandum from Lt. Col Crichton, Advanced Hqs "A" Force to G3, AFHQ, dated 22 October 1943. The Allies assumed the Germans would eventually determine that the British 50 and 51 Divisions left Sicily but the plan was to represent the nine garrison battalions on Sicily as combat divisions and a relief for the 50 and 51 Divisions.

28. Ibid., Memorandum from Major General Rooks, G3, AFHQ to



Chief of Staff, AFHQ, dated 28 September 1943, subject: Deception Plan "FAIRLANDS".

29. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 331, AFHQ, Memorandum from Colonel Dudley Clarke, dated 12 September 1943, subject: The Future of the "A" Force Organization. A formal east/west split was apparently never accepted.

30. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, Letter from Colonel John Bevan, Chief of London Controlling Section, to Major General C. Bissell, G2, War Department, dated 11 December 1944. This letter represents Bevan's comments on a 12th Army Group report which is a short synopsis of history of deception in Europe during World War II. Bevan's chief complaint about the report is the reference to 'secret means', double agents and how the British Secret Intelligence Service worked regarding duping the German Secret Intelligence Service. He was also concerned with the evaluation by 12th Army Group of past deceptions carried out by other organizations, e.g., the FORTITUTDE deceptions for the Normandy invasion planned and executed mainly by Ops "B" SHAEF. Bevan felt 12th Army Group was in no position to evaluate these deceptions -- only SHAEF could evaluate. Although glowing with praise for deception, the Army Group's evaluation is shallow.

31. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 331, AFHQ, Plan OAKFIELD, date not available but probably October/November 1943. The writer of OAKFIELD demonstrated unparalleled optimism that the German Army

in Italy would execute a voluntary withdrawal in the last few weeks of 1943. The optimism was based on the serious disaster facing the Germans in Russia and the fact they could not afford to lose any more forces to the Allies. The deception planners in the Mediterranean were facing continued depletion of shipping, landing craft and troops to the preparations for OVERLORD, and this was making deception more difficult than in the past. Of course, at this time, the German air reconnaissance is getting very weak, especially in the Middle East thereby increasing the value of the double agents and radio deception, and the lessening of importance of real and dummy formations, except for uncontrolled and unknown agents which may 'see' portions of the Allied preparations. These agents were usually very low grade agents whose validity was notoriously low.

32. Hinsley, p. 30.

33. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Closing the Ring, p. 487.

34. Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Cassino to the Alps, p. 21.

35. Blumenson, p. 358.

36. Morison, p. 367. Gallipoli in World War I another example.

37. Blumenson, p. 360.

38. Morison, pp. 329-330.

39. Ralph Bennett, Ultra and Some Command Decisions, 137-139.

40. Hinsley, p. 185.

41. Morison, p. 374.

42. Fisher, p. 40.

43. Ibid.
44. London, England, Public Record Office, WO 204, Piece 8013, 8th Army Report on the Cover Plan for the Attack on the Gustaf Line on 11 May 1944, dated 1 September 1944.
45. Fisher, p. 80. The object for deception in support of a campaign should be to make the enemy disperse his forces in an advantageous position -- Kesselring was clearly a victim of operational level deception.
46. London, England, Public Record Office WO 204, Piece 8013, 8th Army Report on the Cover Plan for the Attack on the Gustaf Line on 11 May 1944, dated 1 September 1944; Allied Armies in Italy report Allied Security and Enemy Intelligence dated 15 June 1944.
47. Fisher, p. 115.
48. Ibid., p. 141.
49. Ibid., p. 309.

## CHAPTER VIII

### Reorganization and Deception

#### Part II: Support to Normandy and the Landing in Southern France

"If the defender were compelled to spread his forces over several points of access, the attacker would obviously reap the advantage of being able to throw his full strength against any one of them." Clausewitz

The final long-term deception plan created by "A" Force for the Mediterranean theater and the Middle East was the strategic and operational Plan ZEPPELIN, the plan for the year 1944. Although ZEPPELIN was the last theater plan created by "A" Force for an entire year, it was the most important because the object of the plan was to contain German divisions in the Balkans so that Hitler would not reinforce either the Russian front or, most significantly, deny Allied access to northwest Europe making a second front in France impossible. In order to place ZEPPELIN in that perspective and its relationship to the overall war effort, it will be well worth the time of painting the background of the strategic policy put forward in Plan BODYGUARD, the Allied global policy for 1944. Plan BODYGUARD would prove to be the peak during World War II of coalition deception planning. The object of Plan BODYGUARD was " ... to induce the enemy to make faulty strategic dispositions in relation to operations by the United Nations

against Germany ... ". The Allies appreciated the fact that the OKW was considering as it had done in previous years the strategic disposition of their forces during the winter of 1943-1944 to meet the expected Allied offensive for 1944, and, although the Germans would be forced to maintain the bulk of their forces against the Russians on the eastern front, that the Germans must suspect an Allied cross channel operation in 1944. It was also obvious to the Allies that as preparations for NEPTUNE and OVERLORD (the landings at Normandy and attack towards Nazi Germany from Normandy), and ANVIL (the landings in southern France) developed, the Germans could not fail to appreciate the Allied intentions for the year. So, the overall problem was to persuade the Germans " ... to dispose his forces in areas where they can cause the least interference with operations 'OVERLORD'<sup>1</sup> and 'ANVIL' and with operations on the Russian Front."

In order to contain German forces away from France and the Russian front, the deception planners in London focused on Scandinavia, the Balkans, and, of course, northern Italy, where fighting was actually occurring, as areas to draw or contain German forces. British intelligence at this time estimated that the Germans would be doing their utmost to hold southeast Europe, though they expected limited withdrawals from the islands in the Aegean and southern Greece.<sup>2</sup> The deception planners estimated that in order to worry the Germans in the eastern Mediterranean, it was necessary for them to believe considerable forces and landing craft was being concentrated in that area and if Turkey was perceived as joining the Allies, the potential to tie down

German divisions was even greater. In addition to these Anglo-American undertakings, the deception planners in Washington and London negotiated with the Russians for them to stage an amphibious threat to the Bulgarian-Romanian coasts.

The overall deception policy, therefore, for 1944 regarding the Mediterranean and Middle East, was to induce the Germans to believe the following:

Since no large-scale cross-Channel operation would be possible till late summer, the main Allied effort in the Spring of 1944 should be against the Balkans, by means of -

(i) An Anglo-American assault against the Dalmatian coast.

(ii) A British assault against Greece.

(iii) A Russian amphibious operation against the Bulgarian-Roumanian coast.

(iv) In addition Turkey will be invited to join the Allies to provide operational facilities including aerodromes to cover operations against the Aegean Islands as a prerequisite to the invasion of Greece. Her refusal would not materially modify the Allied intentions.

(v) Pressure against the satellites to induce them to abandon Germany.<sup>3</sup>

This Allied strategic plan for 1944 was interpreted by "A" Force to mean they had to maintain through the bogus order of battle an Allied strength in the eastern Mediterranean greater than was actually the case; to convince the Germans that Anglo-American forces in north Africa were being replaced by French forces thus providing greater opportunities in the southern region for the Allies; to notionally transfer British divisions and landing craft from India to the Middle East; and, to convince the Germans that fresh divisions from the UK and the USA were

scheduled to arrive in the Mediterranean.

For the year 1944, the supreme operations were OVERLORD and ANVIL and the most important theater-level deception plan in support of Allied forces in the Mediterranean was that which was associated with the landings in southern France. The Allies appreciated the potential for Axis air reconnaissance to discern the build-up of an amphibious force in north Africa and the Mediterranean islands but they intended to deceive the Germans regarding the timing, direction and weight of the Allied invasion force. Actually, German air reconnaissance was not as active in 1944 as it had previously been in the Mediterranean thereby reducing the potential effectiveness of the deception on one of several channels of communication with German intelligence. This factor does not seem to have been taken into account by "A" Force, except after-the-fact, as we shall see later. The Germans believed strongly in the value of photographic reconnaissance, perhaps even more so than their agents in the field. This disruption of a channel of communication may have negated or severely reduced the credibility of some deception operations during the war in the Mediterranean, especially later in the war and in areas where the Germans would have to fly long distance reconnaissance missions, e.g., across the Mediterranean, to discern Allied strength and dispositions.

As Plan ZEPPELIN was the central deception plan for the Mediterranean in 1944, its objects were, first, to support the overall strategic policy of BODYGUARD and, second, to support operations in the Mediterranean. ZEPPELIN was a long-term plan for the entire year 1944 and would necessarily be executed in

stages as the course of operations became apparent: the planners had learned the lesson from Plan BARCLAY in 1943 that events moved quickly and unexpected opportunities invariably influenced the long range plan. The strategy, however, was consistent: convince the Germans of impending operations in the Balkans. The stages were:

first, threaten Crete, western Greece and the Dalmatian coast on 23 March with additional attacks on the Greek mainland, and a Soviet assault on the Bulgarian coast on 21 April;


second, attacks on Crete, western Greece and Yugoslavia postponed to 21 April with the Soviet assault and the attack on the Greek mainland postponed one month;

third, attacks on Crete, western Greece and Yugoslavia postponed again to 21 May to coincide with the attacks on the Bulgarian coast and the Greek mainland; and,

fourth, all threats cancelled and one assault on the Greek<sup>5</sup> mainland and the Bulgarian coast to occur on 19 June.

Again, the Allies surmised that the German General Staff would be considering the strategic disposition of forces in the spring of 1944 to prepare for the inevitable Allied offensive operations against Germany or German-held territory for the year. The primary objectives of ZEPPELIN were to induce the enemy to make faulty initial dispositions during the early part of 1944; to induce the Germans to make a false appreciation of visible offensive preparations in the spring in the Western Mediterranean, and to gain surprise for the operation which was<sup>6</sup> to be launched against southern France in the summer of 1944.





MAP 15

175a

The plan would be complicated by the Allied hesitancy to agree on the ANVIL landings and then the postponement of landings in southern France from June until August. This state of confused affairs, however, must have made the job of German intelligence more difficult in that they could never be certain that the vacillating Allies finally had decided on a campaign. The postponement of the genuine operation forced the deception planners to plan to draw German forces to southern France in the spring of 1944 to threaten an amphibious landing in order that the Germans would not reinforce northern France during the Allied landings in June, and then to divert these threats to another area so that the actual landings on the French coast would not be resisted in August.

The need for an assault against the south of France first surfaced at the Quebec Conference in mid-1943. At that conference, the Combined Chiefs indicated their plans to establish a 'lodgement' in the Toulon-Marseilles area to exploit northward in order to create a diversion of German forces away from the landings in Normandy. This southern jaw of a pincer did not get unanimous approval by all the principal players until five days before D-Day. Churchill never liked the idea of the operation desiring, at first, to use these forces in the Aegean and, later, as the landings occurred in Normandy and the Allied forces began to move inland, their use in northern France. An outline plan for Operation ANVIL was not available until 17 December 1943 but Churchill proposed on 4 February that it be scrapped. The Combined Chiefs directed Eisenhower on 12 February 1944 to direct SACMED (Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean)

General Maitland "Jumbo" Wilson to conduct operations against southern France at about the same time as OVERLORD.<sup>7</sup>

After much wrangling through the spring and summer between the Allies about the wisdom of landing in southern France and after any hope of a near simultaneous assault had faded, Churchill made his last plea to Eisenhower 9 August to use the troops for ANVIL in northern France. Now, however, the reason for ANVIL was clear: the Allies needed another port to get men and supplies to the battlefields in northern France. And so, Churchill gave his half hearted support for the operation the next day and directed the British Chiefs of Staff to authorize Wilson to go ahead. SACMED Hqs now operating from Caserta since early July 1944 commanded a force of American troops under Lieutenant General Patch and the French II Corps for the operation. The actual assault was to be conducted by VI (US) Corps with some French attachments. This force which was later to be designated 7 (US) Army was made up primarily from US divisions assigned to 5 (US) Army in Italy, i.e., the 3rd, 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions.<sup>8</sup>

The ultimate deception operation, of course, remained in support of the landings in Normandy on 6 June. Plan ZEPPELIN provided for a series of simultaneous notional assaults, to draw attention away from northern France, against Varna in Bulgaria (by the Russians), Durazzo (now Durrës) in Albania, Pola (now Pula) in Yugoslavia and Sete-Narbonne in southern France on 19 June. The threats during the critical period of the OVERLORD landings were to be maintained somehow as long as possible past

the notional D-Day to assist in persuading the Germans they had to maintain divisions elsewhere in conquered territories. On 12 June the notional D-Day was changed from 19 June to 24 June and the story to be sold to the Germans was that the assault against France had been postponed and the convoys recalled to Italian ports. This was on account of a suspicion confirmed by Axis broadcasts that surprise had been lost. Moreover, Allied air reconnaissance on 2 June, as the 'story' went, revealed that troops had not moved to northern France but were concentrating in the southern assault areas. The story continued that no new D-Day had yet been fixed and the intention was to launch the 7 (US) Army on southern France only after a substantial movement of German reserves towards northern France had begun.<sup>9</sup> The notion, of course, was to convince the Germans that their presence in the south of France was preventing the Allies from entering their back door.

"A" Force intended that this story continue until 6 July and then altered to begin a deliberate calming period in southern France to lower German resistance and to maintain dispersion of their forces in anticipation of ANVIL. Regarding the Central and the Eastern Mediterranean, notional threats were continued against the Dalmatian coast, Greece, the Bulgarian-Romanian coast, the Aegean islands and against German satellite states; and, of course, the Russian threat against the Bulgarian-Romanian coast.

Were the Germans in the Balkans deceived? Were they appreciating all these threats apparently being mounted by the Allies? The diaries of Field Marshall von Weichs, the German

Commander-in-Chief for the Southeast at the time, provide some insight:

5 May ... a Russian ultimatum to Bulgaria. This will lead to Russia entering a state of war with that state, and to a severe test of loyalty of the Bulgarians to the federation in view of their still strong friendship towards the Russians.

9 May ... Situation in Turkey. The cessation of the chromium deliveries not to be evaluated as omen of the entry of Turkey into the war. England has threatened a blockade, which Turkey could not endure. ... Further behavior of the Turks will depend upon whether or not the position in Romania can be held....If Romania collapses, then Bulgaria will also withdraw from the federation ...

12 May Allegedly a new English division (New Zealandic) in Egypt. OKW is reckoning with an imminent attack on southern Greece....Potential attack points are Peloponnese, east coast of Greece, Epirus. Unfortunately, reconnaissance against the Dardanelles has become extremely difficult, so that presence of landing vehicles unclear.

(This entry for 12 May and the next one for 23 May clearly demonstrate the problems the Germans were having with lack of air reconnaissance, their susceptibility to double agent reports, and the power of the bogus order of battle to induce the Germans to believe the Allies were capable of more than one operation.)

23 May Situation still not discernably altered. In Alexandria the numbers of English divisions has increased, however, no shipping tonnage could be determined, which could confirm a larger operation. A large convoy reported, approximately two divisions, steaming out of the Suez Canal. Reports of preparations in Port Said do not seem to be confirmed. On the other hand, more and more strengthened subversive group activity in southern Greece, which leads to estimating the

Peloponnese as a (potential) war zone...

24 May Various operations against the islands of the Dalmatian coast were repelled in the immediately preceding period, such as the English weak attack on the Island of Vljet. The purpose of these operations is not yet clear, either it was a reconnaissance of the front for later operations or just harassment or an attempt to win bases for subversive group supplies...

27 May ... When the Allies have taken Rome, which unfortunately is to be reckoned with in the near future, they will not go much further north. They will have therewith a broad staging base against the Balkans, and the conclusion of this operation will free forces for the Balkans. In addition, 10-12 divisions in Alexandria ready for deployment, for which only the transport equipment must be brought near....in the not too distant future, one must reckon with a two sided attack on the Balkans.

13-14 June ... the Balkans west flank completely torn up. Operations are to be expected against either Albania or Dalmatia, or Istria, in order to cut open the Balkan front. At the same time reports increase about preparations for an advance in the Aegean. Turkey seems to have become more compliant and will probably put at least airfields at England's disposal ... two sided attack on the Balkans can be expected ...10


Von Weichs has been besieged by visions of disaster prompted by the "A" Force planners and, of course, the raids of the SOE, which play an important part in the assessment of the situation in the Balkans by Oberkommando Sudost as they did in 1943 during the threats against the Balkans in support of the landings in Sicily.

Although the threat to Varna in Bulgaria was largely a Soviet responsibility worked out through the LCS and JSC, Plan TURPITUDE was a major contribution by the Middle East Forces conjured by "A" Force to induce the Germans to retain forces in

the Balkans in fear of the imminent entry of Turkey into the war and to threaten the potential for an Allied thrust through Turkey into Bulgaria and eastern Greece in tandem with the Soviet landing on the Black Sea coast. After the critical period for the landings in Normandy passed, the story was put to the Germans that the (notional) forces designated for the thrust into the eastern Balkans was needed elsewhere but the idea of a Soviet invasion of Bulgaria was kept alive through the concentration of Russian troops and shipping in the Black Sea and through the use of Allied double agents.<sup>11</sup>

Phase IV of ZEPPELIN and Plan TURPITUDE deserve further examination because of their importance in maintaining German divisions during the critical period following the landings in Normandy. The participation by genuine British forces and the huge radio deception deserve particular merit and exemplify the pains the British went through to put this deception over to the Germans. Considerable numbers of aircraft, RAF regiments, armored cars, major British military land forces, the 31 (Indian) Armored Division, etc., were moved into northern Syria and, at Aleppo, an Advance Hqs 9 (BR) Army became active about 48 hours<sup>12</sup> after the opening of the second Front in northwest France.

The air force squadrons which were sent to the Syrian/Turkish border from Palestine were in the early stages of training and were not yet a fighting force, nevertheless, they were supported by a radio deception scheme to create the impression of even greater strength. The whole charade was treated as a real operation and knowledge of that fact was



MAP 16

181a.



limited to only a few very senior officers. In fact, the 'story' put to the Allied forces participating in the operation was that since the Allies' success in Italy and the imminence of a second front in western Europe, the attitude of Turkey to the Allies changed favorably. Moreover, " ... in order to take advantage of any further development in Turkish policy and at the same time to encourage her to take a strong line with the Germans, ...(the Allies intended to)...build up Army and Air Forces in Northern Syria and to create a situation which (could) be rapidly reinforced from other theaters." <sup>13</sup> Since the airfields in northern Syria were close to native villages, the presence of dummy aircraft would not go unnoticed and so three South African squadrons (one squadron of Liberators and two of Spitfires) were stationed at various points along the border for display purposes. <sup>14</sup>

About one thousand signals personnel were involved in the movement to northern Syria; full scale operational, administrative, and signals instructions were prepared and distributed in the normal way; and, until the very end of the operation, the great majority of officers remained convinced that their move across the border was only a matter of days. Traffic on point-to-point communications links between Hqs RAF Middle East in Cairo and the Air Attache at Ankara was increased gradually from 25 May until 7 June; traffic was enciphered in one time pad so the German signals intelligence service would not be able to determine its authenticity. The same treatment was given the link from Hqs Mediterranean Allied Air Force at Caserta, Italy. Signals personnel also sent up a special radio channel

between Aleppo and the invasion headquarters, which was designated at 'COLFORCE', and a telecommunications center in Lebanon. The landlines between Lebanon and Aleppo were used extensively to pass increased volumes of traffic: although not prone to monitoring by the German signals intelligence service, the subject of the increased workload undoubtedly would be the subject of chatter between radio operators. Additional landlines were laid between Hqs COLFORCE with the No. 2 South African Air Force Wing at Rasin el Boud, and with the two fighter squadrons at Minnik.<sup>15</sup>

The wing also opened up a HF (High Frequency) channel from Rasin el Boud for control of aircraft of one of the (genuine) squadrons which was simulating two squadrons of aircraft and necessitated the allocation of additional callsigns to each flight of aircraft. Since VHF (Very High Frequency) transmissions from ground stations could not be intercepted by the German intercept stations in Greece, Crete or Rhodes, the aircraft had to fly at higher than normal altitudes to ensure these stations would be able to intercept their transmissions; the British estimated there may have been German listening posts in Turkey about which the Allies had no knowledge. Similar arrangements were made for Allied aircraft operating from bases in Cyprus where a flight of ten Hurricanes was established with six pilots.<sup>16</sup>

The Allies concluded after the operation ended that these deception activities under Plan FORTITUDE and for the earlier three phases of ZEPPELIN were very successful in that the Germans

strained to increase their air reconnaissance over the areas during the periods of radio deception activity, and by the reinforcement of Crete and Rhodes during April and May 1944, which suggested not merely a maintenance of status quo but the preparation to meet an actual invasion. All of this occurred as the Middle East was being denuded of air squadrons for the second front: 18 operational squadrons were withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean between 1 February and 1 July. The Allied signals intelligence service reported an increase in German air activity from March to June: the number of known German air reconnaissance flights rose from an "... average of 13 a week during March and April to over 20 a week during May and June." In addition, heavy transport aircraft for resupply were engaged on night flights from Athens to Crete, Rhodes, and the smaller islands rising markedly during the periods of increased Allied threats of Plan ZEPPELIN. Not only were there increases in German air reconnaissance and heavy transport aircraft but also the number of known convoy escort flights in the Aegean rose from 19 sorties in February to 66 in March, peaking at 110 in April, and settling at 70 in May and June. All of these activities fell off precipitously in late June and early July when the threats ceased from the British (notional) 9th Army.

The Allies had done their job remarkably well in insuring no German forces arrived in Normandy from the Balkans during the critical period. This feat was recognized by Eisenhower when General Wilson, SACMED, was asked to pass on to his commanders and staffs responsible for the execution of Plan TURPITUDE the appreciation by the Supreme Allied Commander "... of the

thoroughness of their work ... since there is already satisfactory evidence that this plan succeeded in its immediate object and that the threat it conveyed was appreciated by the enemy, since he refrained from moving forces towards North West France during the critical first three weeks after the landings<sup>18</sup> (at Normandy)."

In addition to all of the threats, Allied strength in these areas was exaggerated constantly through the bogus order of battle plan for 1944, Plan WANTAGE. As was the case with CASCADE, Plan WANTAGE was an overwhelming success in persuading the Germans to exaggerate Allied strength in the Mediterranean in 1944, the crucial period. The technique of maintaining a constant deception of strength was the background for the aperiodic threats of invasion played by the Allies -- the threats could be believed since the Germans had information which showed the Allies had sufficient forces to assault in any number of areas. The bogus order of battle was the trademark of their successes. OKW documents which were captured in Italy during the fighting in May 1944 illustrate dramatically the value of the bogus OB to the Allied war effort. As of 24 May 1944, the Allies maintained in reality 38 divisions in the Mediterranean Theater and the Persia and Iraq Command. Plan WANTAGE 'offered' the Germans a force of 64 divisions in those areas and the OKW estimated there were 71 divisions available to the Allies for operations which was an exaggeration of 85%. This was far beyond what the deception planners had hoped the Germans would buy. By counting unallotted units and formations below divisional strength, the relative

figures were: in reality 51 divisions, as per WANTAGE 70 divisions, as per the OKW 77 divisions. This was a gross exaggeration of about 50% of actual strength. All the higher bogus formations included in WANTAGE were accepted by the Germans: 12 (BR) Army; 14, 16 and 25 (BR) Corps; and, the 3  
19  
(Polish) Corps.

Plan WANTAGE was initially issued in February 1944 and reissued in March, April and June 1944 to reflect the (notional) build up occurring in the Balkans. The plan was designed to cover the whole of the Mediterranean Theater plus the Persia and Iraq Command and it included British, American, Polish and, for the first time in the second edition, French forces. As was the case with CASCADE in 1942 and 1943, the means used by Plan WANTAGE were the systematic planting of false information through double agents, arranging for divisional signs of bogus formations to be displayed on vehicles which may be seen and reported by uncontrolled Axis agents, and arranging for the names of bogus formations to appear as often as possible in signals and official documents some of which could be, genuinely, captured by enemy forces. The fantastic success of the bogus order of battle compensated the Allies for the considerable amount of administrative inconvenience which is unavoidable in deception, in particular, for the implementation of bogus orders of battle. In Italy, the Allies had in reality 25 complete divisions in May 1944, WANTAGE offered 27 and the Germans thought 28 divisions were opposing their forces -- this deception was done in an area where forces were in contact and the Germans had access to prisoners of war. In the western Mediterranean but outside of

Italy, the Allies maintained five complete divisions, the Germans 'bought' 15 of which only 11 were offered by the "A" Group deception planner! As forces were located further from German reconnaissance, the tendency was for the numbers estimated by the Germans, to be off by a wide margin. In the eastern Mediterranean, the Allies maintained two British and two Indian divisions, WANTAGE offered thirteen complete divisions and the Germans bought thirteen, correctly indentifying all but two. Regarding defensive formations, the Allies had the equivalent of four divisions: one (French) in Syria and three in North Africa and Corsica. "A" Force showed the Germans 13 equivalent defensive divisions; the OKW estimated the Allies had 15 equivalent divisions for defense in the Mediterranean.<sup>20</sup>

As a result of the Allied operations in Italy and the deception plans operating in the Mediterranean of which Plan ZEPPELIN was the overall theater plan for the year, the following 'successes' were realized:

- \* The number of German divisions in the Mediterranean Theater in late June 1944 was substantially the same as in early February 1944.

- \* No divisions moved from the Mediterranean Theater to northwest Europe during the preparatory period of OVERLORD.

- \* Only one division moved from the Mediterranean Theater towards the OVERLORD area and none arrived in time to influence the battle during the critical days of June 1944.

- \* Captured documents demonstrated that immediately before OVERLORD the German High Command estimated some thirty

German offensive divisions were still uncommitted in the  
21  
Mediterranean Theater.

\* According to British intelligence at the time, on the eve of the landings in France, the Balkan theater was holding down 25 German divisions and there were 58 divisions on the  
22  
western front and 187 on the eastern.

Turning now to France: in view of the (late) decision by the Allies to launch an amphibious operation in southern France as a follow on to the Normandy landings, "A" Force issued several short-term deception plans in mid 1944 directly in support of the ANVIL-DRAGOON landings. Plan IRONSIDE envisioned a threat to the Bordeaux area in the Bay of Biscay to occur on 9 June 1944 to assist the Normandy landings and the landings in southern  
23  
France. Plan FERDINAND, the "A" Force theater deception plan to support the landings, and its AFHQ companion Plan VENDETTA, were intended to reduce as much as possible German strength in southern France near the landing sites and, at the same time, VENDETTA was intended to draw German forces away from the 'control sector' of the 'Gothic Line' (the Bolonga-Florence axis) prior to, and for as long as possible after, the launching of a  
24  
real attack in the direction of Bolonga by AAI.

In support of the ANVIL landings, Plan FERDINAND envisioned an Allied threat to the Genoa area in order to prevent the Germans from holding reserves in the Rhone Valley in anticipation of landings on the French coast. At the same time, AAI's Plan OTTRINGTON in support of General Alexander's attack on the Gothic line in northern Italy in August 1944 had as its principal objective an amphibious threat to Genoa and the threat of an

outflanking land advance towards Ravenna. Although not affecting the notional assault on Genoa, deception plans were thrown awry in Italy when OTTRINGTON had to be cancelled because the notional threat along the Adriatic coast became the real plan when the Allies determined the Germans were too strong in the center of the line where the genuine attack was to have taken place. The new plan, Plan ULSTER, threatened a notional attack on the center while the British 8th Army attacked along the coast towards Ravenna. This change in plan and subsequent attack was a major factor in the penetration of the Gothic line.<sup>25</sup> We shall discuss the impact of ULSTER on the Allied attacks of 26 August 1944 on the Pisa-Florence line at the end of this chapter.

In order to ensure German vigilance was lowest during the landings in southern France, the D-Day for the notional Genoa operation was several weeks after the actual landings on 14/15 August 1944 in southern France. Most of the preparations for the ANVIL-DRAGOON landings could be explained away as preparations for an assault against Genoa. The threats to Genoa were communicated in the usual way to the Germans: through double agents, air attacks on the port, increased photo reconnaissance, raids along the coast near the Gulf of Genoa, issue of maps of the area to the troops destined for southern France, pamphlets dropped by air and, significantly, increased encouragement of Italian resistance fighters that an amphibious assault would occur in the Genoa area.<sup>26</sup>

There were three obstacles to overcome, however, by the planners. The first problem concerned the build-up of air forces



in Corsica to be used for the invasion of southern France. It would be obvious to the Germans that not all of these aircraft were intended for Genoa. The second obstacle was that Plan ZEPPELIN had been building up the threat in north Africa to some twelve divisions which included a preponderance of French troops. The planners were aware that the Germans regarded the principal use of French troops by the Allies for attacking German forces in France and not in Italy. Therefore, there had to be a considerable weakening of the French divisions and shipping in Africa. The third problem would be to find a plausible role for 7 (US) Army since Plan OTTRINGTON already provided for the assault on Genoa being carried out by 6 (US) Corps under 5 (US) Army.  
27

The objectives of Plan FERDINAND at its initial stage were to persuade the Germans that the intentions of the Allies were:

- to make no attack on southern France;
- to disperse the forces originally prepared to attack southern France, especially the French divisions, to other tasks;
- to put all resources in the western and central Mediterranean into one major effort to defeat the German armies in Italy;

- to break the Gothic line by turning both flanks - on the east from the land and on the west from the sea; and,
- to hold strategic reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Adriatic ready to enter the Balkans and Aegean Islands at any point where the Germans weaken.

28

The original Plan FERDINAND began to fall apart when notional threats became genuine operations as options open to the

Allies became less numerous -- opportunistic commanders were wrecking havoc on the "A" Force plans. The final version of FERDINAND had the 'story' changed to the Allies having three operations for execution in August 1944: landing of a French Army in southern France; landing of one Corps from AAI in the Genoa area; and, a thrust from Florence towards Bologna to break the Gothic line. As operational plans became entangled and confusing so did the 'story' "A" Force put over to match the genuine confusion regarding genuine operations during the summer of 1944.

For the Mediterranean campaign, the intention was to persuade the Germans the Allies intended in mid 1944:

- to launch an amphibious assault from the Naples-Salerno area on Genoa in early September, using the US 6 Corps;
- simultaneously to drive up the east coast of Italy towards Ravenna (later changed to a drive up the center of the mainland) with (notional) 5 (BR) Corps;

- to use the French troops in north Africa in the UK for operations against northern France, and for continued operations in Italy and in Morocco (later changed to a drive up the Rhone valley following the landings in southern France);

- to set up 7 (US) Army in southern Italy as a reserve Army for use by General Alexander after the breaching of the Gothic line for exploitation across the Po;

- to garrison north Africa entirely with French forces, and to move all US and British formations to Italy;

- to relieve the strain on maintenance in northern

Italy by transferring the bulk of the tactical air forces to Corsica and by moving the maximum reserve troops to southern Italy;

to hold 3 (Polish) Corps available for trans-Adriatic operations from southeast Italy to exploit any German weakening on the Adriatic coast;

to hold 12 (BR) Army, with seven divisions, in the Middle East for amphibious operations against any part of the Balkans which may become weakened by German withdrawals; and,

to hold 9 (BR) Army, with three divisions, and substantial air forces in the Levant ready to enter Turkey at the most propitious time and to operate against eastern Greece and the Aegean from Turkish bases (Plan TURPITUDE).<sup>30</sup>

The purpose of the Allied landings in southern France, Operation ANVIL-DRAGOON (the name ANVIL was changed to DRAGOON on 1 August because Churchill felt he was 'dragooned' into agreeing to the operation), was now to contain the maximum number of German forces in the south of France from reinforcing the coast of northern France in anticipation of OVERLORD but, more importantly, also to gain another major port for the introduction of additional Allied forces onto the continent.

By the time of the landings in southern France, the German 19th Army, subordinate to Army Group G (with the 1st Army) in the south of France, had been depleted from thirteen to eight divisions from the time of the Normandy landings. Remnants of divisions which were seeing much action in the battles in northern France were moved to central and southern France and exchanged for fresh divisions from the south.<sup>31</sup> Four German

divisions held the coast from the Spanish border to the Rhone valley; one German division had responsibility for coastal defense east of Toulon where the actual landings took place.

According to OB Suedwest, all German mobile combat units had been withdrawn from southern France to the German defensive area in Normandy by August 1944: the Germans were only capable of a static defense along the southern French coast at the time. Actually this was not entirely true -- the 11th Panzer remained in the south because Hitler interfered with an Army Group B order from von Rundstedt to move it to Chartres and Blaskowitz, Army Group G, placed it on both sides of the Rhone.

German intelligence was aware the Allies had withdrawn troops from the Italian coast and were massing in Algerian ports for an attack somewhere in the Mediterranean. Oberkommando Suedwest 'knew' an invasion was imminent by the "deterioration of (the) combat situation in Normandy" General Johannes Blaskowitz's, Commander of Army Group G, appreciation of the situation in August 1944 follows:

"Nevertheless, Army Group G remained doubtful as to the exact landing area, the more so as the enemy base in Corsica was just as closely situated to the Bay of Genoa as to the French coast east of the Rhone River. In fact, the withdrawal of the German front in Italy to the northern side of the Apennine Mountains had invited the enemy to overrun this front by an encircling maneuver consisting of a landing in the Bay of Genoa or by an advance into the plain of the Po River. Therefore, the Allied troops had the opportunity to break through the German lines in Italy and, after passing the Brenner, to penetrate into the upper valley of the Danube River, thus forcing their way into the interior of Germany. The Rhine front and the West Wall would thus lose their value, being attacked from the rear. In this way the war might possibly

have been finished in 1944.

ULTRA showed the success once again of the deception plan when it revealed the confused forecasts of an impending assault from mid-July through D-Day, southern France: a landing in Italy but not in France, expect a landing in the Aegean and the Adriatic, etc.<sup>38</sup> In Berlin, the OKW was leaning towards an Allied landing in the Bay of Genoa but estimated on 10 August<sup>39</sup> there would be no landings in the immediate future. The next day, Hitler authorized a transfer of one division, the 11th Panzer, from the Albi/Carcassonne area near Toulouse at the commander's discretion but it was too late. The Genoa threat was so great that three German infantry divisions and two Panzer divisions<sup>40</sup> had been moved to the Italian frontier. (These forces were later shipped to Normandy as the Allies were threatening the Rhine.) Opposition to the Allied landings in southern France was thereby limited.

Axis agents, reporting to the German Navy, were reporting troop concentrations in north Africa, Italy and Corsica; an influx of ships/material into the area, and, the presence of an airborne division prepared for assault.<sup>41</sup> On 12 August, the German Naval Staff in Berlin estimated a large scale landing would occur in Genoa or in southern France and the whole French and Italian coast was threatened by a potential assault. On the 13th, the Germans were estimating an assault would begin in two days in the Rhone delta and on a smaller scale in the Nice-Toulon<sup>42</sup> area; however, they were still unable to pinpoint the landings. On the night of 14/15 August, ANVIL-DRAGOON began with landings<sup>43</sup> east of Toulon, near St. Tropez. The landings were largely

unopposed; there were a minimum of casualties and Patch's forces moved quickly away from the beachhead in pursuit of the enemy in the north. In addition to the notional threat to Genoa in support of ANVIL, a simulated attack was launched on Baie de la Ciotat by US Navy special forces, west of the landing sites between Marseilles and Toulon where the Germans also believed a major landing possible; numerous raids were conducted also near Genoa.<sup>44</sup>

Radio Berlin actually announced that the Allies had landed near Cannes but were beaten back by the German forces in that area.<sup>45</sup> The deception worked again but the Germans had no reserves and very little forces on the southern coast - the end in Europe was now in sight.

Regarding organizational changes, the second phase in the evolution of the "A" Force after the landings in Sicily took place in July 1944 after the fall of Rome (see organizational chart #4). Clarke moved his Main Hqs from Cairo to Caserta in Italy on 20 July; this headquarters controlled stations in Rome, Naples, Bari, Algiers, Tunis, and Gibraltar. The Rear Hqs "A" Force remained at Cairo and continued to administer the Force as a whole in addition to controlling a station in Beirut. A "No. 1" Tactical Hqs "A" Force assumed the responsibilities for AAI and General Alexander at Caserta; a "No. 2 Tactical" Hqs "A" Force was created to support Force 163, planning the invasion of southern France. This was the first all-American deception organization in the Mediterranean theater and was formed from the American contingent at the now redundant Advance Hqs at Algiers. The organization was known on the table of organization as the



No. 6747 Hqs Platoon (Provisional) and included four American officers including the officer-in-charge. The total "A" Force organizational strength not including the technical units was now <sup>46</sup> 59 officers of which 13 were Americans.

The last major deception operation conducted by "A" Force in the Mediterranean in the year 1944 is possibly the most fascinating of all -- Plan OTTRINGTON and its successor Plan ULSTER. The plans were conceived to assist the Allies in breaking the Gothic line, that is, the German line of defense in August 1944 across the mainland through Florence. The operation is fascinating because of the Allied scheme to convince the Germans that an earlier (notional to the Germans) plan which called for an assault on the eastern side towards Ravenna was actually a cover for the real operation to be conducted towards Florence in the center.

In late June, AAI planned to mount an attack in August aimed at the center of the German line; Plan OTTRINGTON was conceived to draw the Germans to the east coast to prevent a break through by Polish forces there and to threaten an amphibious assault against the west coast by the 5 (US) Army. In order to try and hold Florence, the Germans however moved their best divisions to protect that city thus blocking the Allied intention to drive through the area. Accordingly, the Allies exchanged their operational plan with their deception plan; the intention was to deceive the Germans in keeping those divisions near Florence, a much easier task than getting them to move the forces to another location. The 'story' to be planted on the Germans, was changed to convince the opposition that the pause in the Allied offensive



was due to the need to regroup before an attack was launched through the Florence - Bologna and Florence - Imola axes, which was the original Allied intention, and that the Allies were operating a cover plan to suggest an attack up the eastern coast.  
47

Plan ULSTER was intended to persuade the Germans that AAI intended to use their surplus armor forces in a feint on the Adriatic coast to divert German attention away from the center where the Allied forces would make a frontal assault on the Gothic line through the Futa pass towards Bologna. In order to deceive the Germans, the Greek Mountain Brigade, the 1 Canadian Infantry Division, and major elements of Mark Clark's 5 (US) Army were moved to the center of the line to replace the 8th Army which would be the main attacking force. The 'story' was that the original plan was changed since all available landing craft in the Adriatic were earmarked for an attack on the Dalmatian coast in Yugoslavia which negated plans for an amphibious assault to outflank the Gothic line. Also, 'earlier successes' by the Allies in getting across the Arno offered the possibility for an operation on the center of the line soon.  
48

To deceive the Germans that the build-up on the Adriatic coast was in fact a deception, camouflage displays behind the Polish Corps on the east coast were partially compromised, rumors were spread that the dummy tanks behind this Corps had caused adverse comment amongst the Polish troops, and a notional Corps (5th) compromised its notional communications network through faulty signal procedure. In addition to these rather unique

arrangements, "A" Force at AAI offered its normal menu of tricks and ruses to convince the Germans the Allies were building a large force in the center while at the same time deceiving them that the force on the east coast was superficial and a hoax. <sup>49</sup>

The Eighth Army after action report gives full credit to the deception plan and the speed at which large forces were concentrated on the Adriatic side. An Army Headquarters (8th), two Corps Hqs, eight divisions and three independent armored brigades concentrated during the attack preparation and not one German division was moved east to defend the Adriatic coast. Two days after the battle began, the German 26 Panzer Division began to move but on the same day the German 5 Mountain Division was moving away from the main battle. Another German Panzer Division did not begin to move until 31 August and its move was not complete until 6 September. <sup>50</sup> The Gothic line was broken.

The situation in late 1944 no longer necessitated maintaining a massive strategic reserve in the Mediterranean. Therefore, it was necessary to begin reducing these notional forces in a planned and phased way so that credibility could be maintained with the Germans. The Allies, however, would have to maintain a reserve for AAI, a theater reserve of airborne forces and some reserve divisions for 3 (BR) Corps so the Germans would hesitate to begin any offensive because of any perceived Allied weakness. When the end seemed certain in early 1945, the "A" Force planners began shifting these notional forces to the east <sup>51</sup> to support operations against Japan.


By late 1944, it was apparent that deception activities including the bogus OB were no longer required on the scale

reached prior to that time in the Mediterranean Theater and the Middle East. Allied superiority over the enemy in resources of all kinds was so great that neither defensive deception nor an artificial exaggeration of strength was likely to be required again, except for purely local and temporary purposes. The German lack of resources and the limitations of their lines of communications was so great that the Germans were incapable now of reacting to fresh threats, however effective. By this time, the Abwehr was so disorganized and discredited that it ceased to be an effective instrument to influence the German General Staff. The Abwehr stations were moving closer to Germany beyond effective reach of "A" Force and their activities in neutral countries were reduced through changes of attitude towards the Reich. With the reduction of the Abwehr, there was a marked decrease in air reconnaissance thereby reducing the German ability to see and hear the deception evidence which was produced for their benefit. The German military intelligence structure was now so weak that it would fail without any outside help.

The final major reorganization of "A" Force before its disbandment in 1945 occurred in October 1944 when Main Hqs "A" Force at Caserta was closed and support of AAI was handed over to No. 1 Tactical Hqs "A" Force (see organizational chart #5). This headquarters was now responsible for all deception operations in Italy and the Adriatic for both AAI and SACMED. No. 2 Tactical Hqs "A" Force was now totally transferred to 6th Army Group fighting up from the south of France, and now took operational guidance from Ops "B" under SHAEF. Rear Hqs at Cairo continued

functioning as the senior "A" Force unit in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. This Hqs was also responsible for deception policy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East but the transfer of responsibility to Delhi for support to PAIC was now complete. "A" Force stations were closed in Gibraltar, Cyprus, Algiers, Tunis and Naples but a new station was opened in Florence. Stations in Rome and Bari continued to pass information to the German SIS via the double agent system.<sup>53</sup> "A" Force now consisted of 21 officers and Brigadier Clarke transferred to the Rear Hqs at Cairo to wind down the organization he had built from scratch in 1940.

The Rear Hqs at Cairo in the last few months of the war busied itself in preparing records of "A" Force to be sent to the UK, eliminating the notional formations of the bogus order of battle (Plan WANTAGE), and transfer of the double agent links from the Germans to the Japanese secret intelligence service in support of Southeast Asia Command. SEAC established an outstation at Cairo to take over the machinery of the Rear Hqs "A" Force in January 1945; "A" Force links in Turkey and Persia and Iraq were to be used for the benefit of the Allies in India against the Japanese in the future. "A" Force outstations in Cyprus, Athens and Beirut were closed and their channels handed over to counter-intelligence organizations for those purposes. The technical unit at Cairo was disbanded on 15 December 1944 and its personnel and equipment distributed between similar organizations in Italy and India.<sup>54</sup> For all practical purposes, "A" Force ceased as a viable organization from late 1944. There were no longer any deception requirements except those in support



MAP 18

200a.

of SEAC for use against Japan. The formal closure of "A" Force occurred on 25 May 1945 with an order signed by its last  
55  
commander, Colonel Crichton.

And so ended the most active period of organized deception in the history of warfare.

## CHAPTER VIII

1. London, England, Public Record Office, CAB 80, Piece 77, Minutes of the War Cabinet, 23 January 1944, Plan BODYGUARD. The plan was officially approved by the Combined Chiefs on 23 January 1944. At the time BODYGUARD was drawn up, the Allied strategy was for three near simultaneous offensives (the Russian front, and the landings in Normandy and the south of France), continuing the fighting in Italy, and major deception operations conducted against Scandanavia and the Balkans.

2. Ibid. The notion was to keep German reinforcements away from Normandy during the critical period, i.e., about three weeks after the landings, so the Allies would gain a foothold and a port.

3. Ibid. Note that the Allies are 'giving away' to the Germans the 'fact' that there will be a cross-channel operation in 1944 -- in late summer. Compare this part of BODYGUARD with Feldmarschalls Freiherr von Weichs diary which was provided by Dr. Charles Cruickshank to author. Complete diary located originally Historical Division, Hqs US Army Europe, Foreign Military Studies Branch, Military Study No. P114-C. Von Weichs' assessment of overall situation in the Mediterranean and Middle East was made 31 January - 4 February 1944 and attests to problems facing the Germans at the time with respect to Allied intentions. Von Weichs estimates that the 'English' have enough forces and transport equipment to make further landings in the eastern Mediterranean. He further estimates that the following

area are potential operations by the Allies:

- a. south of France in connection with main invasion in the north of France;
  - b. west coast of Italy in the area of Ostia;
  - c. east coast of Italy in the area of Ancona;
  - d. west coast of the Balkans (Albania or Dalmatia) in co-operation with Tito;
  - e. the Aegean with or without the Dodecanese in conjunction with the entry of Turkey into the war.
4. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Branch, Record Group 331, AFHQ, Extract from BODYGUARD, dated 25 December 1943.
5. Ibid., Plan Zeppelin, Second Approved Version, date not available; Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, p. 147. This scheme of alternately raising and lowering the alert threshold of the enemy by threatening and postponing attacks is a crucial technique in the deceiver's bag of tricks. It conditions the enemy to expect a calming period and induces him to lower his resistance; it almost never fails and is one of the 'secrets' to a successful surprise attack. See Michael Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War, 1976. The idea is to attack during the calming period when the enemy is on the down slope of his alert phase.
6. Ibid., Plan Zeppelin, Second Approved Version, date not available.
7. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, volume XI, The Invasion of France and Germany 1944-



1945, pp. 222-223.

8. Ibid., p. 236.

9. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 331, AFHQ, Memorandum from Brigadier D.W. Clarke, dated 24 June 1944, subject: The Final Phase of Plan ZEPPELIN.

10. Private diaries of von Weichs, CINC Southeast.

11. Memorandum from Clarke, dated 24 June 1944, subject: The Final Phase of Plan ZEPPELIN; London, England, Public Record Office, WO 201, Piece 1592, Note from Paget to Lieutenant General Holmes, 9 (BR) Army, dated 21 May 1944; Cruickshank, p. 154. No further mention was made of dates in order to keep the threat open ended.

12. London, England, Public Record Office, WO 201, Piece 1592, Note from Page to Lieutenant General Holmes, 9 (BR) Army, dated 21 May 1944.

13. Ibid.; PRO, AIR 23, Piece 1448, Memorandum from Wing Commander R.G. Moore, Hqs RAF Middle East, dated 20 August 1944, subject: Operation "ZEPPELIN" IV Report on Radio Deception Scheme.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., WO 201, Piece 1592, Memorandum from Major General Baillon, Ninth Army, dated 13 July 1944, subject: Plan TURPITUDE.

19. Ibid., WO 201, Piece 1795, Memorandum from Brigadier Dudley Clarke, dated 25 June 1944, subject: Note on Results

Obtained by the "WANTAGE" Order of Battle Plan.

20. Ibid.

21. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 331, AFHQ, Memorandum from Brigadier Clarke, dated 24 June 1944, subject: The Final Phase of Plan "ZEPPELIN".

22. F.H. Hinsley, et al, British Intelligence in the Second World War. Volume III. Part I. p. 33.

23. Cruickshank, pp. 158-160. Plan VENDETTA was cancelled by the Combined Chiefs because of lack of physical evidence to support the deception. This action by the Chiefs is open to further exploration since they had ample evidence the Germans were estimating that there may be a landing in the Bay of Biscay concurrent with landings in other areas of France, and other moderately successful deception operations had been conducted with a lack of physical evidence. Moreover, physical evidence was becoming less important because the Germans were not able to fly as many reconnaissance missions nor as far due to Allied air superiority.

24. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Branch, RG 331, AFHQ, Plan FERDINAND, date not available. Plan FERDINAND was approved by SACMED on 4 July 1944, accepted by the Combined Chiefs on 8 July 1944, and those parts affecting AAI were approved by Alexander on 18 July 1944. The plan had been in operation since 7 July 1944. The plan contains the most complex and deliberately confusing 'story' to be put over to the Germans since the genuine situation was also complex and confusing

regarding the planning for operations in the Mediterranean in the summer of 1944.

25. Cruickshank, pp. 203-204.

26. Ibid., p. 168.

27. RG 331, AFHQ, Plan FERDINAND.

28. Ibid.; PRO, WO 204, Piece 6740, Note from Clarke, dated 15 July 1944 at Naples, subject: Note on Plans "OTTRINGTON" and "FERDINAND".

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid. The theater plan was a carefully woven fabric of half truths and lies -- the important point was kthat all the deceptions in the various areas complemented each other.

31. Jacques Robichon, Second D-Day, p. 26.

32. Morison, p. 239.

33. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., U.S. Army Military History Institute, German (OB Sudwest) Estimate of Situation Prior to Allied Invasion of Southern France, by Johannes Blaskowitz, Generaloberst, dated 1954, MS #B-421.

34. Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West, p. 151.

35. Robichon, p. 27.

36. Blaskowitz, MS #B-421.

37. Ibid.

38. Bennett, p. 151.

39. Robichon, p. 29.

40. Ibid., p. 26.

41. Ibid., p. 31.

42. Morison, p. 244.

43. Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 227.

44. Morison, p. 249.
45. Ibid., p. 250.
46. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, RG 331, AFHQ, Memorandum from Brigadier Clarke, dated 5 July 1944, subject: Reorganization of "A" Force.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., Plan ULSTER, dated 14 August 1944.
49. Ibid.
50. London, England, Public Record Office, WO 204, Piece 8010, Memorandum from Major Campbell, Main Hq 8th Army, dated 20 October 1944, subject: Report on the Cover Plan fore the Attack on the Gothic Line 26 Aug 44.
51. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, RG 331, AFHQ, Memorandum from Brigadier Clarke, dated 5 July 1944, subject: Reorganization of "A" Force.
52. Ibid., Memorandum from Clarke, dated October 1944, subject: Reduction of "A" Force. And so begins another cycle in which the deceiver is more powerful than the deceived and therefore there is less reason to deceive. This is the natural demise of the art until the stronger opponent again becomes weaker.
53. Ibid., Memorandum from Clarke, dated 6 October 1944, subject: Reduction of "A" Force.
54. Ibid., Memorandum from Clarke, dated 28 November 1944, subject: Reduction of "A" Force.
55. Ibid., Memorandum from Colonel Crichton, Commander of "A" Force, dated 21 May 1945.

## CHAPTER IX

### Lessons and Conclusions: The Art of Deception

"Thus, march by an indirect route and divert the enemy by enticing him with a bait." Sun Tzu

What can we learn from these experiences in World War II? Was this massive effort useful? Did it save lives and resources? Or was it all just a game? How did they do it? What were their attitudes at the time? How were they organized?

The record indicates that deception was indeed useful in winning campaigns and providing the margin of victory in the battles during the war in the Mediterranean. How much is impossible to measure -- any measure taken would be subjective. Although we can get some idea of the impact of the deception by examination of captured intelligence documents, we can not run the battles and campaigns again without benefit of the deception and observe the difference. So the value of deception, just as the value of intelligence, to the war will always be debated. The historians, however, and certainly those directly involved in deception will tell us that surprising the enemy will almost certainly provide a margin for victory and that deceiving the enemy is the critical aspect to surprise. All surprise is, however, relative. Some Germans and Italians were indeed

surprised to some degree at Sicily, Salerno, Anzio and Provençal but some were not. Those who were not were either oblivious to the clues or a lot smarter than those who were surprised. It was not necessary, and this is vital, that all of the enemy be surprised. Indeed, it would be impossible to deceive and surprise everybody all the time. It is only necessary, apparently, to inject enough doubt so that the enemy does not concentrate his forces at the point you are concentrating yours and that is not hard to do. It only takes effort, patience and a little creativity. If a military commander is not prepared to deceive the enemy so that he throws away an advantage and the lives of his men, he may not be fit to lead those men into battle.

Despite the contribution of deception to victory in war, most historians and students of international activities tend to ignore it. In modern times, this is not entirely their fault since most of the material is classified beyond their reach or hidden from them in unknown places. There has been, however, some renewed interest in the subject among academics and those who are searching for ways to beat a superior foe. There will be some use of deception in the next war but it may not be by Americans. In fact, the track record demonstrates a marked tendency by Americans to ignore deceit as a weapon and charge ahead in a frontal assault. Patton's notion about amphibious operations is perhaps a good example of that attitude: a great many losses would result but there was no way to avoid severe casualties in an amphibious assault.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps this book and

others like it will convince some potential American commanders to consider all the weapons at their disposal and to use the one which can guarantee an advantage, 'multiply the force', and reduce American casualties.

Academics have shown us that the probability of achieving victory when a commander takes the initiative is more than 90% when the enemy is surprised. Without surprise but with the initiative, the commander only has a 50% surety of victory.<sup>2</sup> Barton Whalley has proved that deception is commonly associated with surprise particularly at the strategic and operational level of war. It is also true that the number of cases of surprise is increasing despite new and faster means of communications to speed warnings of hostile intent. Surprise without deception is increasingly rare probably due to the use of more sophisticated and detailed collection systems in use today.<sup>3</sup>

Clausewitz, unlike Sun Tzu, was largely negative about deception since it was, according to him, too difficult to achieve at the higher levels of war. He was, however, in support of deceit when faced with a superior enemy: "... the weaker the forces are at the disposal of the supreme commander, the more appealing the use of cunning becomes."<sup>4</sup> Deception during World War II had its beginnings in the summer and autumn of 1940 in England during the Battle of Britain and in the desert of North Africa when the British were faced with impending disaster and were forced to use guile to defeat a superior enemy. In England, the British used artificial fires, fake airfields and dummy lighting to deceive the approaching German bombers where their target was located.<sup>5</sup> In the desert, they used dummy formations

and parachutists to trick the Italians. These are classic examples of defensive deception, i.e., the British were defending their homeland and were sending the German bombers to bomb fields and haystacks, and offensive deception, i.e., the Middle East Forces were preparing the Italians to look the other way when they attacked their weakened side. On the other hand, deception was considered unnecessary in the Mediterranean toward the end of 1944 when the Allies were in such a superior position regarding the Germans. This leads to the first theory. Deception begins with a perception of weakness and stops with a recognition of strength. Weakness was and will always be the mother of deception.

Deception does not cost much in people or money. It's a rather sound investment with a good return.<sup>6</sup> Anyone who would put aside a lot of resources for deception is only deceiving himself -- it is not necessary and it is probably counter-productive. There were but a few thousand people involved in deception planning and execution in World War II, and those numbers pale when one considers the millions who were in uniform in Europe and around the world during the war. It is also true that deception did not win the war -- no one idea will win a war, it's a combination of resources, strategy, will, intelligence, etc. Without ULTRA or the double agents, deception would have been more than difficult but not impossible. It would have been certainly different without the pipeline to the German intelligence service provided by the double agents and without a means to check its progress provided by the cryptologists in



Bletchley Park. It is also true that deception will not make up for a faulty operational plan as was the problem at Salerno or for not taking advantage of the surprise achieved as was the case at Anzio. Also, the deception planners of the future may have to look to other means to deceive the enemy. Every war will bring changes, some subtle and some dramatic, to the art of deception but the basic precepts will remain.

It was clear that not all the principal players of the Axis swallowed the stratagems involved in the invasion of Sicily. There was enough doubt sowed so that there was disagreement on the best course of action to prevent the Allies from succeeding in their next operation. Mussolini did not totally accept the deception played on the Axis. He believed that Sicily was the target, perhaps because an invasion of Sicily would have been more damaging to Italy and, therefore, to be worried about more than, for example, the Balkans or even Sardinia. Kesselring also did not swallow as hard as the High Command or Hitler, perhaps because he was closer to the action than Berlin. Also, the intelligence officer at the Italian Army headquarters on Sicily, who may have not been privy to all the sources available to the Germans, was not deceived. This nameless officer correctly predicted the forthcoming assault almost down to the day. But he was of less consequence than either Hitler or Mussolini or Kesselring. These later men could move divisions and armies, and change direction and emphasis. It is important to know who you are deceiving and what will more likely be 'saleable'.

The deception of Hitler deserves special mention. Was he really deceived or was he simply responding to the exigencies of

the moment? He was aware the Italians were faltering and he would have to replace them eventually in France, in Italy and in the Balkans. The earlier examination in this study of his conferences shows Hitler was clearly deceived. The Allies needed to prevent the Germans from reinforcing Sicily; it was entirely logical to aim their deception at the one man who made the ultimate decision concerning movements of forces -- Hitler. It was his preconception that the Balkans were the likely target; it was his greatest fear because a loss of territory in the Balkans would damage his war effort more than a loss of Mediterranean islands. The threat against the Balkans was maintained throughout the war by the "A" Force planners and paid them huge dividends. This is the second theory. Play to the fears of your enemy. Know who you are trying to deceive and what you want him to do. It is easier to nudge him in the direction he is headed rather than trying to turn him around. It is not necessary to fool all of the players, only those who are necessary to your plan.

While understandably biased, Dudley Clarke provides us with the result of the deception regarding Sicily. According to him, the premier German commander opened his headquarters in Athens to counter the expected move of the Allies in the Balkans. Hitler moved two armored divisions from Russia to Greece, one armored division from France to Greece and two infantry divisions to Greece. Operational maneuver demands deception in order to allow smaller or weaker forces to concentrate against a local enemy vulnerability. The German vulnerability by July 1943 was Sicily

and it was no accident. German forces were divided equally between Sardinia and Sicily, and if the Allies had not captured Pantellaria on 11 June and threatened Sicily, there would have been one less German division moved to that island. Sardinia and Sicily were reinforced, and the Herman Goering Division moved to Sicily directly after the loss of Pantellaria. In addition, the Italians requested additional German divisions be moved into Italy. By the end of June, five German divisions had moved south of the Alps and two were closing.<sup>7</sup> The decision by the Allies to take Pantellaria is curious. It was attacked in order to provide the Allied invasion forces with an additional airfield from which tactical aircraft could be launched. On the other hand, it signaled to the Germans the Allied intentions to clear the Mediterranean for shipping, one of the prime objectives of HUSKY. Although, for Hitler, the die was cast by the time Pantellaria was attacked as the decision had been taken on the movement of forces between the theaters, there was still time to move forces within the theater and Kesselring did just that. On reflection, the Allies did lose some measure of surprise and force ratio by the attack on Pantellaria and they did draw Axis attention to the area.

Field Marshall Kesselring's comments after the war are germane:

QUESTION: Did the Oberkommando suspect that the first landing on the Continent would take place in Italy?

ANSWER: As mentioned before, it was of utmost importance to the Allied leadership to fully maintain the traffic through the Mediterranean Sea. If - after the fall of Tunisia - there were still some doubts as to the next Allied

objective, the capture of PANTELLERIA made it at once quite clear what the Allied offensive aiming at. Sicily had to become the next target in the Allied strategy and so it did.

Enemy landings beyond the border of Italy, as in southern France or in the Balkans were, at that time, considered out of the question by the German command.

Taking into account the strength of the Allied invasion forces (the affect of the bogus order of battle), we expected that another landing would strike CALABRIA. In this case, SICILY would have become a mouse trap to all German and Italian forces fighting down there.8

(Kesselring continues when asked about operations after HUSKY.)

QUESTION: Judgement of the Allied intentions in Italy by the German command.

ANSWER: In our opinion, the security of the sea communications in the Mediterranean was - as repeatedly mentioned before - of prime importance to the Allies.

Contrary to the opinion of all German military and political authorities in Italy, the German High Command did not believe that - in the long run - Italy would fulfil her obligations as an ally. Consequently, the desertion of this country was to be considered in the framework of our strategy. If the desertion took place, the next Allied objective must become ROME and then the occupation of the whole country.

Expecting another landing in CALABRIA already in the beginning of the offensive, OB Southwest also reckoned with the possibility of the invasion of SARDINIA and CORSICA, so as to encircle the Italian peninsula and create a favorable jump-off for landing operations in Middle or Northern Italy, or Southern France.

The potential danger of a landing at the ADRIATIC coast was believed to be out of the question since the Allies were known to follow a very cautious strategy.

QUESTION: What did the Germans know about

the real Allied plans in Italy?

ANSWER: The Allies were masters in making propaganda of deceptive measures, in short, in the waging of the 'war of nerves'.

OB Southwest had no positive information until a day or two prior to the landing on Sicily.

The most reliable means of reconnaissance was, and remained such, the battle reconnaissance from the air and the ground. Other intelligence that came in was generally so contradictory that it caused more confusion than clarity.9

(Here Kesselring gives the impression he expected landings after Sicily at Rome where he stationed the bulk of the German forces before the Salerno landings. That is where the deception should have been targeted against -- Rome. About the Salerno landings, Kesselring continues.)

KESSELRING: A landing was most likely to take place in the area near NAPLES where it would have a strategic effect.

Less probable but still possible were landing operations in the Gulf of SAPRI, or in the coastal area of SCALEA, or in the Gulf of SAN EUFEMIA...

We had to reckon with the alternative of either a landing near ROME or near NAPLES... Finally, we still expected surprise thrusts in APULIA. The situation on the islands was anything but clear. The result was that all German forces were tied up.10

(He must have believed landings less possible at Naples as only one German division was placed there. The comment about all German forces tied up is significant -- he was dispersed. To a question about knowing secret American intentions, Kesselring replies:)

KESSELRING: ... After their landing in North Africa, the Allies started a 'war of nerves'.

sending a flow of news all over the world. As a result of this, the value of the information that came in from our agents was considerably impaired ... During the first years of war, the most reliable intelligence for the estimate came from the air and combat reconnaissance and, temporarily, also from reports sent by the Navy ... As - especially in this respect - the Allies did little to deceive the German commands and troops, OB Southwest was, in general, well informed about the enemy intentions.11

Ah, the great beauty of it all! Kesselring does not know he has been deceived -- this affect is absolutely essential in order to terminate a deception without prejudicing the next operation employing deception or a similar ruse. We will return to this later. As mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, deception can be either defensive or offensive. In defensive deception, one may wish to exaggerate strength to avoid an attack by an enemy. In the offense, the goal of the deception should be to mislead the enemy about an attack, i.e., its timing, place and the tactics to be employed, or to disperse his reserves. Exaggeration of strength may also be desirable to induce the enemy to accept the possibility of a number of attacks occurring simultaneously. In both defense and offense, deception is used to obtain a favorable advantage of position or strength. Generally, for a force on the defensive, intelligence information about the enemy's plans and dispositions may be more important than the use of deception whereas, in the offensive, intelligence about the enemy is less important than the use of deception to defeat an enemy. The deception in support of HUSKY exaggerated Allied strength in the Mediterranean Theater and the Middle East through the bogus order of battle (Plan CASCADE) and in the

timing and place for the assault which was the subject of the deceptions of Plan BARCLAY and Plan MINCEMEAT. As the Germans were on the defensive, it was important to them that they know the Allied place and date of attack. For the Allies, it was crucial that they deceive the Germans about their concentration of force. And therein lies the third theory: intelligence is critical to the defense as deception is critical to the attack. This applies regardless of the relative strength of the forces.

German accounts of the Allied offensive through the Mediterranean 1942-1944 generally concede they were surprised and deceived by the several amphibious landings. The only point of debate seems to be how much and that is really not relative since it is clear that the surprise and deception were enough to provide a relative advantage to the Allies. One can argue about whether or not tactical surprise was achieved and the degree to which it was or was not achieved. The important point is that strategic or operational level surprise was achieved and this is much more significant. The Axis was generally aware that an Allied offensive was imminent but they could not point out when and where to a sufficient degree to allow a concentration of forces against the assault.

What were the means used to achieve the ends? In the case of Sicily, the deception planners used double agents, photo reconnaissance, false order of battle, raids, genuine administrative procedures, bombing of cover targets, genuine training, radio deception of several kinds, false documents, rumors, pamphlets, diversions, feints, demonstrations, active/defensive camouflage, deceptive deployment of command

posts, etc. There was nothing they did not resort to in order to achieve their aims. The tools of deception are many but the art is in their selection and synchronization. The "A" Force became masters of the game by the end of the war. It was true that deception was inspired and created by a few gifted individuals but as we have seen in the "A" Force example, the execution can be organized along military lines. Science can support it and there are an unlimited number of ways to deceive an enemy. In the case of the HUSKY deception, the bogus order of battle was the foundation for all the means to be played against, the double agents were the communications channels to the enemy's intelligence service and ULTRA was the safety valve. Deception on the scale attempted during World War II in the Mediterranean would not have been effective without these three essential ingredients. The fourth theory is: Any information channel can be used for deception. Prior to World War II, the general belief was that deception could not be done as it was during World War I because of advances in the science of war. That is not correct: the more one depends on a channel of information, the more likely one will be deceived. Increasing the number of channels may allow noise to be introduced into the situation, thereby, raising the possibility for confusion and deception especially if all information channels are considered equally valid. The human dimension is capable of countering and eventually deceiving any channel of information so long as the user is consistently satisfied with its output. On the other hand, of course, increasing the channels of information and avenues of



verification increase the opportunities to identify a deception if the channels are skeptically evaluated and constantly checked.

Deception in World War II in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East was largely a British affair. They created it, they evolved it and they taught it to an unwilling student, the Americans. Why was there a difference in attitude to the use of deception between the British and the Americans? Was it because Americans are too straight forward and find it difficult to lie not only to each other but also to an enemy? Or was it because the British were absolutely against the wall and had to resort to anything to prevent defeat and high casualty rates? Americans tend to believe long term logistics and production will defeat an enemy in the end. There is no doubt they are important. We also want to get to the heart of a problem right away and attack it relentlessly -- we are generally impatient with a lack of progress. We need immediate results or we think we may be failing. The British, on the other hand, are masters of the subtle gambit. They will look for ways to get others to do the nasty work for them: that is how they won and maintained an empire. Their national character demanded that they be cautious and husband resources; their strategy during World War II was largely opportunistic rather than making long range plans and sticking closely to them.

Colonel Baumer, the American Army officer detailed to the LCS during the war, believed that most Americans were uncertain of the benefits of deception and that they wanted to "throw everything at the enemy". Americans believed in superiority of firepower, troops, material. Deception was unnecessary and was

perhaps a delaying element and an impediment to achievement of an objective.<sup>11</sup> In David Mure's book "Master of Deception", William Casey, current head of the CIA and who was head of the OSS in Europe during the war, speaking about American attitudes in general to deception, is quoted as saying, "Eisenhower and the American officers coming north with their colleagues to staff SHAEF had a far more positive attitude towards deception".<sup>12</sup> By late 1943, these Americans were beginning to pay attention to the British successes in the Mediterranean Theater.

As the letter quoted in Chapter III from Bissel on the JSC to Bevan of the LCS in 1945 demonstrated, Washington, while convinced of the utility of deception, had major difficulties getting the mainly American-led theaters in the Pacific to deceive the enemy on the scale regularly practiced in Europe. This telling remark from a Joint Planning Staff memorandum in late 1944 illustrates the point: "Deception measures employed in the war against Germany have paid large dividends ... Failure to provide coordinated deception plans for the Pacific in the past has prompted submission of the subject memorandum by Joint Security Control".<sup>13</sup> In the referenced memorandum, the JCS recommended sending teams to the Pacific from Washington to " ... assist theater commanders and staffs in development of coordinated use of all methods and means facilitating coordination of deception plans and implementation between adjacent theaters".<sup>14</sup> The Pacific was an American sphere regarding deception and we were responsible for coordination of deception at the strategic and operational level across the

theaters.

During the early years of World War II, there was no apparatus, no theory<sup>15</sup> and no enthusiasm for deception. We were not convinced of the value of deception or of double agents. By the end of the war, US attitudes changed but it was too late to create the deception demanded at the higher levels of warfare. Credit must go to the British who built on the experiences of "A" Force in the Middle East. The British had achieved an organization of trained and imaginative personnel with the proper command-and-control relationships to make it work.<sup>16</sup> This brings us to our fifth theory: Americans do not deceive because they feel superior in power to a potential enemy, and they do not know and consequently do not respect an enemy's intellect. In order for Americans to deceive, these attitudes must change. There is no doubt that since Americans are known for their openness to the point of being a fault, deceptions carefully contrived by the U.S. may be more successful with less effort than other nations. At the same time, Americans are more likely to fall for a deception. Regarding this openness, we are prone to leak classified information as we find it difficult to keep a secret; we are an open society and we have a public government. But, these are channels of communications, also, to a potential enemy.

It is true that the British national character was supportive of deception but so also were its leaders, especially Churchill. Churchill fiercely believed in using all the tools available to beat Germany including intelligence and other secret devices; he had a "...greater faith in, and fascination for, secret intelligence than any of his predecessors...As first Lord

of the Admiralty in 1914 he had been personally involved in the founding of Room 40 and the revival of British codebreaking...".<sup>17</sup> On his accession to the leadership of the British people, he ordered the Chiefs of Staff to review the ways<sup>18</sup> by which intelligence was used in operational decision making. He demonstrated, in World War I, an early flair for deception during the battle of the Marne in 1914 when, as First Lord of the Admiralty, he sent a brigade of Royal Marines to Ostend in Belgium with orders to give their presence full publicity. Before the fighting calcified in 1918, the German armies attacked across northern Europe during the early months of the war. There seemed to be no stopping them but they were constantly looking backward over their right shoulders fearing an allied stroke against their lines of communication in Belgium and northern France. The British government had already made the decision to attach the British Expeditionary Force to the French left and landing on the Belgium coast was ruled out since resources were few. Churchill, however, dispatched the Marines, and the Germans thought they were dealing with 40,000 men instead of 3000, and that their rear was threatened. The Germans halted their advance and their plan<sup>19</sup> for the early conquest of France failed.

Churchill believed that Germany could be defeated from the rear through the Balkans; he never relinquished his ultimate object of a Balkan offensive. He opposed the large scale combats of the First World War and thought that some other way must be found to defeat Germany: perhaps bombing, a back door, economics, subversion,<sup>20</sup> deception, etc. Deception in World War II owes as

much to Churchill as to Wavell and Dudley Clarke. There is another lesson here from the study of deception in World War II, the sixth theory. Deception requires strong support and inspiration from the highest civilian and military leaders for it to succeed.<sup>21</sup>

One of the fascinating aspects, however, of the influence by Churchill in deception was his long standing belief that the British would return in force through the Balkans. The Allied half-victory in Sicily, considering the numbers of German and Italian troops that were allowed to escape to the mainland, and the landings on the mainland in September, diverted Churchill's attention to the Aegean Islands and the Dardanelles, and the possibility of bringing Turkey into the war on the side of the

<sup>22</sup>  
Allies against Germany. The focus of the deception in the Mediterranean played by "A" Force was the Balkans. The deception planners knew how to make a 'story' plausible: it must be based on credible potential operations and in the eyes of the Prime Minister, at least, these were credible threats only if they could get an agreement with the Americans for operations in that area. Churchill, a 'Balkan' from World War I, never got his wish but he certainly must have enjoyed the show the deception planners put on for him as an intellectual substitute.

Why were the Germans deceived so regularly during the Mediterranean campaign and at the beaches in Normandy? Was it a fault of their national character? Could they have prevented their disastrous intelligence failures? Is susceptibility to deception universal to all nationalities or were the Nazis particularly vulnerable? There are no easy answers to these

questions -- one can present evidence to support a whole range of possibilities.

Deception is essentially a non-physical attack on the enemy's intelligence. The enemy intelligence in this case was Admiral Canaris and his Abwehr, the military intelligence organization of Nazi Germany. Heinz Hoehne, Canaris' biographer,<sup>23</sup> clearly demonstrates the general weakness of the Abwehr. The Abwehr had neither internal cohesion nor a settled existence. It was a victim of severe internal strife within Hitler's government and military structure. The rivalries between the various intelligence agencies and the dominance of Hitler condemned the Abwehr to an unsuccessful record. The Abwehr was so inefficient that the Luftwaffe and the Navy built up their own intelligence organization to lessen dependence on the Canaris organization and its shortcomings. The Abwehr failed to detect the Russian build-up at Stalingrad and to report the potential landings of the Allied forces on the north African shores. The British had bombarded it with so many rumors of projected landings that the<sup>24</sup> Abwehr was totally confused as to where the Allies would land. Throughout the months immediately preceding the Allied landings in Sicily, it predicted the main assault would come in the Balkans. The Abwehr never realized that its entire network of agents in Britain had been penetrated by British counter-intelligence and all of the information collected by these agents was disinformation supplied by the British Secret Intelligence Service. Not only were agents turned in Britain but also in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

Canaris was so severely criticized he rarely visited Hitler's bunker even though he was the head of military intelligence. His singular conduct of affairs in which officers were compelled to act, and in which his officers intrigued and denounced each other prevented the organization from reforming itself after its early failures. Training was deficient and inductees to the Abwehr were usually reservists who had no connection whatsoever with intelligence or espionage. They could not recognize the significance and value of the information received from their outstations.

It was in their field operations that the Abwehr was really weak. These stations which the "A" Force and London used to communicate information to Berlin were overly bureaucratic and they had low standards with no supervision from the headquarters. The controllers at these stations were easy to bribe by foreign intelligence services. Some of their field agents dreamed up their information. The station in Athens in particular fed the Abwehr with fictitious reports and agents in the Middle East. Canaris became aware of some of these scandals and hushed them up rather than following through and cleaning out the useless and dangerous. Western adversaries considered the Abwehr especially corrupt in areas where these agents were exposed to La Dolce Vita: Lisbon, Madrid, Istanbul and other stations in the eastern Mediterranean. Throughout the war, the British feared a collapse of the Abwehr due to its inefficiency and its consequent loss to Allied deception operations. In addition to the field operations, there was no lack of corruption at the headquarters in Berlin: smuggling of foreign currency, bribes, etc.

Although the German intelligence system may have lost its credibility and, so with it, missed the 'story', Hitler, forced to be his own intelligence analyst, was susceptible to the deception which was even more dangerous for the Germans.

One could almost believe that Canaris and some of his staff were actually working for the Allies. In fact, Major General Oster, one of Canaris' principals, was a major player in the conspiracy against Hitler and, like Canaris, was executed in May 1945 as a result of the attempt on Hitler's life in July 1944. There is some evidence that Canaris undermined the Nazis and selectively transmitted or withheld information from Hitler.<sup>27</sup>

David Kahn in his "Hitler's Spies" makes the point that throughout the war, German intelligence was guilty of catastrophic failures and the basic factors which prompted these failures were: arrogance, aggression, power struggles within the officer corps, the authoritarian structure of the Nazi state, and anti-Semitism.<sup>28</sup>

There is overwhelming evidence that German intelligence was doomed to fail and a primary cause was their national style, their attitude towards intelligence and their perception of their role in the world. It was the genius of the Allies that they recognized this and attacked their intelligence through the use of deception throughout the war. But deception has not been confined to ruses played against the Germans. Americans have used it in the Civil War against other Americans, the Germans used deception against the British in Operation Sea Lion and against the Russians in Operation Barbarossa during World War II,



the Israelis deceived the Egyptians in 1967 and the Egyptians deceived the Israelis in 1973. The German Operation Sea Lion is interesting in that, originally in 1940, the operation was a genuine plan for the invasion of the British Isles, but as Hitler's attention turned to the east, Sea Lion became a deception played both on the British and the Russians to mask Operation Barbarossa. Additionally, the British perhaps realized Sea Lion was not possible and used it to deceive their own people of an 'invasion' in order to ensure continued alertness on the part of the citizenry and continued support of the American government and public<sup>29</sup> for the British.

As a whole, German intelligence was not as good as either Allied intelligence or even that of its Ally, the Italians, in the Mediterranean. However, the Germans were capable of intelligence coups and deception during the war as Patrick Beesly demonstrates in his book about Naval operations in the Atlantic<sup>30</sup> during the Second World War. Allied successes in deception can not be totally blamed on the failure of German intelligence. The important point to be learned from the study of deception is that any nation can be deceived and those who think they will not are probably more vulnerable than those who concede some weaknesses and take steps to prevent or reduce the chance of occurrence. The Whalley study illustrates the inevitability of the success of deception from Suz Tzu's philosophy in the fifth century B.C., up to modern times and is the best illustration of the seventh theory: any nation can be deceived. While recognizing the limitation of the case studies presented in this work, deception can not fail. Accepting this, one would also have to accept the

deduction that follows: not using deception is throwing away an advantage to the enemy.

What can we learn about the organization or lack of organization of deception during World War II? Was deception successful as a result of a particular kind of organization?

Before we look at the Allies, it may be useful to learn what the Germans did or did not do with the problem of deception. It is true that the deception played against the British and the Russians was inspired by Hitler, however, there was no comparable German organization to "A" Force and Ops "B". There was no coordinating organization and each unit worked in isolation; there was no definition of responsibilities between military groups. There was no central agency, no top command coordination. Simply put, either Hitler originated it or there was no deception on a large scale because there was no organization for it. <sup>31</sup> This is in sharp contrast to the organization which evolved under the Allies during World War II.

Before going on, one must be reminded that the organization of deception during World War II evolved over several years from 1940 to 1943, and it continued changing until the end of the war. There was ample time to allow for this evolution -- the next war may not allow for that luxury.

Deception in World War II was directed and coordinated from the highest levels of the government and the military. The LCS in London provided the strategic global policy which was to be carried out by the various theaters in coordination with one another. The LCS was a small group of innovative thinkers who

worked directly for the British Chiefs of Staff and who kept very close to the strategic plans of the civilian and military leaders. The individual theaters were responsible for the creation of operational level deception plans in concert with the strategic policy guidance. The theater deception organization was responsible for the execution of the plans and the nurturing of plans at the Army Group and Army for tactical deception purposes. Plans were submitted to the LCS by the Theater for approval and for coordination with other Theaters, and for strategic guidance. There was a loose federation of the deception planners and although they were directly responsive to the commander they remained very close to each other and coordinated a great deal with their parent deception organization. Tactical deception although subordinate to strategic and operational level policy was used more frequently, as the war progressed and confidence in it gained, by the Armies when in contact with the local enemy.

"A" Force was responsible for several theaters in the beginning in order to fill the void of a central coordinating body. As the organizations developed in London and Ops "B" was created, responsibility shifted away from "A" Force to the individual theaters. There was continuity between deception plans as there was continuity between Allied strategies for prosecution of the war. Plans were coordinated in order to ensure unity of purpose and elimination of contradiction of the 'story' being sold the Germans. The decision was made early in the operational planning to make use of deception. "A" Force insisted on the need to remain under operations and close to the

commanders so that 'stories' being sold would not uncover some real plans to the enemy and that the genesis of the deception plan would parallel the operational seed of the commander's plan.

The following quote states another side of the problem:

"Certainly, the tendency in the 19th and 20th century has been for the great majority of professional soldiers to either reject stratagem entirely or to avoid it by passing such an 'un-soldierly' task to the limbo of the secret services along with psychological warfare, covert operations and other black arts. While there are very good rational arguments for placing deception and, particularly, operations under the intelligence (or counterespionage) staffs, I suspect that this psychological factor has been at least as effective in assuring that placement. Moreover, it has almost certainly inhibited the effective integration of stratagem with routine operations planning. I suspect, for example, this might well prove to have been a contributing factor in the slow and still incomplete adoption of stratagem in military doctrine."32

The staffs designated for operational deception planning were dedicated staffs at the Theater and Army Group level. As well as doing the planning, they also participated in the execution by requiring operations, for example, to issue orders cancelling leaves or by requesting reconnaissance over a particular beach. In contrast to London where there were difficulties initially in coordinating the use of the double agents, "A" Force co-worked with MI-5 the double agents for deception purposes. "A" Force played a significant role in the execution as well as the planning. This brings us to our final theory for this chapter: deception should be organized and structured to parallel the military organizations which it supports rather than being left to the whim of a commander. The deception organization needs a short line to the commander in

order to know his plan and it must be part of operations. The deception plan is an integral part of the operational plan; it must be developed with the operational plan, not before or after it. At the operational level, the deception plan must be coordinated with other plans within the theater and with other theaters. And, finally, when operations consider a plan, they should also consider its affect on a recurring deception plan.

To conclude this organizational analysis, one more quote from Whalley is appropriate:

"The history of stratagem has been largely ignored since WW II -- stratagem was come to be widely treated as the modern and arcane province of the intelligence services. It's original and most effective form is at the central and highest levels of the military planning process".<sup>33</sup>

## CHAPTER IX

1. Martin Blumenson, Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 355.
2. Ronald G. Sherwin and Barton Whalley, "Understanding Strategic Deception: An Analysis of 93 Cases", in Strategic Military Deception, ed. by Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, p. 185.
3. Barton Whalley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War, pp. 253-254.
4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, p. 203.
5. Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, p. 4 and 19.
6. Interview with Professor Michael Howard, Oriel College, Oxford, England, 5 February 1986. Professor Howard's impression is that "deception was a complete bonus" for the Allies during World War II.
7. Albert N. Garland, Howard McGaw Smyth and Martin Blumenson, Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.
8. Carlisle, Barracks, Pa., US Army Military History Institute, Field Marshall Kesselring with Lieutenant General Westphal, "German Strategy During the Italian Campaign", MS #B-270: 11-12.
9. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
10. Ibid., pp. 47-48.
11. Theodore R. Sarbin, "Prolegomenon to a Theory of Counter

Deception", in Strategic Military Deception, ed. by Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, p. 167.

12. David Mure, Master of Deception, p. 233.

13. Washington, D.C. National Archives, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 218, Records of the JCS, CCS 385, Pacific Theater, JPS 560/2, Memorandum from the Joint Staff Planners, date 30 November 1944, subject: Deception in the War Against Japan.

14. Ibid., JCS 498/5, Memorandum from Joint Security Control, dated 1 August 1944, subject: Authorization for Deception Team to Work With Pacific Theater Staffs.

15. Donald C. Herbig and Katherine L. Herbig, "Propositions on Military Deception", in Strategic Military Deception, ed. by Daniel and Herbig, p. 14.

16. Cruickshank, p. 216.

17. Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service. The Making of the British Intelligence Community, p. 478.

18. Ibid., p. 516.

19. Basil Liddell Hart, "The Military Strategist", in Churchill Revised, p. 184.

20. A.J.P. Taylor, "The Statesman", in Churchill Revised, pp. 50-51.

21. Interview with Professor Michael Howard, Oriel College, Oxford, England, 5 February 1986.

22. Stephen Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, p. 219.

23. Heinz Hoehne, Canaris.

24. Ibid., p. 490.

25. Ibid., p. 491.
26. Ibid., pp. 493-494.
27. Ronald G. Sherwin, "The Organizational Approach to Strategic Deception: Implications for Theory and Policy", in Strategic Military Deception, ed. by Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig.
28. David Kahn, Hitler's Spies, p. 524.
29. Donald McLachlan, Room 39, p. 348.
30. Patrick Beesly, Very Special Intelligence.
31. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army Military History Institute, Harold Weberstedt, Oberstleutnant, "Deception Carried Out During the War on Higher German Command Levels", MS P-044c.
32. Whalley, p. 102.
33. Ibid., p. 262.



## CHAPTER X

### More Theory and Some Final Thoughts

"Few senior officers were gifted with imagination and idea of a deception plan as distinct from a cover plan. It meant having troops practice things (exercises) never intended to do, diversion of ships and aircraft, dispatch of large quantities of stores which were not to be used, special courses for warfare not to be practiced, printing of maps not to be used, issue of special clothing for areas they weren't going, issuing medical supplies, etc. Most thought it was new fangled and not worth their trouble." Dennis Wheatley, Member of LCS

The ninth theory is: Deception at the operational level of war is not improvised. If it is improvised, it is tactical deception and not operational. It is an important distinction; as campaign plans take time to develop, so does deception. All the ramifications must be worked out beforehand and its potential impact must be understood in light of policy and strategic guidance. It takes time to build the web and the operational planner must have patience. This brings us neatly to the tenth theory.

The tenth theory is: It is necessary to have a constant deception so that the threats and notional attacks can be believed in light of the capabilities. In other words, threats will be less liable to be accepted, if there is no appreciation for the capability. The Allies accomplished this during the

Second World War through the use of the bogus order of battle which was a continuing scheme developed to exaggerate strength in areas from which assaults could be launched.

The eleventh theory develops the idea of deception termination. The deception must be terminated in a way which does not arouse the suspicion of the enemy; there must be a plausible explanation put to the enemy why what he was expecting did not happen or why the enemy operational plan was changed at the last minute. It is absolutely essential to achieving multiple successes and was one of the secrets of the deception planners during the war.

The twelfth theory concerns conditioning the opponent by alternately raising and lowering his alert through threat, relax, threat, relax, etc. The Allies did this through the 'postponement' scheme of threatening an assault for 'x' day, postponing it for another day, postponing it for a second time and then launching the real attack during the let down of the last postponement. Threats of attack on an enemy have the affect of giving a reputation to his intelligence service of 'crying wolf', a dangerous reputation for any intelligence agency. In the heat and fog of war, where friction plays such an important role, the raising and lowering of the threat is natural enough without deception influencing the curve and the subsequent operational reaction.

One final theory, number thirteen, brings together several rather obvious techniques under the heading of natural intelligence exaggerations. It is natural for an intelligence organization to exaggerate enemy capabilities when there is a

lack of information. For example, it was easier to deceive the Germans during the war about the number and identity of divisions which were located furthest from their intelligence services. The further removed from the area of contact, the greater the degree of exaggeration by the Germans of WANTAGE bogus divisions. This was especially true of higher echelons and headquarters: the German intelligence services were much more likely to identify a Corps or an Army (incorrectly) than a division since the higher formations have no combat troops as such.

Deception is a non-physical attack on the enemy's command-and-control and intelligence network. Wavell's direction to Clarke in 1940 was to 'manufacture strength out of weakness: to organise by every available means the deception of the enemy high command'.<sup>1</sup> Deception is inconvenient for those who think it is a peripheral activity to the main fight, which it is. It will mean having men accomplish tasks which appear to be a waste with no obvious objective. Deception is like keeping two sets of books on resources: one being real and the other being real plus or minus some fakes. Deception is also risk taking. Churchill said the truth should be surrounded by a bodyguard of lies but Dudley Clarke said the deception plan is so precious it should be flanked with an escort of truths. The 'story' should contain<sup>2</sup> 90% truth so it can be verified. In order to sell your 'story', you may have to divulge a truth. This is especially difficult for those who think deception is simply good security in keeping the enemy unaware of what you are doing. Deception is a mind game played with the enemy. It is not for the weak of heart nor

the dull brained.

Deception can be learned but it also can be forgotten. Stonewall Jackson taught Henderson who tutored Allenby and Wavell who lectured Clarke. But Americans may have forgotten the diversions and feints and demonstrations of Jackson.

Although deception is an art, science can support it and science will become more important to deception as science becomes more important to waging war and to producing information.

The difference between strategic deception, operational deception and tactical deception can best be explained by the degree of maldeployment you want the enemy to achieve. Strategic deception answers the question: will the country fight and will it attack? Operational level deception focuses on the campaign: where will it be, when will it begin, how will it be fought, and what forces will the enemy use? Tactical deception deals with forces in contact and is perhaps more difficult because it is more 'ad hoc', that is, successful tactical deception is very opportunistic, and, unfortunately, may have, when not part of an operational plan, the smallest payoff.

Deception based on real potential operations is more likely to succeed but it is also the most risky to the deceiving force if it is necessary to revive the alternative. Deception plans should be possible, potential, eventual or rejected operational plans. Landings in southern France were sold as a deception in 1943, not very successfully, to the Germans but 'bought' back a year later in Operation ANVIL. Part of the deception for HUSKY included a potential for landings on Sardinia which was a very

real option studied by the AFHQ in early 1943. Operation BRIMSTONE, as it was known, actually was favored by Eisenhower. Attacks on Rhodes and the Dodecanese were objects of a continuing deception played against the Allies until late 1943 when the British actually landed forces there. These forces were later defeated and thrown off the islands.

Successful deception in one area may affect in a negative fashion a deception in another. Perhaps, the success of "A" Force in the Mediterranean in selling the story of the Balkan invasion materially affected the transfer of troops from northern France, which was the object of Plan STARKEY and other related deception plans in 1943. The notion being sold, unsuccessfully, to the Germans was a cross-channel operation that year.

It is important to reiterate: no deception plan ever won a war or a campaign or a battle. If the operational plan and its execution have flaws, no amount of good deception planning will overcome. The landings at Salerno and Anzio did not achieve the results desired because the operational planning was perhaps hasty, somewhat indecisive and, for the Anzio operation, the commanders did not take early advantage of the beachhead and strike inland. The deception plan is part of the operational plan and they should be conceived in tandem. Early planning is necessary in any operation but ample time may not be available. The planning for HUSKY was more complex and extensive, and time was very short for AVALANCHE. As events begin to move quickly, tactical deception operations will do the adjusting. The deception can still be successful especially if an ad hoc

operation is played against a background of a continuing long-term deception previously 'sold' to an enemy.

Intelligence analysts tend to over exaggerate and this is their most significant weakness. Deception plays on that aspect and is successful in part because of that weakness. Counter-deception should be based on a strong, constantly checking and rechecking, intelligence service which is challenging itself frequently. Whalley, however, points out that the irrefutable conclusion of historical evidence is that the deceiver is almost always successful regardless of the sophistication of his victim in the same art, i.e., deceivers can be deceived easily.<sup>3</sup> The suspicion is then that deception and counter deception organizations should be distinct organizations. Counter-deception should be an intelligence task assigned to the most inquisitive and challenging 'nay-sayers' available.

There are styles of deception which may vary from culture to culture.<sup>4</sup> For example, the deception in support of their invasion of France in 1940, Operation Barbarossa in 1941 and the Ardennes offensive in 1944, exhibited some characteristics which portray the German national style. Radio played the principal role; it was used to conceal the movement of units and to deceive their enemy into thinking units remained at their locations. Their modus operandi was the same in each operation and, significantly, it worked each time. Previous radio traffic patterns were continued for units which had moved and radio silence was used to<sup>5</sup> 'mask' the units at their new locations. For the Chinese, the deep lure and multiple stratagems traditionally are part of their military strategy. The Soviets style includes false war scare

and efforts to induce overestimation of their military capabilities.<sup>6</sup> Study of a national style can provide clues to the characteristics of a potential deception and allow for some preparation to offset the deception or to counter it.

Psychologically, it is more difficult to sell deception if one feels superior to a real or potential enemy. Additionally, a weakened enemy may not be able to respond to a threat and, therefore, the deception may be useless to pursue. Prior to the beginning of a war, it may be impossible to admit a relative weakness and, consequently, few nations which are victims of an aggression are prepared to deceive, whereas, aggressors usually employ deception as the opening salvo of a war.

Deception has an interactive nature to it that is emphasized as a war or campaign progresses. It is absolutely necessary to put oneself in the shoes of the adversary and attempt to determine what the enemy will do given certain information. Mure reports that one of Clark's basic theories of deception was that the deceiver must think about what he wants the enemy to do not what he wants him to think. The successful deceiver will feed the potential victim bits and pieces of information over a period of time and let the deduction be derived by the victim's intelligence service.

## CHAPTER X

1. M.R.D. Foot and J.M. Langley, MI-9 Escape and Evasion 1939-1945, p. 77.
2. David Mure, Practice to Deceive, p. 14.
3. Barton Whalley, Strategami: Deception and Surprise in War, p. 146.
4. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, "Propositions on Military Deception", in Strategic Military Deception, ed. by Daniel and Herbig, pp. 13-14.
5. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army Military History Institute, Hans von Griffenbert, General of Infantry, "Deception Carried Out During the War on Higher German Command Levels", Military Study P-044a.
6. Daniel and Herbig, pp. 13-14.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Christopher Andrew, War Majesty's Secret Service. The Making of the British Intelligence Community, Viking Press, 1985
- Patrick Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, Ballantine Books, 1981
- Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West, Hutchinson & Co., 1979
- Martin Blumenson, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969
- Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, Holmes and Meier Publishing, Inc., 1979
- Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, Harper & Row, 1975
- Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. The Hinge of Fate, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950
- Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Closing the Ring, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951
- Ronald Clark, The Man Who Broke Purple, Little, Brown & Co., 1977
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1967.
- Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, Oxford University Press, 1979
- Department of Military Art and Engineering, US Military Academy, Operations in Sicily and Italy, USMA, 1947
- Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Cassino to the Alps, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977
- M.R.D. Foot and J.M. Langley, MI-9 Escape and Evasion 1939-1945, Little, Brown & Co., 1980
- Albert N. Garland, Howard McGaw Smyth and Martin Blumenson, Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965
- Kent Roberts Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II, Robert E. Krieger Publishing Co., 1963
- Michael Handel, "Military Deception in Peace and War", in The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, The

Magnes Press, 1985

Michael Handel, "Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars", in Strategic Military Surprise, Incentives and Opportunities, ed. by Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, Transition Books

Michael Handel, "Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise", in The Journal of Strategic Studies, September 1984

Michael Handel, "Perception, Deception and Surprise, The Case of the Yom Kippur War", 1976

Basil Liddell Hart, The Decisive Wars of History, Little, Brown & Co., 1929

Basil Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, Paragon Books, 1979

Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968

Colonel G.F.R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, Longmans, Green & Co., 1906

Trumbull Higgins, Soft Underbelly, Macmillan, 1968

F.H. Hinsley, et al, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume II, Part I, Cambridge University Press, 1984

Heinz Hoehne, Canaris, Doubleday & Co, 1979

Michael Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968

Admiral Sir William James, The Codebreakers in Room 40, St. Martin's Press, 1956

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton University Press, 1976

Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Politics, Princeton University Press, 1970

R.V. Jones, The Wizard War, Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1978 (Also published as Most Secret War, Hamilton 1978)

David Kahn, Hitler's Spies, Macmillan, 1978

Ronald Lewin, American Magic, Farrar, Straus, Geroux, 1982

Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War, Arrow Books Ltd., 1980

Ronald Lewin, The Chiefs: Field Marshal Lord Wavell.

Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy, 1932-1947, Farrar,  
Straus, Geroux, 1980

Ronald Lewin, The Other Ultra, Hutchinson & Co., 1982

J.C. Masterman, The Double-cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945, Yale University Press, 1972

Harold MacMillan, The Blat of War 1939-1945, Harper & Row, 1966

Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1942-1944, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958

Donald McLachlan, Room 39, Atheneum, 1968

Military Intelligence Division, US War Department, German Military Intelligence, University Publishers of America, 1984

Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr., Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle, World War II, Stein & Day, Inc., 1985

Brigadier C.J.C. Molony, et al, History of the Second War: The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume V, H.M. Stationery Office, 1973

Ewen Montagu, The Man Who Never Was, Evans Brothers, 1953

Ewen Montagu, Beyond Top Secret Ultra, Peter Davies, 1977

Samuel Eliot Morison, History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, vol XI, The Invasion of France and Germany, 1944-1945, Little, Brown & Co., 1947-1962

Samuel Eliot Morison, History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, vol IX, Sicily - Salerno - Anzio January 1943 - June 1944, Little, Brown & Co., 1947-1962

David Mure, Master of Deception: Tangled Webs in London and the Middle East, William Kimber, 1980

David Mure, Practice to Deceive, William Kimber, 1977

Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954

Hugh Pound, Sicily, William Kimber & Co., 1962

Jacques Robichon, The Second D-Day, Walker, 1969

Stephen Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, William Morrow & Co., 1978

Theodore R Sarbin, Prolegomenon to a Theory of Counter De-

- ception, ed. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L Herbig,  
Strategic Military Deception, Pergamon Press, 1981
- Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith,  
Oxford Press, 1963
- Sir Archibald Wavell, Allenby: A Study in Greatness,  
Oxford University Press, 1940-1944
- Viscount Wavell, Allenby in Egypt, Oxford University Press,  
1940-1944
- Barton Whalley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War,  
Unpublished, 1969 (Center for International Studies,  
MIT)
- Barton Whalley, Codeword BARBAROSSA, MIT Press, 1973
- Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, Harper & Row, 1952
- F. W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret, Harper & Row, 1974

## GLOSSARY

ABWEHR - German Secret Intelligence Service.

ABWEHRSTELLE - German outstations for contact between Berlin and agents in the field.

AFHQ - Allied Forces Headquarters. Eisenhower's headquarters for invasion of north Africa, Sicily and the Italian mainland.

"A" Force - the Allied deception organization headed by General Dudley Clarke which was responsible for deception in several theaters and which attached its units to military formations for general deception support. Existed 1940 to 1945.

ALERT - double agent in Lebanon.

ANVIL-DRAGOON - the Allied codenames for the invasion of southern France on 14/15 August 1944.

ANIMALS - partisan/SOE raids against Greek coast to distract Germans directly prior to landings in Sicily.

ARSENAL - tactical (sonic) diversions in support of the Sicily landings

AVALANCHE - the Allied codename for the amphibious landings at Salerno on 9 September 1943.

BARBAROSSA - the German operation for the invasion of Russia in June 1941.

BARCLAY - the deception plan for the Mediterranean Theater and Middle East for 1943 which included the deception for HUSKY.

BAYTOWN - Invasion of southern Italy via Messina, September 1943.

BOARDMAN - interim Mediterranean Theater deception plan for the period July through September 1943 which threatened Sardinia, southern France, and an attack on the Peloponnese in late September. Prelude to Salerno landings.

BODYGUARD - Allied deception policy for 1944 which included guidance for Normandy invasion.

BOOTHBY - Allied deception plan for the landings on the Italian mainland in September 1943.

BRIMSTONE - Allied plan for invasion of Sardinia.

BUTTRESS - Invasion of southern Italy planned but not executed. Replaced by BAYTOWN in September 1943.

CASCADE - the bogus order of battle for 1942 and 1943.

CCS - Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CHEESE - double agent in Egypt.

CINC - Commander-in-Chief.

COCADA - overall Allied deception plan threatening invasion of northwest Europe in 1943.

COSSAC - Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander. Lt Gen Morgan's planning group for OVERLORD. Became SHAEF when Eisenhower was assigned as Supreme Allied Commander.

CROFT-CONSTABLE - Clarke's alias for operations.

DIADEM - Spring 1944 offensive against Gustav line and advance on Rome.

Echelon "D" - the equivalent to "A" Force in India. Headed by

Peter Fleming. Initiated by Wavell when he was CINC for southeast Asia.

EL GITANO - double agent in North Africa.

FAIRLANDS - intermim Mediterranean Theater deception plan from September through November 1943 which threatened a landing in October between Elba and Gaeta Bay, a landing in November between Livorno and Spezia, and a threat against Rhodes and Crete. Used to disperse German forces arrayed against Clark's 5 (US) and Montgomery's 8 (BR) Army following landings at Salerno.

FERDINAND - "A" Force deception plan in support of landings in southern France featuring a threat to Genoa.

FORTITUDE SOUTH - Allied deception plan to divert German attention to Pas de Calais as the Allies invaded Normandy.

FRACTURE - Naval feint associated with landings in Sicily.

GALVESTON - Clarke's alias for intelligence.

G.H.Q. - General Headquarters, a British term.

GOBLET - Invasion of Italy, planned but not executed, 1943.

HIPPO - 5th (US) Army deception operation in August 1944.

HUMBLE - double agent in Syria.

HUSKY - Allied codename for the invasion of Sicily on 10 July 1943.

ISSB - Intelligence and Special Security Board.

JEWEL - double agent in North Africa.

JCS - (US) Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JIC - (British) Joint Intelligence Committee which was the highest level intelligence group responsible for

intelligence estimates and policy.

JSC - (US) Joint Security Control. A small group of senior intelligence officers in Washington responsible for coordination of deception and security for the US. It was a part of the JCS.

LCS - London Controlling Section which was a small group of staff officers responsible for generating global deception policy for the British Chiefs of Staff. Existed 1941 to, at least, 1945. Headed by Colonel Stanley and Colonel Bevan.

LEMON - double agent in North Africa.

MEF - Middle East Forces. British Theater Command, headquartered at Cairo and headed by Wavell and Wilson during periods of World War II. Amalgamated into Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean with AFHQ in 1944.

MINCEMEAT - a one-time deception played on the Germans in support the Sicily invasion. False documents, giving away the invasion as occurring in the Balkans and Sardinia, were found on a dead courier's body which was found off the coast of Spain. The documents were copied and found their way to Berlin. See Ewen Montagu's book "The Man Who Never Was".

MI-5 - British Counter-espionage. B Branch specifically tasked with double agents.

MI-6 - British Secret Intelligence Service or SIS.

MI-9 - British escape and evasion of POWs organization.

"N" Section - the part of "A" Force responsible for escape and evasion of Allied prisoners of war during World War II.

NEPTUNE - Allied plan for the landings at Normandy, 6 June 1944.

NUNTON - AFHQ/AAI deception plan for Anzio landings which



threatened landings at Livorno at the end of January 1944.

OAKFIELD - deception plan of 15 Army Group (November - December 1943/4) to induce Germans to withdraw south of the line between Civitavecchia to Pescara to the north by threatening northwest Italy (Genoa) and a landing on the Adriatic coast east of Bologna.

OB SUEB - Oberhefeshoher Sued, CINC South

OKH - the German High Command for ground forces. Oberkommando der Heeres.

OKW - the German Armed Forces High Command. Oberkommando der Wehrmacht.

OSS - Office of Strategic Services. Predecessor of CIA. Headed by Colonel Donovan during World War II.

OTTRINGTON - AAI deception plan August 1944 which threatened Genoa and a land advance to Ravenna.

OVERLORD - the Allied codename for the attack across France after the landings in Normandy, 6 June 1943.

PAIC - (British) Persia and Iraq Command.

PESSIMISTS - double agents in the Middle East.

PWE - Political Warfare Executive. British propaganda and subversive literature organization.

PRO - Public Record Office in London.

QUICKSILVER - double agent in Lebanon.

"R" Force - name of deception unit assigned to Montgomery's 21 Army Group for invasion of Normandy.

RAM - double agent in North Africa.

SACMED - Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

SEAC - Southeast Asia Command. Wavell's command in India.

SHAEF - Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. Main Allied headquarters from late 1943, specifically for invasion of continent in June 1944.

SHINGLE - Allied codename for landings at Anzio 22 January 1944.

SIME - Security Intelligence Middle East, the MI-5 organization which with "A" Force controlled the double and fake agents in the Mediterranean, Middle East, PAIC and Africa.

SIS - British Secret Intelligence Service or MI-6.

SOE - Special Operations Executive. British agents for work behind enemy lines.

TINDALL - fictional operation to contain Germans in Norway, 1943.

TURPITUDE - Allied deception plan in support of invasion of Normandy in 1944. The deception planners moved (notional and real) formations to northern Syria and made extensive use of radio to give the impression of a large force ready to enter Turkey and threaten the Balkans.

ULSTER - Allied deception plan for the attack on the Gothic line in August 1944.

ULTRA - codename for special intelligence which was derived by breaking German codes and reading traffic between major German military formations, and which the Germans thought was secure. British cryptologists at Bletchley Park provided translations and messages for the Allied commands during World War II.

VENDETTA - AFHQ deception plan in support of landings in southern France (ANVIL-DRAGOON) which featured a threat against

Genoa.

"W" Board - a British group of high ranking military and civilians who initially were set up to control the double agents but which was found to be too much of high level to work the double agents on a day-to-day basis. It gave way to the XX Committee.

WADHAM - large scale (notional) amphibious operation threatening the Britany coast 1943.

WANTAGE - the bogus order of battle for 1944.

WAREHOUSE - the deception plan conceived by "A" Force for the Middle East in 1943, largely incorporated into Plan BARCLAY.

WHISKERS - double agent in North Africa.

XX or 20 Committee - British committee which controlled the double agents. The committee was chaired by John Masterson and included representatives from all the intelligence services in London. The entire system was known as "The Double Cross System" and it was essentially British control of German agents who were turned around to work for the Allies.

ZEPPELIN - the "A" Force strategic and operational deception plan for the Mediterranean Theater and the Middle East for 1944.

30 Committee - committee in the Mediterranean and Middle East equivalent to XX Committee in London. Probably located in Cairo; had stations throughout the area which communicated directly with Abwehr outstations.

TABLE ONE  
CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE

MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONAL AND DECEPTION PLANS

DATE -----	OPERATION -----	DECEPTION -----
Dec 1940	Sidi Barrani	(nameless)
Sep 1942	El Alamein	BERTRAM and subsidiary plans: DIAMOND, BRIAN, MUNASSIB, MARTELLO, MURRAYFIELD, and MELTINGPOT
Nov 1942	TORCH (North Africa)	SOLO II, PENDER I, PENDER II, SWEATER, and QUICKFIRE
1943	Theater-wide Bogus Order of Battle	BARCLAY CASCADE
Jul 1943	HUSKY (Sicily)	BARCLAY MINCEMEAT WAREHOUSE ANIMALS ARSENAL FRACTURE
Sep 1943	AVALANCHE (Salerno) & BAYTOWN (Messina Crossing)	BOARDMAN, BOOTHBY
Sep-Nov 43	Italian Campaign	FAIRLANDS OAKFIELD
1944	Global Theater-wide Bogus Order of Battle	BODYGUARD ZEPPELIN WANTAGE
Jan 1944	SHINGLE (Anzio)	NUNTON
May 1944	DIADEM (Gustav Line) Anzio Breakout	no name HIPPO
May-Jul 1944	OVERLORD	TURPITUDE
Aug 1944	ANVIL-DRAGON (Southern France) Gothic Line	FERDINAND, VENDETTA, and (IRONSIDE) OTTRINGTON/ULSTER

TABLE TWO  
GENUINE ORDER OF BATTLE FOR HUSK"

FORMATION	EMBARK	LANDING
8 British Army (Force 545)		
-----		
5 Infantry Div	Suez	ACID NORTH
50 Infantry Div	Alexandria	ACID SOUTH
231 Inf Brigade	Haifa	BARK EAST
51 Infantry Div	Tunisia/Malta	BARK SOUTH
1 Canadian Div	UK	BARK WEST
78 Infantry Div	Sousse/Sfax	Reserve
1 Airborne Div	Kairouan	Reserve (except for troops used in initial assault)
46 Infantry Div	Tripoli	Reinforcing
7 US Army		
-----		
45 Division	US to Oran	CENT
1 Division (less 1 RCT)	Algiers	DIME
3 Division	Tunis/Bizerta	JOSS
2 Armored Division (less 1 ACT, plus 1 RCT fm 1 Div)	N. Africa	Floating Reserve
9 Division	-	Reinforcing
82 Airborne Div	Kairouan	Reserve (except for troops used in

TABLE THREE  
 BOGUS ORDER OF BATTLE FOR EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN  
 PLAN BARCLAY

FORMATION	EMBARK	LANDING/DATE
West Crete Force - BARK EAST -----		
231 BR Inf Bde & attached troops	Egypt & Cyrenaica	Western Crete/24 July
46 BR R.T.R	"	"
7 BR Abn Bde of 4 BR Abn Div (dummies)	Cyrenaica	"
Peloponexse - ACID NORTH -----		
Hqs 13 BR Corps	Suez & Haifa	Araxos-Patras Area/26 July
5 BR Inf Div	"	"
HQ 4 BR Armd Div	"	"
3 BR C.L.Y.	"	"
24 BR Fd. Regt	"	"
66 BR Med Regt	"	"
BR No. 1 Svy. Bty	"	"
BR S.R. Sqn (ME. SAS Regt)	"	"
3 BR Commando	"	"
Peloponese - ACID SOUTH -----		

6 BR Parachute Bde                      Cyrenaica Kalamaia Area/25 July  
     of 4 BR Abn Div  
     (dummies)

50 BR Div                                Suez &      Kalamaia Gulf/26 July  
    Alexandria

44 BR R.T.R.                            "            "

98 BR Fd Regt                          "            "

Peloponese Force - BARK SOUTH  
 -----

Hq BR 30 Corps                        Malta        Zante Island/26 July

51 BR Div                               "            "

Hq BR 23 Armd Bde                    "            "

50 BR R.T.R.                           "            "

11 BR R.H.A.                           "            "

456 BR Lt Bty                          "            "

7 BR Med Regt                          "            "

4 BR Abn Div (less                    Cyrenaica Corinth Area/26 July

two Bdes)

(dummies)

8 BR Armd Div                          Cyrenaica Kalamaia Gulf/27 July

(dummies)                              & Egypt

78 BR Inf Div                          Malta        Araxos-Patros/28 July

(BR rsv div)

56 BR Inf Div                          Tripoli      S. Morea/Follow-up

3 BR Corps                              Egypt        Morea/Follow-up

(2 New Zealand, 1

Greek, 10 Ind Div)

TABLE FOUR  
 BOGUS ORDER OF BATTLE FOR WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN  
 PLAN BARCLAY

FORMATION	EMBARK	LANDING/DATE
<u>Corsica Force - BARK WEST</u>		
1 Canadian Div	UK	Ajaccio/31 July
One Can. Tank Regt	"	"
40 BR R.M. Commando	"	"
41 BR R.M. Commando	"	"
142 BR Fd. Regt	"	"
70 BR Med. Regt	"	"
1 Canadian Army	"	N. Africa for Ajaccio/30 July
Tk Bde less 1		
Tk Regt		
<u>Corsica Force - CENT</u>		
32 US Abn Div	Tunisia	Ajaccio/30 July
less troops allotted		
to initial assaults		
Force 343		
45 US Inf Div	Oran	Floating reserve for either
		Corsica or Sardinia
107 US CA. Gp	"	"
753 US Tank Bn	"	"
4 US Ranger Bn	"	"
Sardinia Force - JOSS		



3 US Div	Bizerta	Palmas Bay/31 July
3 US Ranger Bn	"	"
CC "A" 2 US Armd Div	"	"
20 US Engr Regt	"	"

Sardinia Force - DIME

Hqs 2 US Corps	Oran	Pecora Area/31 July
1 US Div less	Algiers	"
1 R.C.T.		
1 US Ranger Bn	"	"
70 US Tank Bn	"	"
82 US Abn Div troops	Tunisia	Villacidro/1 Aug

Southern France


1 BR Airborne Div	Constantine	Marignane/4 Aug
Hqs 6 US Corps	Casablanca	Port de Bouc/4 Aug
9 US Inf Div	Oran	"
34 US Inf Div	Bizerta	"
4 BR Inf Div	Tunis	Cassis/4 Aug
less 1 Bde Gp		
1 Bde Gp of 4	Tunis	Ciotat Bay/4 Aug
BR Div		
Hqs 5 BR Corps	Bone	Endoume/5 Aug
46 BR Inf Div	Algiers	"
1 BR Inf Div	Tunis	"
6 Br Armd Div	Bone	Endoume/6 Aug

Southern France - KOOL  
-----


2 US Armd Div	Oran	Port de Bouc/6 Aug
less 1 A.C.C.		
1 R.C.T. 1 US Inf Div	"	"
1 US Armd Div	Casablanca	Port de Bouc/7 Aug
Hq BR 8 Army	N. Africa	Marseilles/Mid-Aug
9 BR Corps	"	"
10 BR Corps	"	"
19 French Corps	"	"

# ORGANIZATION CHART # 1

## DECEPTION ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN - 1943




# ALLIED ORGANIZATION FOR INVASION OF SICILY (LAND FORCES)




PROPOSAL\* FOR  
DECEPTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN  
LATE 1943/EARLY 1944

"A" FORCE HQS  
CAIRO



EAST/WEST SPLIT  
\* NEVER ADOPTED

DECEPTION ORGANIZATIONS IN THE  
MEDITERRANEAN MID-1944



- (1) CONTROLLED OUTSTATIONS IN  
ROME, NAPLES, BARI, ALGIERES,  
TUNIS & GIBRALTAR
- (2) CONTROLLED OUTSTATION AT  
BEIRUT
- (3) PLANNING - INVASION OF  
S. FRANCE

DECEPTION ORGANIZATIONS IN THE  
MEDITERRANEAN OCT 1944

